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Perspectives on Science and Culture
Kris Rutten, Stefaan Blancke, and Ronald Soetaert
This edited volume in the Comparative Cultural Studies Series explores the 
intersection between scientific understanding and cultural representation from 
an interdisciplinary perspective. The contributions in this volume analyze pop-
ular representations of science and scientific discourse from the perspectives of 
rhetorical criticism, comparative cultural studies, narratology, educational stud-
ies, discourse analysis, the cognitive sciences, and naturalized and evolutionary 
epistemology. As such, the volume fits within the theoretical and methodolog-
ical framework of comparative cultural studies as a contextual approach to the 
study of culture from an interdisciplinary perspective. The main objective of 
this volume is to explore how particular cognitive predispositions and cultural 
representations both shape and distort the public debate about scientific con-
troversies, the teaching and learning of science, and the development of science 
itself. Theoretically, this volume will integrate, on the one hand, C. P. Snow’s 
concept of the two cultures (science versus the humanities) and Jerome Bruner’s 
confrontation between narrative and logico-scientific modes of thinking and, on 
the other hand, cognitive and epistemological approaches to human cognition 
and culture, including science.
From this unique conciliatory framework, the volume explores how narra-
tives and other cultural representations transform complex scientific issues into 
digestible bits of information based on particular selections and deflections. 
Some of the contributions analyze how scientific representations and metaphors 
of science take shape in pictures, cartoons, and television broadcasts, but also 
in novels and popular magazines. Others specifically focus on the implications 
of these representations and (mis)understandings for science education, both in 
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formal and informal educational settings. Thematically, the contributions focus 
on a wide range of current debates about evolutionary theory, global warming, 
genetic modification, and so on. As such, it indirectly engages with discussions 
pertaining to the politics of science. The aim of this volume is to engage in the 
ongoing debate about the public understanding of science and is original in its 
interdisciplinary scope, ranging from philosophy, cognitive psychology, anthro-
pology, and biology to literature, cultural studies, and rhetoric.
Public Understanding of Science
There has been increasing attention on the valorization of scientific research, in 
combination with a growing public debate about the uses and applications of sci-
entific findings for social and economic purposes (Benneworth and Jongbloed). 
Media coverage of scientific findings plays an important role in shaping the 
public understanding of science and as such creates a context for socio-ethical 
debates about the application and development of scientific research (van Dijck). 
However, the communication of science is always, inevitably partial and this 
partiality raises issues of authority, creates potential misunderstandings, and 
complicates the public debate about science (Tietge). One of the main aims of 
science communication and programs aimed at increasing scientific literacy is to 
create a better public understanding of science and to emphasize its wider rele-
vance to society (Gross, “Roles”).
Science communication often consists of a one-way flow from scientists to 
the general public by accommodating scientific findings to a nonexpert audience. 
Such a unilateral approach is indeed important for transferring relevant scientific 
knowledge to society but runs the risk of disregarding the contexts that give sci-
ence its public significance and the ambiguities that arise from particular framings 
in the public debate (Gross, “Roles” and Rhetoric). Public concerns and opinions 
from stakeholders are often seen as (unwarranted) anxieties or vested interests 
rather than “assets” that have a role to play in the debate about scientific develop-
ments and applications (Bauer; Bauer, Shukla and Allum). There is an entangled 
and reciprocal relationship between science and society and therefore there is a 
need for a better understanding of the accommodation of scientific findings from 
experts to lay audiences, for an understanding of the different positions in the sci-
entific and the public debate, and for an integration of scientific developments and 
the needs of society (Fahnestock; Gross, “Roles” and Rhetoric; Tietge, Rational).
For example, there is an ongoing body of research on the public under-
standing of genetics. Although there have been vast scientific advances in DNA 
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technology, the socio-ethical and the legal and political debates still remain very 
contested and ambivalent. In her seminal work, Imagenation, José van Dijck has 
shown that the public imagination of genetics has undergone an important trans-
formation during the decades that this branch of scientific research took shape, 
as the synopsis of her book notes: “From news stories of DNA strings escaping 
from our laboratories to the ongoing debates over bioethics, from James Watson 
and The Double Helix to the Human Genome Project, Van Dijck portrays the 
‘imaginary’ tools of genetics as players in a theater of representation — a multi-
layered contest in which special interest groups and professional organizations 
mobilize images in a heated debate over the meaning of genetics” (van Dijck). 
Popular representations of genetics do not necessarily reflect the advancement of 
genetic technology but these cultural accounts offer the repertoires and images 
with which different stakeholders debate the social, legal, political, and moral 
issues related to genetics research.
Rhetoric of Science
In this volume, rhetoric is introduced as one of the approaches to studying the 
public understanding of science. Rhetoric is the study and practice of persua-
sion. Scientists are inevitably engaged in the process of persuasion both within 
the academic community and outside, in public forums which need to be con-
sidered as different rhetorical situations (Simons; Harris; Journet). The focus 
of “new rhetoric” has expanded to many discursive domains, including science. 
There is a growing body of work on the rhetoric of science (Gross, “Roles” and 
Rhetoric; Gaonkar, “Idea”; Fahnestock; Harris; Simons), which focuses on the 
rhetoric of the scientific article (Gross et al.), the role of metaphors in the com-
munication of science (Journet), the popularization of science (Tietge), and 
the critical assessment of emerging technologies (Zappen). As Alan Gross has 
argued, “The rhetorical view of science does not deny ‘the brute facts of nature’; 
it merely affirms that these ‘facts,’ whatever they are, are not science itself . . . 
Whatever they are, the ‘brute facts’ themselves mean nothing; only statements 
have meaning, and of the truth of statements we must be persuaded. These pro-
cesses, by which problems are chosen and results interpreted, are essentially 
rhetorical: only through persuasion are importance and meaning established” 
(Gross, Rhetoric 4).
The application of rhetorical studies to science has also been used to analyze 
the discourse of popular culture and how it relates to complex social phenom-
ena such as the proliferation of pseudoscience (Gunn) or antipsychiatry (Rutten 
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et al.). The rhetoric of science studies how scientists — as part of a discursive 
community — frame and communicate their knowledge, what they argue 
about and how, how scientists present their findings, and what genres, formats, 
and media they use to communicate those findings (Ornatowski). Despite 
the growing body of scholarship on the rhetoric of science, there is a need for 
further development of rhetoric as a framework for the public understanding 
of science, specifically given the increasingly mediatized public debate in an 
expert-dominated society (Fahnestock; van Dijck). A rhetorical approach to 
scientific discourse studies how particular framings of scientific findings and 
developments influence the socio-ethical debate, how this relates to science pol-
icy, and how an awareness of the rhetorical dimensions of science is important 
for scientific as well as nonscientific audiences and what the educational dimen-
sions are of such a rhetor ical awareness.
Two Cultures
In this volume, we also discuss the ongoing confrontation between science and 
the humanities by focusing on C. P. Snow’s concept of the two cultures (and the 
so-called science wars) and Jerome Bruner’s confrontation between narrative and 
logico-scientific modes of thinking. The concept of the “two cultures” refers to 
C. P. Snow’s famous 1959 essay in which he problematized the gap between liter-
ary intellectuals and scientists. Until today, the concept has survived as a trope to 
frame the debate between the humanities and science. The notion of the two cul-
tures was also central in the work of the educational psychologist Jerome Bruner, 
who confronted two modes of thought, two modes of cognitive functioning, 
each rendering different and distinctive ways of constructing reality and order-
ing experience: the logico-scientific mode and the narrative mode. For Bruner, 
these two modes are complementary though irreducible to each other and both 
have different operating principles, different criteria of well-formedness and dif-
ferent procedures for verification. The main difference is that logico-scientific 
arguments need to convince by applying procedures for establishing formal and 
empirical proof, and that narratives can convince of their lifelikeness by verisi-
militude (Rutten; Rutten and Soetaert).
The logico-scientific mode of thinking focuses on general and empirically 
tested truths, and the knowledge that it produces should not be contradic-
tory. The narrative mode, on the other hand, focuses on the intentionality of 
human actions (what and why?) and the context in which these actions took 
place (where and when?). From the narrative perspective, truth is approached 
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as situated or contextual. Indeed, as Bruner states, “the imaginative application 
of the paradigmatic mode leads to good theory, tight analysis, logical proof and 
empirical discovery guided by reasoned hypothesis. . . . The imaginative applica-
tion of the narrative mode leads instead to good stories, gripping drama, [and] 
believable (though not necessarily ‘true’) historical accounts” (13; also qtd. in 
Rutten and Stoetaert). It is not the aim in this volume to evaluate the differ-
ence between these two modes of thought. Indeed, Bruner himself has already 
pointed out the problematic aspect of this strict distinction between two modes 
of cognitive functioning (for an extended discussion of these two modes see 
Rutten; Rutten and Soetaert). However, based on Bruner’s theory of narrative 
as a specific mode of knowing, the aim is, among others, to study what can be 
learned from narratives and to explore how narratives can be used as tools to 
thematize and problematize the distinction between the two cultures.
Cognitive Science
Besides rhetorical and narrative approaches to the study of science and culture, 
this volume will also introduce perspectives from cognitive science. Cognitive 
science comprises several disciplines such as artificial intelligence, psychology, 
and philosophy that treat the mind as an information-processing organ. Decades 
of research have made it clear that the mind can only perform that function if it 
holds particular expectations about the world. If it did not, the mind would be 
absolutely clueless as to which information to attend to and how to handle it. 
An important category of such expectations is “intuitive ontologies,” which are 
spontaneous assumptions and inferences about the causal structure of particu-
lar domains of reality (Boyer). For example, folk physics deals with inanimate 
objects, folk biology is concerned with the living world, and folk psychology 
guides our inferences about agents. These intuitions work fast, automatically, and 
under the radar of conscious awareness, but they do exert an important influence 
on the beliefs we hold reflectively, both at the individual and at the cultural level.
The epidemiology of representations, developed by cognitive anthropologist 
Dan Sperber, explains how the susceptibilities of the human mind shape and 
constrain the formation and distribution of beliefs. Ceteris paribus, the represen-
tations that tap into our intuitive expectations stand a better chance of grabbing 
attention, being remembered, and transmitted. Played out over multiple trans-
missions, these representations will become the most popular within a particular 
population. In other words, they will become cultural. Intuitive ontologies, too, 
fix a lot of cultural content as they affect our beliefs about the world around us. 
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These beliefs might be intuitively appealing but they are usually not scientifically 
accurate. Creationist stories, for instance, tap into our folk biology and psychol-
ogy, but hardly provide an adequate explanation for the origin and the diversity 
of species (Blancke and De Smedt).
For that reason, a proper understanding of human cognition in general 
and intuitive ontologies in particular is essential for the study, understand-
ing, and improvement of science education, the public understanding of science, 
and even science itself. The minds of students and lay people are not blank slates 
that can simply be inscribed with any input. Instead, they come equipped with 
naive conceptions of the world, which constitute formidable cognitive obstacles 
for teachers and popularizers to overcome (Shtulman). Recently, much research 
in cognitive and developmental psychology, philosophy, and the history of sci-
ence has been done on how intuitive ontologies make possible and thus influence 
the development, understanding, and acceptance of scientific theories and con-
cepts (Carey and Spelke; Carruthers et al.; Evans et al.; Heintz; Nersessian). This 
volume aims to make a contribution to this literature and tease out the implica-
tions for the development, teaching, and understanding of science.
Naturalized, Social, and Evolutionary Epistemology
The philosophical tradition of naturalized epistemology takes seriously the 
insights from the cognitive sciences to understand the processes of knowledge 
generation and acquisition. As evolved biological creatures, humans have only 
limited cognitive and sensory abilities. In order to overcome these limitations 
and to develop and sustain counterintuitive scientific concepts, scientists rely 
on all sorts of help such as observational tools (e.g., telescopes), conceptual tools 
(e.g., analogies), and reasoning tools (e.g., logics). For that reason, philosopher 
Susan Haack describes science as common sense, but “more so” (101). One 
important scaffold is criticism by others. It is natural for us to look for argu-
ments and facts that confirm rather than contradict our position. Hence, to have 
our views corrected, it is crucial that we submit them to the critical eye of our 
peers, who are similarly predisposed to defend their own ideas, but who are very 
happy to detect any errors in the beliefs and arguments of others (Mercier and 
Heintz). Science is thus necessarily and inherently social. To understand how sci-
ence works, therefore, one needs to investigate how the social dimension adds to 
the development of scientific knowledge. This is the domain of social epistemol-
ogy, to which rhetorical, historical, and sociological studies of science have made 
important contributions. These studies have clearly demonstrated that scientific 
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insights do not result from rigidly applying the scientific method, but emerge 
from the interactions among fallible human beings. However, in contrast to pop-
ular postmodernist and relativist interpretations, the social character does not 
infringe upon, but rather results in and corroborates science’s epistemic strength 
(Goldman; Haack; Longino).
Evolutionary epistemology is the strand of naturalized epistemology that 
focuses on the evolutionary dimensions of knowledge generation. This philo-
sophical project comes in various shapes. Evolutionary epistemologists such as 
Donald Campbell, Karl Popper, and David Hull have argued that science pro-
ceeds in ways analogous to biological evolution. Various hypotheses provide the 
variation from which the ideas and beliefs that best fit the world are selected and 
retained. Recently, however, the focus has shifted to the study of the implications 
of evolutionary approaches to the human mind for our understanding of science. 
How do our evolved abilities and constraints affect the course of science? More 
broadly, the term “evolutionary” also refers to a populational view that aims at 
explaining the distribution and stability of particular beliefs and ideas within 
the scientific culture. An epidemiology of representations enables us to identify 
and map the various causal factors, including our evolved abilities and the specif-
ics (e.g., institutions, social arrangements, artifacts) of the environment that the 
minds of scientists engage with. As such, an epidemiological approach opens the 
way towards the integration of the various studies of science, and consequently, 
of the humanities, social sciences, and biological sciences (Heintz).
Consilience
Because of its interdisciplinary scope, this volume underwrites the reconciliation 
of rhetorical, narrative, cognitive, and epistemological perspectives — although 
some of the contributing authors are still skeptical. Whereas the rhetoric of sci-
ence investigates which communication tools and strategies scientists deploy to 
convince others, cognitive science helps to shed light on why scientists use these 
particular tools and strategies and not others and why some, but not others, are 
successful. More fundamentally, a cognitive approach also helps to explain why 
arguments play such an important role in science, science communication, and 
education: they are constitutive of human reasoning — that is, of providing (con-
vincing) reasons to persuade someone else of one’s views (Mercier and Sperber; 
Sperber and Mercier).
Cognitive science also makes a valuable contribution to the debates about 
the two cultures in the sense that it puts doubt on the existence of a sharp 
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boundary between the two. Cognitive approaches to science assume that scien-
tific thinking builds on ordinary cognition. Hence, there is no essential property, 
no silver bullet by which one could distinguish scientific from so-called other 
ways of reasoning. Scientists, too, rely on narrative thinking and other intuitive 
means of reasoning to develop their counterintuitive theories. This is not to deny 
that scientific cultures differ from other kind of cultures — science has its own 
institutions, organizations, procedures, and so on — but a cognitive approach 
implies that the difference will not be as clear-cut as the traditional two-culture 
approach suggests. An epistemological project that integrates the cognitive and 
cultural dimensions will enable us to develop a fine-grained understanding of the 
various scientific cultures, how they generate knowledge, and the similarities and 
differences between them. At the same time, it helps to explain what happens to 
scientific concepts outside these cultures, when transmitted to the larger public 
via (popular) science communication and education.
Contributions
In part 1, “Narrative and Rhetorical Perspectives,” the volume brings together 
new work on the public understanding of science from the perspective of liter-
ature, narratology, cultural studies, anthropology, and rhetoric. In his chapter, 
“Experiencing Nature through Cable Television,” David J. Tietge explores the 
relationship between cable television representations of nature and biology and 
how they influence the public understanding of environmental networks. The 
author argues that the metaphors, delivery, content, and orientation of such pro-
gramming are guided by what Kenneth Burke calls an “occupational psychosis,” 
a collective orientation that mirrors the economic principles of the culture in 
which such “edutainment” has been produced. More specifically, he is interested 
in how cable nature programming frames nature entertainment as a commer-
cialized product that is to be consumed, capitalized on and expanded. According 
to Tietge, the anthropocentric nature programs discussed in his chapter start 
from the ideal that giving the audience what it wants — by relating to familiar 
ideological orientations such as war, conflict, and competition — is more profitable 
than representing nature from the traditional perspective of orthodox biological 
science. Representing nature as a product thus inevitably affects public attitudes 
about nature and the environment. In the final section, Tietge therefore argues 
that there is a need for a “rhetorical literacy” which would include “instruction 
on all educational levels in language structure; close critical readings of popular 
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texts, including cable nature programs; how logical arguments are constructed; 
what can be done with existing knowledge and how new knowledge can be made; 
and how people, agencies, corporations, and other institutions all have rhetorical 
reasons for presenting knowledge in a preordained way.”
In his contribution, “Steven Pinker and the Scientific Sublime: How a 
New Category of Experience Transformed Popular Science,” Alan G. Gross 
argues that although the rhetoric of science has become a vital subfield within 
rhetorical studies — a field within which he has been working for a long time 
already — the rhetoric of popular science has been largely ignored. Alan Gross 
has recently been working on a book project entitled The Scientific Sublime: How 
Popular Science Unravels the Mysteries of the Universe, in which he explores the 
popularization of science by (contemporary) scientists and science writers such 
as such as Steven Weinberg, Richard Feynman, Stephen Hawking, Richard 
Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould, Brian Green, Rachel Carson, and Lisa Randall. 
He focuses on their argumentative skills to persuade the general audience about 
how science can answer fundamental questions about the human being and 
the universe, amongst other topics. Gross argues that these authors employ an 
overarching rhetorical concept, the sublime, as a category of experience that 
generates a sense of wonder at the discoveries of science. In his contribution to 
this volume Gross starts from this larger project and develops a critical analysis 
of the work of Steven Pinker. The sublime, he claims in this chapter, is a persua-
sive resource that is being used by Pinker and other scientist-popularizers. The 
author argues that Pinker’s major works share a single overriding assumption: 
“science can be relied on to shed significant light on subjects far removed from 
the laboratory or the observatory and can astonish us by its revelations about 
language, about the mind, about human behavior generally, and about violence 
in particular.” Gross argues that the scientific sublime is invoked and evoked in 
each of these works.
Although this specific reading and analysis of the work of Pinker is of course 
open to debate and discussion (and the work of Pinker and the topics he explores 
in his popular books have been discussed from many different perspectives), it is 
an example of a critical assessment and analysis of the rhetoric of popular science 
and popular scientists. It also exemplifies the complexity of bringing scientific 
debates to a larger audience through popular science.
In his chapter, “Architectonic Discourses and their Extremisms,” Barry 
Brummett starts from the question: “What can humans know with some mea-
sure of confident certainty, and what can we know that must always be largely 
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contingent, exigent, and — in a word — arguable?” Taking Aristotle’s distinction 
between discourses that offer sure and certain systems to guide distinctions, and 
those discourses (primarily rhetoric and dialectic) that manage decisions that are 
contingent and uncertain, Brummett explores a range of discourses that have 
historically claimed to be architectonic, or ruling, discourses. The author claims 
that the extremism consists not in resorting to sure and certain systems to guide 
decisions, but instead in resorting to these systems to guide decisions that ought 
to be decided rhetorically. The extremism in architectonic discourses is illus-
trated in a brief analysis of a website opposing childhood vaccinations. Brumett 
argues that the search for an architectonic discourse is a natural human desire. 
However, his contribution can be read as a plea to take any architectonic dis-
course with a great deal of caution.
In his chapter, “Science and the Idea of Culture,” Richard van Oort 
argues that the conflict between the sciences and the humanities should not 
be understood in terms of the local “cultural” differences between scientists 
and humanists (C. P. Snow’s “two cultures”), but rather in terms of the more 
fundamental problem of language origin: “Is language an extension of animal 
communication systems, or is it something radically different? Is it explain-
able in purely Darwinian terms, or is it an evolutionary anomaly (i.e., without 
precedent in evolutionary history)?” Van Oort argues that when it comes to 
explaining culture, science inevitably presses up against its limits. The central 
paradox of culture, according to van Oort, is that culture depends upon biol-
ogy — “because culture requires brains and brains are the products of biological 
evolution” — but at the same time culture is also an institutional given. Van Oort 
starts by discussing the work of C. P. Snow, who criticized humanists for failing 
to take an interest in the work of their colleagues in the sciences and concurs that 
a genuine dialogue between humanists and scientists is rare. But van Oort argues 
that the problem of human origin (and specifically language origin) is one area 
in which dialogue seems both desirable and necessary, because it concerns both 
parties alike: “the sooner humanists recognize their stake in this fundamental 
question, the sooner they will be able to overcome their anxiety about the func-
tion of the humanities in a culture that privileges science as the only form of 
‘serious’ cognition.”
In their contribution, “A Rhetorical Analysis of the Two Cultures in 
Literary Fiction,” Ronald Soetaert and Kris Rutten reconstruct the debate 
between and about the “two cultures” from a rhetorical perspective (focusing 
on “science wars” and perspectives from the “third culture”). Science and liter-
ature are described as particular terministic screens and the binary oppositions 
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between these different “ways of seeing” are problematized. The major focus is 
on the importance of rhetoric and narrative in general and the role and function 
of the humanities — literary culture — in particular. The authors analyze two 
novels (Saturday and The Children Act) as a case study to reflect upon how the 
novelist Ian McEwan problematizes and thematizes the confrontation between 
art and science. They argue that McEwan participates in the debate about the 
two cultures with novels with essayistic ambitions on the one hand, but that he 
accommodates scientific facts and arguments into his prose on the other hand. 
The fact that these McEwan novels are vehicles that reflect upon the relation 
between art and science implies that he uses the novel as an allegory to discuss 
major social and cultural problems. The works of McEwan that are discussed 
in this chapter can be read as part of an ethical turn in literature and a revival 
of humanism in twenty-first century literature. Both novels reflect upon (and 
defend) traditional humanistic values in general and the function of literature 
in particular.
In his chapter, “The Missing Link and Human Origins: Understanding an 
Evolutionary Icon,” Peter C. Kjærgaard argues that in the history of evolution-
ary theory no single topic has attracted so much attention and caused so much 
public debate as the question of human origins. In the discussions following the 
discovery of hominin fossils in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries the idea of the missing link between humans and animals turned into what 
has historically become one of the most powerful icons of evolution. Until the 
mid-twentieth century, however, both adherents and critics of evolution hailed 
the missing link as a crucial proof of the correctness of the theory of human 
evolution. It continued to be a hot topic in public debates and as such a good 
selling point for popular science books equally exploited by journalists, profes-
sional science writers, and scientists. Despite the fact that the idea of a missing 
link as a necessary piece of evidence for human evolution bears no meaning in 
contemporary science, it is wrong to think that is has no relevance. The missing 
link’s lasting effects on public understanding of human evolution has made it far 
more than a mere cultural product and as such it continues to be a problem in 
public engagement. This chapter presents a brief history of the missing link as an 
evolutionary icon in popular and scientific contexts.
In part 2, “Cognitive Perspectives,” the contributions focus on how findings 
and insights from within the cognitive sciences can help us to understand and 
improve the public understanding of science. In her chapter, “Suspicion toward 
Science and the Role of Automatic Intuitions about Origins,” Elisa Järnefelt 
argues that skeptical public attitudes to evolutionary theory and climate change 
xx Introduction
are anchored in the intuition that nature has been purposefully created by a 
supernatural being. As people will not easily revise their intuitive beliefs about 
these issues, scientists face the enormous challenge of finding ways to override 
them when communicating with the public. She concludes with a couple of sug-
gestions in regards to science education and communication.
In her chapter, “Bridging the Gap: From Intuitive to Scientific Reason-
ing — The Case of Evolution,” Margaret Evans examines the use of intuitions to 
jump-start more sophisticated reasoning, as has been proposed for mathemat-
ics. The question addressed in this chapter is whether core intuitions can also 
jump-start biological reasoning. Intuitive ideas can offer an immediate action 
plan that allows us to make a rapid appraisal of the human mind or the natural 
world. Yet, there is a downside, such as a reliance on what may be inaccurate 
scientific judgments, based on cognitive predispositions such as anthropomor-
phic or essentialist reasoning. Studies conducted with museum visitors will be 
used to support the argument that specific cognitive predispositions can both 
help and hinder understanding. Margaret Evans argues that core intuitions can 
provide a series of stepping-stones, which, if navigated with care, may promote 
science learning.
The chapter by Andrew Shtulman, “Missing Links: How Cladograms 
Reify Common Evolutionary Misconceptions,” provides an excellent example 
of how thinking tools can enforce rather than override intuitive misconcep-
tions. Developed as a conceptual tool to understand common ancestry and 
phylogenetic relationships, cladograms also tend to strengthen several popular 
misconceptions about evolution. This chapter focuses not on what the clado-
grams represent, but on what they fail to represent: extinction, diversity, and 
variation. These omissions are unproblematic in a scientific concept but they lead 
people to miscomprehend these three important evolutionary concepts.
In the final chapter of this section, “Representations of the Origin of Species 
in Secular (France) and Religious (Morocco) Contexts,” Dominique Guillo 
reveals the complexity of people’s ideas concerning evolution. In France, people 
who claim to accept evolutionary theory hold views that in fact come very close 
to intelligent design, which they share with nonevolutionists in Morocco. This 
shows the perpetual influence of cognitive biases. However, Guillo also finds 
that people’s representations of the origin of species are often blurry and cannot 
be compared to the well thought out beliefs of evolutionary biologists. Instead of 
treating the blurriness as noise that needs to be removed to get at people’s true 
beliefs, scientists might better regard it as characteristic of people’s representa-
tions of the origin of species.
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In part 3, “Epistemological Perspectives,” we consider the epistemolog-
ical implications of the social and cognitive aspects of science. In his chapter, 
“Updating Evolutionary Epistemology,” Christophe Heintz considers Donald 
Campbell’s evolutionary epistemology and specifies why it is a worthwhile proj-
ect for explaining the evolution of science as a specific case of cultural evolution. 
However, he also criticizes Campbell’s evolutionary epistemology for assuming 
that blind variation and selective retention is the process through which science 
evolves. This assumption, the author argues, is at odds with much of what we 
know about scientific cognition and the history of science. Heintz therefore pro-
poses an updated research program for evolutionary epistemology, which faces 
new challenges.
The following chapter, “Intuition in Science Education and the Public 
Understanding of Science,” by Stefaan Blancke, Koen Tanghe, and Johan 
Braeckman, examines the role of intuition in science communication in general. 
They start from the double role intuition plays in science itself: as a cognitive bias 
it detracts scientists from finding out about the real world, but as a scaffold it is 
indispensible for the construction of highly counterintuitive scientific concepts 
and theories. This double role puts science communicators in a peculiar position. 
On the one hand they need to develop educational tools, practices, and strategies 
to avoid the pitfalls of our intuitive reasoning; on the other hand they need to 
appeal to the very same intuition to instill a scientific understanding in their 
audience. As a result, some approaches that seem promising at first may turn out 
to have the opposite effect.
In the final chapter, “Vindicating Science — By Bringing It Down,” Maarten 
Boudry and Massimo Pigliucci argue that there is no stark difference between the 
social and the rational. Nor is it the case that true beliefs are self-evident and that 
only flawed beliefs require a causal explanation. Instead, if we want to explain sci-
ence’s epistemic superiority, we need to take into account the factors that allow 
for and sustain the development of scientific beliefs, including the social.
Part 4 contains a thematic bibliography on narrative, rhetorical, cognitive, 
and epistemological perspectives on science and culture.
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Part 1
Narrative and Rhetorical Perspectives
The application of rhetorical and narrative approaches to science have been used 
to analyze the discourse of popular culture and how it relates to complex social 
phenomena such as the proliferation of pseudoscience or antipsychiatry. The rhet-
oric of science studies how scientists — as part of a discursive community — frame 
and communicate their knowledge; what they argue about and how; how sci-
entists present their findings; and what genres, formats, and media they use to 
communicate those findings. Despite the growing body of scholarship on the 
rhetoric of science, there is a need for further development of rhetoric as a frame-
work for the public understanding of science, specifically given the increasingly 
mediatized public debate in an expert-dominated society. A rhetorical approach 
to scientific discourse studies how particular framings of scientific findings and 
developments influence the socio-ethical debate, how this relates to science pol-
icy, and how an awareness of the rhetorical dimensions of science is important for 
scientific as well as nonscientific audiences and what the educational dimensions 
are of such a rhetorical and narrative awareness.
In part 1, this volume brings together new work on the public understand-





Experiencing Nature through Cable Television
David J. Tietge
Abstract
This chapter discusses the relationship between cable television repre-
sentations of nature and biology and the influence they wield over public 
understanding of environmental networks. The metaphors, delivery, content, 
and orientation of such programming are driven by what Kenneth Burke 
calls an “occupational psychosis,” a collective orientation that mirrors the 
economic principles of the culture in which such “edutainment” has been 
produced. More specifically, the author is interested in how cable nature pro-
gramming leaves us with nature entertainment as a product — a distinctly 
commercialized thing to be consumed, a franchise to be capitalized on and 
expanded. Just as Disney did before them, the anthropocentric nature pro-
grams discussed in this essay reflect an ideal that giving the audience what 
it wants — by tapping into the ideological orientations like war, conflict, 
and competition they already possess — is more profitable than representing 
nature from the stodgy seat of orthodox biological science. Moreover, the 
chapter addresses the outcomes of representing nature as a product and how 
this affects public attitudes about nature and the environment.
The nature documentary, as a genre, has a long mass media history and has taken on 
a range of forms, from the anthropomorphized Disney wildlife film shorts of the 
of the mid-twentieth century to the twenty-first century cable animal serials that 
represent what I like to call the “Savannah Gladiatorial Games.” In between, there 
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are many subgenres, each with its own signature and each employing some greater 
or lesser degree of scientific authority, depending on the intended audience and 
purpose of the program. Consequently, each generic form conveys a particular set 
of rhetorical messages, some more exacting in the rigors of production than others, 
but all geared toward an attempt to bring us closer to nature in some vicarious way. 
In our high-tech, largely urban and suburban culture, the natural world is seen as 
something remote and uncommon, and this sense of remoteness contributes to the 
public’s inability to understand nature in terms that aren’t corrupted by this orien-
tation. While some nature documentaries try very hard to act as a corrective to this 
alienation from nature, others perpetuate the myth that nature is ours to conquer, 
control, and transform into a human image. Yet other programs seem orchestrated 
strictly for their entertainment value, a kind of reality TV for the wilderness, while 
still others are written for political, scientific, or educational purposes. All such pro-
grams carry ideological assumptions that, when critically unpacked, reveal some very 
important motives and objectives on the part of the producers, directors, and play-
ers in these natural dramas, and provide a fascinating cross section of the American 
mind-set concerning the natural world and our relationship to it.
While there are seemingly countless cable programs dedicated to animals, 
there are just as many dedicated to natural phenomena like severe weather and 
natural disasters. One show, Whale Wars, is less about whales per se, and more 
about the personalities of the ecological soldiers who protect them from the rav-
ages of whale poaching. The Deadliest Catch, likewise, tells us virtually nothing 
about the Alaskan king crab or its behavior (except that it is a difficult species 
to fish for) but all about the dangers to humans while fishing for them in the 
Bering Sea under extremely cold and hazardous weather conditions. In both 
of these shows, the focus is on the drama among the humans — not the animal 
that has gathered them together towards a common goal. The narrative revolves 
around such questions as: Will the new deck hand work out? Should we board 
the whaler or merely try to scare the ship off? Will we reach the catch quota and 
make a profit? There are other programs that focus on the human theatrics of 
being in an unfortunate “natural” situation, be it severe weather, an inhospitable 
environment, or a confrontation with wild animals. This category of programs is 
one that is not strictly anthropomorphic (assigning to nature human attributes), 
but anthropocentric, that is, centers on human individual and social troubles in 
wild environments or under extreme conditions and, most significantly, maps 
our behaviors and expectations onto natural contexts.
To help theoretically frame this idea of how we receive representations of 
nature relates to how we, as members of a capitalistic, technological society, tend 
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to also frame the world within terms that reflect the interests of production 
and consumption. In Permanence and Change, Kenneth Burke borrows John 
Dewey’s notion of “occupational psychosis” to explain this concept, noting that 
“the term corresponds to the Marxian doctrine that a society’s environment in 
the historical sense is synonymous with the society’s methods of production” 
(38). In its most primitive form, occupational psychosis reveals itself through a 
preoccupation with the main source of food for a self-contained group (Burke 
uses the example of “tribes”), such that this form of sustenance manifests itself 
symbolically and conceptually in everything the tribe does. If fish are a staple 
for a given tribe, fish and fishing become a major — even central — topic of con-
cern running through the culture: art, religion, music, dress, and so on. In more 
developed civilizations, the occupational psychosis becomes more complex and 
abstracted, such that members of society are often unaware of the origins of their 
worldview, despite the fact that they voice that worldview symbolically through 
their language all the time. If wealth, technology, and ownership are central to 
our economy, we will routinely express ourselves in terms that reflect these inter-
ests, including in our choice of entertainment.
Therefore, it is theoretically important for this essay to notice how the two 
most dominating American orientations of science and capitalism are philo-
sophically couched in a common assumption about the materiality of the world; 
both are concerned with the physical, objective “reality” of human existence, and 
therefore, how nature can be understood and manipulated for physical ends. 
Nature programming, then, must submit to certain epistemological “truths” 
that shape how such knowledge is presented in a media venue tethered to an 
economic imperative that forces nature programming into generic categories for 
prescribed viewers. Such attitudes have political and educational ramifications 
for how the general public perceives debates that concern the natural world, how 
we understand the science behind these debates, and the policies we make to 
address our most pressing environmental problems.
With the increasing popularity of so-called reality TV in the last decade 
or more, we can expect that most educationally oriented cable stations like 
Discovery, The Learning Channel, NatGeo, the Science Channel, and oth-
ers would have to submit to the demographics that drive cable ratings for all 
channels. America’s occupational psychosis determines the framing of the con-
tent for these education channels, which have been pressured to conform to an 
“edutainment” format that meets the needs and preferences of today’s television 
viewer. The nature shows that air regularly on these stations reflect a confor-
mity to “intense,” “extreme,” and “ultimate” themes, identifying superlative 
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characteristics in animals, environments, weather, or natural disasters that pro-
vide the dramatic backdrop for the program’s content. A rather curious example 
of this kind of framing is a program shown on the History Channel called 
Serial Killer Earth, which is a clear case of an anthropocentric structure pitting 
humans against nature in a kind of planetary dragnet, such that it represents 
an anthropomorphizing of the earth itself and all the forces it can summon 
for human destruction. We need only look at the show’s title to see that calling 
the earth a “serial killer” is bizarrely inappropriate, but is deliberately geared to 
attracting an audience segment increasingly obsessed with murderers, serial kill-
ers, and other social deviants. Strangely, this trend in cable formatting indicates 
a regression to some of America’s earliest attitudes about nature, a time when 
the first American settlers from Europe saw the frontier as uninviting, hostile, 
dangerous, and even freakish.
A quick glance at the episode titles and descriptions bears this out further. 
The episode “Death by Dust Storm” features “apocalyptic dust storms” that “suf-
focate cities around the globe”; it also features “a tornado chasing a family, nearly 
crushing them with their truck” and further mayhem as “Mother Nature con-
tinues to wreak havoc,” as though she were a criminal still at large. In “Mudslide 
Massacre,” a twister “targets” a truck driver in Oklahoma and a volcano “smoth-
ers” Indonesian citizens. The verbs used to describe these natural occurrences 
assign willful actions and motivated intent, but it is difficult to tell just how 
metaphorically the audience is supposed to take such narrative accounts. Even 
if viewers see the language only as a metaphorical shorthand, such a framing 
device elicits a sense of victimhood and helplessness at the hands of a sentient 
force, thus distorting the true unpredictability of climactic and geological events. 
While scientists look to climate change as one factor in more frequently severe 
weather, the cessation of global greenhouse emissions and other environmen-
tal measures will never eradicate catastrophic storms, tornados, or earthquakes 
entirely. The negative personification of physical phenomena promotes an odd 
association with the natural world as something to be feared and ultimately as 
something that cannot be stopped. Perhaps the strangest episode title is “When 
Lakes Attack,” conjuring images of lakes becoming animated through a super-
natural transformation and striking out against enemy humans in some Lord of 
the Rings epic. The idea that we are at war with nature is implied in “Tornado 
vs. Airport,” as though there has been a deliberate battle arranged to determine 
a conclusive victor between these two “combatants.” The notion that the earth 
is conscious — and malevolent — seems misplaced in the twenty-first century, 
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harkening back to a time when superstition about natural forces ruled human 
attitudes about its relationship to us. But of course the most basic aim of such 
tactics is to increase ratings by attempting to quench American entertainment 
bloodlust and our fixation on all things violent and “extreme.” From a produc-
tion and time slot perspective, shows like Serial Killer Earth must compete 
with other cable programming that adopts the same base attitude about what 
it is we want in our entertainment, so nature is transformed into an entity of 
ruthless evil. In a word, such programming becomes simple product, packaged 
to conform to the collective associations triggered by our culture of nationalism, 
ownership, law and order, and war.
The themes of attack, war, and battle reveal the colonial side of our occu-
pational psychosis: Americans’ tendency to think in militaristic metaphors. 
We have wars on everything — drugs, crime, women, poverty, Christmas, even 
God — and cable TV nature documentarians seem to be tapping into this cul-
tural orientation. Some TV documentaries, such as NatGeo Wild’s Caught in 
the Act, are reminiscent of gladiatorial games. The animals are usually exotic 
(giraffes, hippos, tigers, lions, rhinos) and large, pitted against one another in 
incongruous ways (a giraffe attacking a rhino, for example). Crossing the generic 
boundary between nature documentary and high-contact, extreme sports, there 
is an ancient Roman quality to the spectacle, with its focus on the exotic, the 
spectacular, and the violent. We are a society that loves to see a fight, and what 
could be more exhilarating than witnessing two large, wild animals go after one 
another? Showcased in these episodes are themes like “Clash of the Cheetahs,” 
“Elephant Battleground,” “Wild Dog Attack,” and “Cannibal Octopus.” Most 
of the footage is provided by amateur photographers who serendipitously hap-
pened to be in a prime spot to capture an unusual shot, but often it is of poor 
quality and compensated for by jerky, quick-cut editing and supplemental foot-
age spliced in. Most episodes are not overly sensationalized, however, and many 
of the situations that have been “caught” on film are truly unusual or unexpected, 
like the video of a pride of lions attacking an adult mother hippo and, eventually, 
its calf (there is another example where a “coalition” of three cheetahs perform a 
similar assault on a wildebeest). It is uncomfortable to watch, and the narrative 
accompanying the video is supplied almost entirely by the person shooting the 
footage (in this case an amateur naturalist photographer living in South Africa) 
and generally avoids the temptation to moralize. For this series, then, there is an 
incongruity between interpretive vantage points. Whereas the photographer’s 
narration stresses how unusual just such a spectacle is (lions normally do not 
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attack full-grown hippos) and how surprised he was to have been able to capture 
it on film, the production mantra for the whole series, according to its website, is 
that it “teaches us that nature doesn’t always play by the rules.”
Or consider the footage of a lion attacking a mongoose, a creature perhaps 
one-fiftieth the size of the lion. The mongoose, caught helplessly in the claws of 
the lion (which appears to be playing with it more than attempting to eat it), 
fights back viciously in its terror and takes the lion by surprise. When the mon-
goose escapes the big cat’s clutch, the smaller animal lunges at it until it finds 
an opening and scurries heroically down a tunnel. The narrating photographer 
is amazed at the mongoose’s tenacity, and declares that “nature always teaches 
me something new.” Amazing as the footage is, again the lesson is consistent 
with the defining rule of survival — in this case, which was more threatened and 
which had the most to lose. This should not strike one as particularly “new.” 
For the lion, the mongoose was little more than a morsel, and its casual toy-
ing with the small creature indicated its lack of commitment to such a modest 
meal, as it could have crushed it with its jaws or ripped it open with its claws any 
time it wanted. For the mongoose, it was a mortal battle for its own existence, 
and it unleashed a fury borne of the desperation to save its own life. While it 
is indeed surprising that it escaped, the evolutionary law of the jungle remains 
unbroken — survive any way you can.
Assigning such rules to the wild is one way of engaging our occupational 
psychosis, since it reflects our desire to superimpose moral order onto a system 
that is intrinsically amoral. Steven Jay Gould, in an essay called “Nonmoral 
Nature,” argues that this is a conceptual mistake, since it reflects more about our 
need to impose ethical meaning onto nature than it does any scientific reality 
about how nature actually operates (60). But still other popular nature programs 
of note highlight the preoccupation with warlike scenarios and life-threatening 
situations. NatGeo airs a program called Dangerous Encounters, where herpetol-
ogist (reptile specialist) Dr. Brady Barr locks horns with dangerous wild animals 
like crocodiles, snakes, wild boars, and sharks. Animal Planet features shows 
like I Shouldn’t Be Alive, a survivalist drama whereby the ordeals of people who 
have survived natural horrors are interviewed and their stories are recreated, and 
Swamp Wars, in which, according to Animal Planet’s website, “Miami-Dade Fire 
Rescue Venom One battles the alligators, constrictors, and other lethal animals 
that threaten South Florida.” The Discovery Channel airs programs like Man 
vs. Wild, another survivalist show with host “Bear” Grylls going “face to face 
with the grueling task of navigating remote locations, sharing invaluable survival 
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strategies along the way.” The Science Channel runs Monster Bug Wars to empha-
size the brutality of the insect world, where “a host of ruthless bugs as bizarre as 
they are lethal slug it out in real-life battles to the death. Witness epic encounters 
between swarms of marauding assassins, and vicious one-on-one clashes where 
only one bug survives.”
While such portrayals may make a certain practical sense if cable markets 
are competing for viewers, it also marks a symptom of social malaise about our 
collective condition. There is a disturbing pessimism running through our cul-
ture that seems to embrace the dark and the unpleasant, at least when it comes 
to our choice of visual distractions, as is evidenced by the sheer number of horror 
movies, violent action movies, violent thrillers, and war movies released in any 
given year. To map this collective fetish onto nature programs seems odd, to say 
the least, but perhaps the most important question is, what does it do to public 
perception about nature when it is portrayed as a battleground, or on a more per-
sonal level, a sentient fiend bent on human destruction? As a symptom of limited 
scientific literacy and misinformation about scientific discoveries, it appears that 
programs like Serial Killer Earth and Swamp Wars are exacerbating an already 
perilous condition by treating the human-nature relationship as a warlike strug-
gle for dominance instead of as a reciprocation, a kind of symbiosis between 
human and environment that contributes to the health of both. On a primal 
level, it is not hard to understand this attitude, since harsh environmental con-
ditions, unpredictable climate, and violent natural forces have always been part 
of the challenge to our survival, harkening back to a more ancient occupational 
psychosis. (It is little wonder that, extending from this, primitive and modern 
religions alike have attributed to natural disasters a sign of a god’s displeasure 
or a manifestation of God’s will.) But what the more militaristic man versus 
nature metaphor suggests is a rationalization for our control over nature, not a 
capitulation to the gods or a recognition that these powerful forces are part of 
our natural condition, not a separation from it. In typical American binary fash-
ion, our relationship with nature — with the earth — is a battle that must have 
two sides, a front, and an objective. This is neither a superstitious attitude nor a 
strictly rational one, but it has an internal logic given the assumptions implicit in 
the militaristic framework that contains the relevant anaologies (we fight to win, 
there is a good guy and an evil enemy, there is a threat that must be preempted, 
we must summon our technology, victory equals dominance).
Perhaps one of the main reasons such representations have potentially 
hazardous outcomes is linguistic, that is, pertaining to aspects of our language 
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system in which we have lost the capacity to distinguish from the purely literal; 
hence we mistake the metaphor for the thing itself. According to Chris Hedges, 
author of Empire of Illusion,
We are a culture that has been denied, or has passively given up, the linguistic 
and intellectual tools to cope with complexity, to separate illusion from real-
ity. We have traded the printed word for the gleaming image. Public rhetoric 
is designed to be comprehensible to a ten-year-old child or an adult with a 
sixth-grade reading level. Most of us speak at this level, are entertained and 
think at this level. (44)
Hedges’s statement may help explain why the producers of cable television nature 
shows have opted to portray natural phenomena in such a blatantly uneven 
and reductionistic way. By conflating everything to resemble some familiar 
type — celebrities or infamous criminals, for example — modern mass media has 
eschewed complexity of thought in favor of something everyone can “relate to.” 
This becomes a problem for functional (not to mention scientific) literacy, which 
Hedges documents as being in serious trouble in the US. According to his esti-
mates, nearly one-third of the US is illiterate or barely literate (unable to read 
above a fifth-grade level). Hedges explains that “the culture of illusion thrives by 
robbing us of the intellectual and linguistic tools to separate illusion from truth. It 
reduces us to the level and dependency of children. It impoverishes language” (45). 
Our linguistic and rhetorical deprivation has transformed the American citizen 
into someone who is engaged only by something familiar or something that can be 
easily and consistently mapped onto a personal belief system in some literal way. If 
the sophistication of literacy necessary for critical thought has been compromised 
or systematically stunted in the way Hedges claims, the problem is ultimately a 
failure of education in the face of overwhelming media mediocrity, and it explains 
why so many people make decisions that are against their own best interests and 
apply these same bankrupt decision-making patterns onto their choice of enter-
tainment and their attitudes about nature. It also explains why edutainment 
options are so exasperatingly limited. If a program doesn’t resemble other recog-
nizable formats very closely, it will not get watched because that would require a 
rhetorical acumen that simply doesn’t exist for the average American. If nature is 
not framed as a competition, a war, a crime, or a pugilistic conflict, chances are (so 
the logic goes) that cable programs dedicated to nature themes will fail.
A linguistic inadequacy as severe as Hedges describes makes producing any 
television program a simple matter of plugging certain details into a boilerplate 
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formula, but even the details are remarkably alike. That people can watch bland, 
indistinct programming episode after episode means that, in Hedges’ words, “we 
become trapped in the linguistic prison of incessant repetition” (49), and this rep-
etition is seen at every site of the mainstream media, whether in programming, 
advertising, news, or sports. For those who care to diverge from such generic cat-
egories and view something on one of the “education” channels, they will often 
find only a difference in content, not presentation. Personalizing nature and its 
forces is like getting to know the “characters” on a reality TV show — characters 
who are also blandly generic. We have an opportunity to “take sides” and pass 
judgment on humans, animals, and nature all at once. Scientific fact, logical 
coherence, and critical literacy become the casualties under such conditions, 
because there is no opportunity (or need) to employ them.
Paraded before the viewer in the battlefield nature narratives I’ve been dis-
cussing is the string of experts, some of whom are genuine, others a bit more 
dubious. This is of course intended to lend the narratives credibility, but the way 
expertise is employed by the producers often feels perfunctory. If the narrative 
involves a tornado in a program like Serial Killer Earth, the show may inter-
view a meteorologist who gives us general information about tornadoes — how 
powerful they are, how unpredictable they are, what conditions are necessary 
for tornadoes to form, the kind of damage they can cause, and so on — but 
such experts rarely comment on the content of the central narrative that is the 
main part of the show. They are there for lexical reference only, and they func-
tion as the arbiters of trivia about the phenomenon du jour. The inclusion of 
such experts actually contributes to the illusion instead of providing a skepti-
cal counterdiscourse for the framing of the narrative. Credentials for experts 
are often not mentioned or suspiciously vague, but in a culture that thrives on 
the illusion media manufactures for us, in a narcissistic need to see ourselves in 
everything we digest, all opinions become equally valid as long as they match 
our own expectations. Hedges notes: “When opinions cannot be distinguished 
from facts, when there is no universal standard to determine truth in law, in sci-
ence, in scholarship, or in reporting the events of the day, when the most valued 
skill is the ability to entertain, the world becomes a place where lies become true, 
where people can believe what they want to believe” (51). Experts, under these 
conditions, become mere window dressing for the legitimacy of the narrative, no 
matter how sensationalized, exaggerated, or otherwise distorted, to create the 
militant tone necessary for our “war with nature.”
While it is not my intent to condemn these programs as blatant propagators 
of out-and-out lies that contribute to the eradication of an enemy called nature, 
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there is a deception taking place in these narratives about the dangers we actually 
face and the causes behind them. One effect of the incessant repetition mentioned 
earlier is that we are caught in the illusion that the world is far more hazardous to 
us than it really is. The large number of programs, movies, and TV series show-
casing serial killers may lead one to believe that serial killers are lurking around 
every corner; likewise, the number of programs detailing the catastrophic expe-
riences of those caught in violent natural maelstroms may make us want to avoid 
going outside. There is also a solipsism in the idea that natural events are staged 
against humans for human entertainment, as if natural phenomena auditioned 
for the title of “most extreme” in order to satisfy the viewer’s voyeurism in watch-
ing people tormented by bad situations. When entertainment and education 
are conflated, the result can be the pervasive dissemination of bad impressions 
created by distorted information that may do more harm than good if people 
cannot distinguish those aspects which are sensationalized for entertainment 
effect from those that are intended to be instructional. Compounding this 
distortion further is the ever-increasing reliance on special effects and CGI tech-
niques to augment those components of a program that are more cumbersome 
(or impossible) to reconstruct using more traditional filmic methods. Media and 
cultural studies scholar Phil Bagust observes that the “nature documentary as a 
‘screen genre’ and an ‘industry sector’ has begun to respond to commercial pres-
sures to entertain a youthful, special-effects literate, computer-game playing and 
blog-empowered audience that has been socialized in a globalized world of rich, 
spectacular, kinetic, and often violent ‘virtual geographies’ ” (213).
Special effects are so prevalent in all programming these days that one 
should not infer that they are reserved only for cable nature programs, but they 
do have a unique effect when applied to this genre. Special effects are as old as the 
camera itself and have frequently been employed in documentaries going back to 
the earliest moving pictures. The camera, however, has always been touted as an 
instrument of science, and as such, photography has enjoyed a privileged recep-
tion when it comes to its apparent realism in depicting the objects under its gaze 
(215). “A picture is worth a thousand words” and “the camera does not lie” are 
truisms that reveal our faith in the realistic purity of photographic reproduction. 
The visualization of subjects through a photographic medium has always cre-
ated an illusion of intimacy with the subject matter because as a species we favor 
vision over all the other senses. One need only recall the story of one of the first 
cinematic displays at a theater, a very short film involving a perspective shot of a 
train heading straight toward the audience. As the story goes, some members of 
the audience were so convinced of its realism that they dove out of their seats or 
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bolted for the exit in order to avoid being hit by the photographic image! This 
reaction does seem odd to us today, as we are so accustomed to the virtual win-
dows of the theater or the ubiquitous television and computer monitor that we 
would never panic at the false impression of a cinematic train, but it does speak 
to the power of photographic media to summon such “magic.” And the realism 
of early photography was cartoonish by today’s standards — the grainy, black and 
white film used back then hardly even registers with us as photography today, 
yet we indulge in our own illusions, seeking that which we perceive as more and 
more “realistic.” The realism we recognize, however, is of an unusual order. CGI 
is used so much in film and television that we have confused its sleek, glossy fin-
ish with how we experience the world with our own senses. The “realism” can 
actually be attributed to the computer enhancement of colors, shapes, depth, and 
motion that we would never feel when making physical, sensual contact with 
the actual world around us. The use of color enhancement techniques is espe-
cially deceptive; the colors we see on high-definition televisions or computers, 
for example, are actually far more vivid than what we would see if we were view-
ing the subject directly. Our eyes register the colors of a computer interpretation 
of its target image, colors we mistake for the ones actually being recorded. The 
effect is a sense of reality that is more intense than the visual reality we experi-
ence when viewing the world.
To complicate matters further, there has been what Bagust calls a “blurring 
of boundaries” in contemporary television documentaries that creates a tension 
between the assumed objectivity of the documentaries and the need to acknowl-
edge the viewing preferences of an audience that seeks to be entertained. As he 
puts it, “with the arrival of new economic imperatives and new digital technol-
ogies of representation, not only have the barriers between ‘objective recording’ 
and ‘popular entertainment’ collapsed but so has ‘the fixity of the relationship 
between signified and signifier supposed by realism’ ” (217). That is, the relation-
ship between the subject being recorded and the person doing the recording is 
no longer distinct (we see this in so-called gonzo or POV techniques), as was 
the case with more traditional assumptions regarding the faithful and unstained 
reproduction of reality, and the audience is perhaps only vaguely aware of this 
new dynamic. One of the questions that necessarily arises from this shift is 
what is the threshold between fact and fiction whereby a program can still be 
considered a documentary? While the events in Serial Killer Earth are based 
on personal histories, they are dramatized to a degree where strict journalistic 
facts become far more pliable — and questionable. How should the audience 
determine which aspect of the portrayal should be taken as factual, which are 
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embellished or dramatized, and which are hypothetical or even fictional? The 
degree to which audiences today are able to negotiate these differences is hard 
to say. Sociologists have one measure, whereas television producers, though per-
haps relying on certain sociological determiners, tend to run by strict numbers 
and stats. Who watches a program and how often is far more important in the 
for-profit sector of cable television than whether or not the message being sent is 
properly interpreted.
The effect is similar among nature programs that rely heavily on a polished 
presentation over more substantial content, and this includes all of the shows 
mentioned here. The generic categories of nature program and reality TV, I have 
suggested, are becoming increasingly blurred. According to Daniel Beck et al., 
this blurring has occurred with documentaries generally, and we can trace a 
history of its development by looking at programs like Candid Camera, which 
was one of the first reality TV programs — in fact, one of the first TV programs, 
period, first airing in 1948 — that modeled an attempt to bring “real” situations 
to life using “ordinary” people (9). From this early example, we are already wit-
nessing an overlapping of television fact and fiction through a contrived situation 
designed to get a pseudo-sociological response. Beck breaks these genres down 
further by tracing other television categories that have historically been either 
fact based or fiction based, whereas others like crime shows, talent shows, game 
shows, and documentaries “are seen as a mix of authentic and fictional elements” 
(17). One of the complications that results when this mix appears in nature pro-
grams is that “the viewers have to negotiate the paradoxes and contradictions 
inherent in the genre and to reconcile the tension between what is subjectively 
real and fictional” (17). The effect may in fact be more acute for nature program-
ming because the situations, places, and wildlife are often alien to our usual 
understanding of the natural world. In a typical reality TV show we have some 
common point of reference: we cook, we have friends, we use products, we are 
familiar with stores and may even run our own; but we are not so accustomed 
to camping in a rain forest teeming with hazardous or even deadly life. We are 
not in the habit of being caught in an earthquake or run out of our homes by 
a volcano. Again one might conclude that the intent of presenting “reality” is 
seriously compromised by these factors, the unintended consequence being that 
the audience has a warped sense of the significance of geographical spaces and 
events, or of foreign habitats or the species within them, or of our interconnec-
tivity to them.
Man vs. Wild, for example, is a survivalist’s fantasy that taps into the 
American vision of masculinist values: the lone man in a hostile environment, 
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carrying with him only the barest of necessities to combat the malicious elements, 
the harsh landscape, and the lack of food and water. Sometimes Bear Grylls does 
not even have a source of fire, or must eat anything containing protein — insect 
larvae, chick embryos from partially incubated birds’ eggs, beetles, raw fish or 
crustaceans, worms — or he must recycle his own urine in order to keep from 
dying of thirst. The reality of his peril is of course considerably lessoned if we 
consider that he is obviously not alone, and it is unlikely that his camera crew 
or support staff are enduring the same hardships as he is, providing him with 
a convenient safety net. The conditions he is describing are “real” enough as far 
as the physical and biological science of it are concerned, but they are staged to 
demonstrate a particular survival strategy and therefore more closely reproduce 
boot camp than any situation most of us (or he) will ever accidentally encounter. 
Shock value seems to be a mainstay for this program, especially when it comes 
to what Grylls is “forced” to eat. But he is in no actual danger unless something 
goes terribly unrehearsed — like the daredevil’s bane of decades past — defying 
the script and man’s will against natural forces.
This does in fact happen, as in the 2006 death of Australian Steve Irwin, aka 
The Crocodile Hunter. Though the rumors immediately circulated that Irwin 
was killed by a croc, he was in fact impaled by a stingray while making the iron-
ically titled documentary, Ocean’s Deadliest. Irwin was energetic, flamboyant, 
and entertaining, and in many ways blazed the path for personalities like Bear 
Grylls to be a popular success. One glance at Irwin’s website is all the evidence we 
need to see the conflation of edutainment and commercialism in action. The site 
reads like a billboard for a Florida reptile house, and it is difficult at first to find 
informational content amid the overwhelming presence of ads for Croc Hunter 
products like shirts, toys, books, vacation packages, or DVDs.
And Irwin’s case is interesting for other reasons. His website biography 
reports that he is a naturalist, a herpetologist, and a conservationist, all indicat-
ing that he has formal degrees in the biological sciences. In fact, he does not, 
but received his experience with animals by “studying and caring for animals 
at his parents’ wildlife park, which is now known as the Australia Zoo” (“Steve 
Irwin”). Credentialing for a television celebrity is obviously different than it is 
for a scientist or a professor, requiring only practical experience and no formal 
study or college education. But unless one actively sought out this information 
about Irwin, one might assume that he has the formal education necessary to be 
an authority on exotic and dangerous animals. Bear Grylls, likewise, has no for-
mal college degree but served in the British Special Air Services, climbed Mount 
Everest, has a black belt in karate, and is an “avid” skydiver. In the American mind, 
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such a resume eclipses any “book learning” that most professionals would view 
as imperative for being considered an expert. In addition to this autodidacticism, 
both Irwin and Grylls create personae akin to that of the thrill seeker, not the 
scientist, and this resonates with an audience that insists on action over instruc-
tion. Also, neither of these men are American, and their accents have a beguiling 
effect on their ethos that Americans seem to respond favorably to. Australia has 
had a special place in the American heart ever since the 80s Crocodile Dundee 
craze, and Brits have always been synonymous with culture in American lore. 
Irwin and Grylls personify the rugged man of the wild and the explorer mythos, 
intrepid with self-assuredness and that elusive quality assigned to such men, cha-
risma. They are performers, first and foremost, manifesting a role that is ideally 
suited for the act in which they are appearing, specifically groomed to occupy a 
unique cable niche.
And such qualities mesh well with the man vs. nature metaphorical frame, 
since they are the same qualities we would expect from our best and bravest (if not 
brightest). If our relationship with nature is to be portrayed as warlike, the sol-
dier persona maintains a certain metaphorical consistency, and Irwin and Grylls, 
while not soldiers, certainly do emote the same soldierly ethos through their 
daring, their willingness to engage any threat, their mercenary spread to exotic 
locations, and their ability to survive the harshest of conditions in fulfillment of 
their mission. The fine line between science and sensationalism, between the pur-
suit of dangerous animals for biological knowledge and the display of a glorified 
circus spectacle, is carefully walked by these performers, and there are elements 
of both. Irwin, for example, usually had a reason for meddling with creatures, but 
it was not always clear whether it was for research and conservationist purposes 
or just for kicks. Grylls’s stated purpose is to illustrate “survival skills,” but again, 
for the average viewer, his program taps into a masculinist state-of-nature day-
dream far more than it does into any bona fide need to know such things. Again 
we see nature entertainment as a product — a distinctly commercialized thing to 
be consumed, a franchise to be capitalized on and expanded. Just as Disney did 
before them, the anthropocentric nature programs have recognized that giving 
the audience what it wants — by tapping into ideological orientations like war 
and conflict that they already possess (a distinctive feature of our occupational 
psychosis) — is more profitable than representing nature from the perspective of 
academic biological science.
The programs I have been discussing here represent an educational opportu-
nity that has not, unfortunately, been well fulfilled. Because they are so popular, 
it is important for the watching public to be vigilant about how they interpret 
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what they are seeing. While I do not think that the American public as a whole is 
nearly as naïve about how the media both confirms and influences its attitudes as 
some have suggested, I do think that we are witnessing the need for a higher lit-
eracy in technologically delivered information systems like contemporary nature 
programs. So far, we have been so eager to rush headlong into the “information 
age” that we have overlooked the need to decipher the overwhelming amount of 
information we can access. “Technological literacy,” as the term is commonly 
used, means only the knowledge of how to operate new technology and apply 
it; it does not tend to refer to the means by which new information delivery sys-
tems repackage information, create facts and factoids, history, data, and indeed 
knowledge itself, or how more traditional sources like books and libraries can 
greatly supplement click-of-a-mouse information access. As a critical tool nec-
essary in the twenty-first century, such “rhetorical literacy” as I am advocating 
would include far more instruction on all levels of language structure; close crit-
ical readings of popular texts, including cable nature programs; training on how 
logical arguments are constructed; utilizing existing knowledge and making new 
knowledge; and examining how people, agencies, corporations and other institu-
tions all have rhetorical reasons for presenting knowledge in a preordained way.
When it comes to nature programming as a technological source of informa-
tion, cable programmers and producers could aid in rhetorical literacy as well; they 
might, for example, emphasize what role we can play in our own environmental 
stability. And while no actions will ever prevent blizzards, hurricanes, earthquakes, 
floods, or other natural catastrophes, actions to make our biosphere healthier can 
help reduce the frequency of many of our most common disasters while also pro-
viding realistic countermeasures to actual threats. They might help us understand 
the basics of survival under real circumstances rather than indulge our voyeuristic 
tendency to demand shock and awe in our edutainment. I have discussed only a 
few of the many programs that cable television now airs and only a few of the meth-
ods that are used to construct a subgenre of nature show that represents one slot 
in the lineup. These shows, however, reveal something broader about American 
priorities because of their popularity and ubiquity, and they may present certain 
social, political, and environmental hazards to an uninitiated public.
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Chapter 2
Steven Pinker and the Scientific Sublime: 




This chapter argues that a well-respected experimental psychologist, Steven 
Pinker, burst upon the scene with his first book, The Language Instinct, a 
masterly performance that made us feel that our unique ability to speak 
and understand language was a daily miracle linguistic science had com-
pletely unraveled. His second popular science book, How the Mind Works, 
was another blockbuster; it went beyond his area of immediate competence, 
presenting us with a completely worked-out computational theory of mind. 
The Better Angels of Our Nature reinterpreted history, insisting that, contrary 
to popular belief, violence had diminished over time. Every one of Pinker’s 
major works shared a single overriding assumption: science could be relied on 
to shed significant light on subjects far removed from the laboratory or the 
observatory; science could astonish us by its revelations about language, about 
the mind, about human behavior generally, and about violence in particular. 
The scientific sublime is invoked and evoked in each of these cases.
Although the rhetoric of science has become a vigorous subfield within rhetorical 
studies, the rhetoric of popular science has been largely ignored. Popular science 
books and essays create a formidable barrier to scholars in the humanities: their 
study involves the knowledge of science in fields as diverse as myrmecology and 
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mathematical biology. There is a second problem, one I have tried to face. Despite 
a half century of effort on the part of its scholars, rhetoric has never really shed 
its pejorative connotations. In my latest project, The Scientific Sublime: How 
Popular Science Unravels the Mysteries of the Universe, to be published by Oxford 
University Press, I felt I was relatively safe concerning my knowledge of science; 
after all, I had been in the field for a quarter century. But the pejorative connota-
tion of rhetoric gave me pause. Calling my work The Rhetoric of Popular Science 
and employing rhetorical terminology explicitly seemed unnecessarily to narrow 
my audience. This avoidance did not mean that I would avoid rhetorical analysis; 
I just wouldn’t call it rhetorical analysis. This chapter on Steven Pinker is a rhe-
torical analysis; indeed, given that it deals with a master rhetorician, how could 
it not be?
In The Scientific Sublime, all the authors with which I deal — Steven Pinker, 
but also Richard Feynman, Steven Weinberg, Brian Greene, Lisa Randall, 
Stephen Hawking, Rachel Carson, Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Dawkins, and 
E. O. Wilson — employ a single, overarching rhetorical concept, the sublime, first 
identified in late antiquity in a treatise by Longinus. On the Sublime claimed 
that certain literary passages generated awe, for example: “God said, Let there 
be light, and there was light.” Awe was an emotion Aristotle did not mention in 
his Rhetoric; still, awe can easily join the emotions he does mention. When, after 
having disappeared for centuries, On the Sublime reappeared in early modern 
Europe, it began a cultural journey of some significance; it led to an expansion 
from literature to nature, and from nature to science. In the eighteenth century, 
there developed a scientific sublime, a category of experience that generated a 
sense of wonder at the discoveries of science. The sublime, I claim in this chapter, 
is a persuasive resource that Pinker and his fellow scientist-popularizers consis-
tently employ.
Pinker employs this persuasive resource to amaze us with the facts and theo-
ries of science. On these topics his rhetorical skills, consistently energized by the 
sublime, rightly impress us with his ability simultaneously to inform and to con-
vince. But Pinker also uses these skills and this persuasive resource to advocate 
for positions on which there is deep and long-standing professional disagreement. 
Of course, Pinker is entitled both to hold and to convey his professional stands to 
his readers. But it is also possible to feel that in these instances his employment 
of the scientific sublime might well mislead them because opposing sides are not 
given a fair shake. Readers might come to believe that these stands and opinions 
are not just stands and opinions.
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The Scientific Sublime
In his History of Astronomy Adam Smith provides us with the first satisfactory 
analysis of the psychology of the scientific sublime, a new category of experience 
derived from Longinus. According to Smith, a path to the sublime opens when 
a spectacular natural event — an eclipse of the sun, for example — captures our 
attention and causes
the imagination and memory [to] exert themselves to no purpose, and in vain 
look around all their classes of ideas in order to find one under which it may 
be arranged. They fluctuate to no purpose from thought to thought, and we 
remain still uncertain and undetermined where to place it, or what to think 
of it. It is this fluctuation and vain recollection, together with the emotion 
or movement of the spirits that they excite, which constitute the sentiment 
properly called Wonder, and which occasion that staring, and sometimes that 
rolling of the eyes, that suspension of the breath, and that swelling of the 
heart, which we may all observe, both in ourselves and others, when wonder-
ing at some new object, and which are the natural symptoms of uncertain and 
undetermined thought. What sort of a thing can that be? What is that like? 
are the questions which, upon such an occasion, we are all naturally disposed 
to ask. (Smith, Essays 39)
Two other senses of wonder are evoked when we answer these questions. The 
first is the discovery of a pattern in nature, a sense not noticed by Smith: the 
Babylonians could predict eclipses but not explain them. Such explanations 
evoke Smith’s other sense of wonder. His example is the satisfying astonishment 
that greeted Ptolemaic astronomy on its introduction in ancient Greece, a system 
that made mathematical sense of the heavens:
If [the system of concentric spheres] gained the belief of mankind by its plau-
sibility, it attracted their wonder and admiration; sentiments that still more 
confirmed their belief, by the novelty and beauty of that view of nature which 
it presented to the imagination. Before this system was taught in the world, 
the earth was regarded as, what it appears to the eye, a vast, rough, and irreg-
ular plain, the basis and foundation of the universe, surrounded on all sides 
by the ocean, and whose roots extended themselves through the whole of that 
infinite depth which is below it. (Smith, Essays 56)
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Achievements such as this cannot be appreciated by ordinary folk: the problems 
they solved would never have occurred to them (Smith, Essays 45). Moreover, 
they would regard the efforts to find a solution as worthless because without 
practical application:
It is in the abstruser sciences, particularly in the higher parts of mathemat-
ics, that the greatest and most admired exertions of human reason have been 
displayed. But the utility of those sciences, either to the individual or to the 
public, is not very obvious, and to prove it, requires a discussion which is not 
always very easily comprehended. It was not, therefore, their utility which 
first recommended them to the public admiration. This quality was but little 
insisted upon, till it became necessary to make some reply to the reproaches of 
those, who, having themselves no taste for such sublime discoveries, endeavor 
to depreciate them as useless. (Smith, Sentiments 272)
For Smith, it is in Newton’s Principia that these abstruser sciences culminate:
Can we wonder then, that it should have gained the general and complete 
approbation of mankind, and that it should now be considered, not as an 
attempt to connect in the imagination the phenomena of the Heavens, but 
as the greatest discovery that ever was made by man, the discovery of an 
immense chain of the most important and sublime truths, all closely con-
nected together, by one capital fact, [that is, gravity], of the reality of which 
we have daily experience. (Smith, Essays 105)
C. P. Snow gives us another example — the second law of thermodynamics, 
the principle that all closed systems eventually run down: “it has its own som-
ber beauty; like all major scientific laws, it evokes reverence” (Snow 72). Of 
course, Snow cautions, “it needs understanding, which can’t be attained unless 
one has learnt some of the language of [science]” (72). This is exactly what 
scientist-popularizers hope to communicate to a mass audience. Unlike well-
known popular science physicists like Stephen Hawking, Steven Weinberg, 
Brian Greene, and Lisa Randall, however, Steven Pinker does not limit himself 
to the abstruser sciences. He sets as his goal the evocation of our sense of wonder 
at the latest discoveries in linguistics, psychology, and history, his own and those 
of others. To do so, he employs a category of cultural experience Adam Smith 
applied to science itself, the sublime.
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The Language Expert
In the latter half of the tenth century, the Anglo-Saxon monk, Aelfic, wrote a 
homily on daily miracles, the power of God to sustain the universe moment by 
moment, a marvel hidden in plain sight:
God hath wrought many miracles and daily works; but those miracles are 
much weakened in the sight of men, because they are very usual. A greater 
miracle it is that God Almighty every day feeds all the world, and directs the 
good, than that miracle was, that he filled five thousand men with five loaves: 
but men wondered at this, not because it was a greater miracle, but because 
it was unusual. Who now gives fruit to our fields, and multiplies the harvest 
from a few grains of corn, but he who multiplied the five loaves? The might 
was there in Christ’s hands, and the five loaves were, as it were, seed, not sown 
in the earth, but multiplied by him who created the earth. (The Sermones 
Catholici 185)
Steven Pinker strives to be the Aelfric of linguistics, to explore with us the ordi-
nary miracle of language acquisition and use. He labors successfully to make 
clear and cogent to the general public the recondite insights of Noam Chomsky, 
the linguist who claimed that the intricate patterns that characterize the world’s 
languages, their differing surface structures, were the consequence of a com-
mon core, a deep structure, a universal grammar, the generator of all languages. 
The success of The Language Instinct, and of Pinker’s two subsequent books on 
language, was due in part to the clarity of his exploration of this phenomenon. 
But it is not this clarity that makes his work compelling; it is his evocation of 
the scientific sublime, a revelation that shows us that something we all pos-
sess — something we all take for granted — is a daily miracle that repays our 
careful scrutiny, an examination that reveals a human capacity that science lays 
bare and explains.
Pinker reveals linguistics as the science that shows us just how much of a 
miracle language is, and the wonder that is evoked when we understand how 
language works. All of us routinely turn its storehouse of words and rules into 
an infinite number of possible sentences, each newly minted for the occasion. 
Because we achieve these articulate heights by the age of three, we can’t have 
learned language just from hearing our parents speak. We must have been primed 
in advance; each of us must have an all-purpose language generator packed inside 
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our skulls. Of course, we all speak different languages: French children learn 
French, American children, English. But this is only because a universal gram-
mar, an innate capacity, made learning any language possible. It is this grammar, 
modified to accommodate the rules of particular languages, that generates the 
sentences we speak. If American, we learn that almost all adjectives precede their 
nouns. Americans say, “the blue ink.” If French, we learn that adjectives generally 
follow their nouns. The French say “l’encre bleu.” Modern linguistics tells us that 
these differences obscure commonalities, persistent patterns that are themselves 
a source of wonder; it also reveals the generator of these patterns, their explana-
tion, a source of wonder even more impressive than the first.
Modern linguistics deals not only with the miracle of language, but with the 
miracle of speech. If we had language, but not speech, we could still communi-
cate effectively: the profoundly deaf do it every day. Most of us, however, rely on 
our ability to convey our thoughts through the sounds we make. This capacity to 
form sounds into words and sentences and to perceive those sounds as words and 
sentences evolved in coordination with the universal grammar, a simultaneous 
development so impressive it gives some philosophers pause when evolution is 
given as their explanation. Even Pinker, a man who will insist in later work that 
he knows how the mind works, doubts our ability to understand human speech 
recognition: “The human brain . . . is a high-tech speech recognizer, but no one 
knows how it succeeds” (Pinker, Instinct 183); in fact, “no system today can 
duplicate a person’s ability to recognize both many words and many speakers” 
(Pinker, Instinct 162). Pinker also explains why the speech generator is just as 
miraculous as the speech recognizer:
First, one of the six speech organs is chosen as the major articulator: the lar-
ynx, the soft palate, tongue body, tongue tip, tongue root, or lips. Second, 
the manner of moving that articulator is selected: fricative, stop, or vowel. 
Third, configurations of the other speech organs can be specified: for the soft 
palate, nasal or not; for the larynx, voiced or not; for the tongue root, tense 
or lax; for the lips rounded or unrounded. Each manner or configuration is 
a symbol for a set of commands to the speech muscles, and such symbols are 
called features. To articulate a phoneme, the commands must be executed 
with precise timing, the most complicated gymnastics we are called upon to 
perform. (Pinker, Instinct 171)
Phonemes form words, those groups of letters separated by spaces on the printed 
page. In fact, those spaces exist only on the page: in reality, speech is a steady, 
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seamless stream of sound. While our ears and our brain experience this stream, we 
hear sentences made up of words, an extraordinary transformation. That a three-
year-old can have mastered this mental and physical feat is truly astonishing.
Each language also has its phonetic fingerprint, the growl of German, the 
lilt of French. This is how the great comedian, Sid Caesar, seemed to speak 
German or French while actually speaking nonsense. Pinker quotes a woman 
who produced under hypnosis the following pseudo-Slavic nonsense: “Ovishta 
reshra rovishta. Vishna beretishti? Ushna barishta dashto” (Pinker, Instinct 
172). Once the shape of a language is firmly embedded, however, the pattern is 
resistant to change. Every Chinese child speaks unaccented Chinese. But few 
American adults can learn to speak unaccented Chinese: almost all speak it with 
an American accent. Although the language is clearly Chinese, the pattern of 
sounds that speakers generate is tainted indelibly by their native tongue. “Here 
is Jack and the Beanstalk” with an Italian accent: “Unans appona taim uase 
disse boi. Neimmse Giacche. Naise boi. Live uite ise mamma. Mainde de cao” 
(Pinker, Instinct 172). While most adults cannot go from language to language 
and sound like natives, many actors can. In the old-time radio show, Life with 
Luigi, J. Carrol Naish and Alan Reed adopted an Italian accent, transforming 
“Jack and the Beanstalk” into “Giacche enne Binnestauche.”
Just as there are rules for grammar, there are rules that govern phonetics, 
determining how features are arrayed into phonemes and words. In the writ-
ten language, many verbs end in “ed” in the past tense: slapped, jogged, bedded. 
While these endings are all spelled the same way, they do not sound the same 
way. In slapped the “ed” is pronounced “t”; in jogged it is pronounced “d”; in bed-
ded it is pronounced “ed.” In each case, the reason is phonetic, and a rule applies. 
After an unvoiced vowel, we get “t”; after a voiced vowel, we get “d”; after a “d” 
(or a “t”), we get “ed.” In each case, the constraints of our speech apparatus deter-
mine our pronunciation.
But if this is so, why do we persist in tolerating the gap between pronun-
ciation and spelling? Why not spell words just the way they sound: slapt, jogd, 
bedded? Isn’t English spelling irrational? Certainly, it does not make sense to 
have a “b” in debt or a “k” and a “gh” in knight. They are there only because 
history put them there: the “b” because of a mistaken analogy with Latin, the 
“k” and “gh” because these letters were once pronounced. The arrival of dictio-
naries regularized spelling and fixed these oddities, seemingly forever. As Pinker 
points out, however, phonetic spelling would only make things worse. We would 
spell “courage” differently from “courageous,” “muscle” differently from “muscu-
lar.” The fact is that “writing systems do not aim to represent the actual sounds 
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of talking, which we do not hear, but the abstract units of language underlying 
them, which we do hear” (Pinker, Instinct 191).
Taking Sides
Pinker’s three books on language introduce us to two lively controversies in lin-
guistics: the origin of language and the origin of concepts, the ideational forces 
behind language. I have already noted that Pinker’s greatest theoretical debt is 
to Noam Chomsky, the most influential advocate of the theory that language 
is generated by a set of rules built into our brains. Chomsky’s 1957 Syntactic 
Structures created a revolution in the study of language. Two years later, in 
a devastating review of a behaviorist approach that language is a form of con-
ditioning, B. F. Skinner’s view in his Verbal Behavior, Chomsky reminded us 
of his alternative, one that would prove fruitful indeed. He saw the grammar of 
a language as a mechanism that generates sentences in the way that a deductive 
theory generates theorems. For him, linguistics should be viewed as a study of 
the formal properties of such grammars. With a precise enough formulation, 
this general theory could provide us with a uniform method for determining 
how sentences are generated, used, and understood. In short, it should be possi-
ble to derive from a properly formulated grammar a statement of the integrative 
processes and generalized patterns imposed on the specific acts that constitute 
an utterance (Chomsky, “A Review” 55–56). As Newton reduced the workings 
of the universe to the law of gravity and the laws of motion, Chomsky reduced 
language to the operation of this grammar. It was awe inspiring when Chomsky 
first brought these ideas before the public; it is still awe inspiring. The trouble is, 
it might not still be science; it might not be true, an uncomfortable fact of which 
Pinker is well aware.
Despite its tremendous success and legion of followers, the universal gram-
mar met with almost immediate challenges from many quarters (Harris). And 
these challenges have not abated. Three decades after Chomsky’s initial rev-
elation, for example, David Rumelhart and James McClelland proposed an 
alternative to his rule-based system. There were rules of a sort, they said, such as 
the rule that most past tenses in English end in “ed.” But these were generated 
not by a universal grammar, but by the experience of children with the spoken 
language. It was an experience represented in neural networks by an increase 
in the probability of the “ed” ending, the ending of regular verbs. Of course, 
irregular verbs also have to be learned. Some come in patterns: for example, 
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slept, kept, wept, and crept, and their phonological analogues, leapt, prepped. 
A few others, frequently occurring oddballs, such as was, go, went, must be 
learned by rote.
In this research program, connectionism, language learning is just learning. 
Rumelhart and McClelland summarize their view:
We have, we believe, provided a distinct alternative to the view that chil-
dren learn the rules of English past-tense formation in any explicit sense. We 
have shown that a reasonable account of the acquisition of past tense can be 
provided without recourse to the notion of a rule as anything more than a 
description of the language. We have shown that for this case, there is no 
induction problem. The child need not figure out what the rules are, nor even 
that there are rules. The child need not decide whether a verb is regular or 
irregular. There is no question as to whether the inflected form should be 
stored directly in the lexicon or derived from more general principles. There 
isn’t even a question (as far as generating the past-tense form is concerned) as 
to whether a verb form is one encountered many times or one that is being 
generated for the first time. A uniform procedure is applied for producing 
the past-tense form in every case. The base form is supplied as input to the 
past-tense network and the resulting pattern of activation is interpreted as a 
phonological representation of the past form of that verb. This is the proce-
dure whether the verb is regular or irregular, familiar or novel. (McClelland 
and Rumelhart 267)
These views are, obviously, a challenge to any rule-based system. Pinker’s strategy 
in rejoinder is to point out the many problems that Rumelhart and McClelland 
have in accounting for every instance of the past tense. For example, because their 
model is based exclusively on the sound of words, it cannot account for those that 
sound alike but have different plurals, words such as wring and ring. Given this 
and related difficulties, Pinker feels justified in dismissing “the knee-jerk associ-
ations that drive the Rumelhart-McClelland model” (Pinker, Words 110). This 
is the position of Pinker and Alan Prince, whose article dismantled this model, 
piece by piece. Nevertheless, it turns out that Pinker and Prince “are probably the 
model’s biggest fans” (Pinker, Words 117). In Words and Rules, Pinker proposes a 
compromise — a kind of unified theory of linguistics — that, while it applies the 
Rumelhart-McClelland model to all irregular verbs, applies his own rule-based 
model to all regular ones. For Pinker, there must be rules for regular verbs.
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McClelland is having none of it. There may very well be rules, but they would 
not have been there in the first place; they would have developed as the outcomes 
of probabilistic processes:
We do not claim that it would be impossible to construct a rule-based model 
of inflection formation that has all of the properties supported by the evi-
dence. However, such an account would not be an instantiation of Pinker’s 
symbolic rule account. In fact, rule-based models with some of the right char-
acteristics are currently being pursued. . . . If such models use graded rule 
activations and probabilistic outcomes, allow rules to strengthen gradually 
with experience, incorporate semantic and phonological constraints, and 
use rules within a mechanism that also incorporates word-specific informa-
tion, they could become empirically indistinguishable from a connectionist 
account. Such models might be viewed as characterizing an underlying con-
nectionist processing system at a higher level of analysis, with rules providing 
descriptive summaries of the regularities captured in the network’s connec-
tions. (McClelland and Patterson 471)
Like Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures, Rumelhart and McClelland’s initial article 
has generated a tsumani of empirical research, created by an army of men and 
women staking their careers on the fruitfulness of connectionist theory. From 
their point of view, the rule-based program of Chomsky and Pinker may be 
worse than wrong; it may inhibit our understanding of the nature of language; it 
may actually mislead us. Linguist Franklin Chang concludes that
it is possible that the requirement that syntactic knowledge in different lan-
guages be instantiated in a common syntactic theory actually hinders the 
development of explicit models. Ironically, by making fewer assumptions 
about the universal nature of syntactic knowledge and allowing learning to 
determine the constraints for each language, we might actually get closer to a 
universal account of human language behavior. (Chang 392)
Pinker involves his general readers in another controversy about language, 
the origin of concepts. Clearly, we didn’t enter the world with concepts like 
trombone and electron inside our heads. On the other hand — and this is the 
problem — concepts can’t be learned. Although we can learn about trombones 
and electrons, we can only do so by asking questions like: What does a trom-
bone sound like? How big is an electron? Such questions assume that we already 
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have the concept of trombone and electron in our heads. One possibility — a 
possibility favored by Pinker — is that we are born with certain basic concepts 
already in our heads, concepts like cause and effect. These are innate. Concepts 
like trombone and electron are acquired, the progeny of some combination of 
these basic concepts.
There is a problem with this apparently very sensible approach, one that 
well-respected philosopher Jerry Fodor hammers home. Pinker’s solution 
requires that his repertory of innate concepts be sufficient to define exactly what 
we mean when we use either trombone or electron in a sentence. But all defini-
tions save the mathematical are as full of holes as Emmentaler cheese. Triangles 
can be defined; ordinary words cannot. Let’s take the verb paint. Let’s define 
paint as “cover a surface with paint.” No, that won’t do. If we kick a can of paint 
over on the floor, we haven’t painted the floor; if Michelangelo is working on 
the Sistine ceiling, he is not painting it; he is painting a picture on it; if he dips 
his brush into a pot of paint, he is not painting the brush, but preparing to paint 
the ceiling. The problem is general. Kill can’t be decomposed into cause to die. 
Although I can cause you to die by not calling an ambulance, I haven’t killed 
you. This problem also has quite a reach: philosopher Edmund Gettier showed 
conclusively that you can’t define knowledge as justified true belief. Indeed, you 
can’t define knowledge at all.
Pinker thinks he has an answer to these difficulties. Fodor has confused 
definitions with semantic representations. For example, the semantic represen-
tation of the verb paint would include the idea that to paint is the act of an agent 
whose goal is to cover a surface with paint. But this fix is no fix at all. We still 
haven’t dealt with the difference between I painted the ceiling and I painted a 
picture on the ceiling. Moreover, what are we to say of I painted the wound with 
mercurochrome? What about the verb to butter? Is a person who butters a per-
son who spreads a viscous, yellowish edible substance, not necessarily butter, on 
another edible substance? Suppose I use butter to soothe a burn? Am I buttering 
the burn? (Pinker, Stuff )
Nobody, it seems, favors Fodor’s original or his revised position, one in 
which he abandons the view that trombone and electron are innate. For this, 
he substitutes a mysterious process in which trombones and electrons imprint 
their concepts on our brains the way ducklings are imprinted from birth with the 
concept mother. But Pinker’s solution — alleged semantic representations — is a 
nonstarter. Indeed, Pinker seems aware of his failure. In How the Mind Works, 
he gives us an example that defies analysis in terms of semantic representation. 
A bachelor is a man who has never married, right? So is Arthur, who is living 
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with Alice, a bachelor? Is Bruce, who has arranged a marriage simply to avoid the 
military draft? Is Charlie, who is seventeen and lives with his parents? Is David, 
who is also seventeen, but on his own and living the life of a playboy? Are Eli and 
Edgar, homosexual lovers, living together? Is Faisal, with his three wives, a man 
in search of a fourth? Is Father Gregory? (Pinker, Mind 13)
I have no opinion about the relative merits of these opposing positions. More 
to the point, I do not think I am are entitled to an opinion. First, I lack the knowl-
edge required, and second, even the required knowledge is at present insufficient 
to achieve closure on the part of the participants. I can hope that experts will 
eventually agree, and that that agreement will stand the test of time. In the mean-
time, I have Chomsky and Pinker on the one hand; Rumelhart, McClelland, and 
Fodor on the other. In each case, Pinker’s scientific sublime is generated, not by 
means of a widely accepted theory but by an interesting hypothesis, supported by 
apparently solid arguments and apparently convincing evidence.
How the Mind Works
How does the mind work? According to Pinker, all mental capabilities depend 
on the brain’s computational abilities. This is not to say that we are walking 
around with a laptop between our ears; it is to say, rather, that the brain processes 
our sensations in a way analogous to the way a computer processes its zeroes 
and ones. Does the general case obtain? Can we legitimately view the brain as a 
computer? Whether or not we can, computational theory seems fully to explain 
certain remarkable characteristics of human vision, a theory that Pinker clearly 
and incisively expounds, a legitimate evocation of the scientific sublime.
We all face a problem: How do we identify the orientation of shapes rotated 
in space? According to one theory, we retain each separate orientation in mem-
ory; according to another, we are capable of rotating shapes in their own mental 
space; according to a third, geon theory, orientation doesn’t matter — identifi-
cation is simply a matter of pattern matching. Pinker conducts an experiment 
to decide which theory is correct. He is a scientist, after all, not just a reporter 
of science. It turns out that people use all three methods, depending on the cir-
cumstances. But Pinker is not finished. He also wants to give us the flavor of his 
discovery, the sudden insight into the way the visual system works, an experience 
he calls “my happiest moment as an experimenter” (Pinker, Mind 281).
In image rotation, there is an interesting anomaly. While the degree of image 
tilt generally correlates with the time it takes to identify images, this is not true 
of mirror images, a result that continues to baffle. Disregarding this persistent 
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puzzle, Pinker and his graduate student start to write up their paper. In it, they 
speak of a different “strategy” employed for mirror images, a sure indication that 
they are “clueless” about the real solution to their problem. It is then that “an 
idea hit” (Pinker, Mind 282): it turns out that a two-dimensional shape, rotated 
around its axis like a chicken on a spit, can always be aligned with its mirror 
image: the degree of tilt makes no difference. The computational theory of mind 
chalks up another victory. The scientific sublime has been evoked, legitimately to 
inform and persuade.
But Pinker is not satisfied merely to explain feats of human vision; he wants 
also to trace them back to their origin, to endorse an evolutionary theory of 
mind. Uniformly, he attributes the origin of the incredible feats of which the 
human eye is capable to selection pressures operating on human variation, a 
process that begins with our simian ancestors and ends with us. An example is 
cyclopean vision — our ability to see with both eyes shapes that which cannot be 
seen with only one:
Primates evolved in trees and had to negotiate a network of branches masked 
by a veil of foliage. The price of failure was a long drop to the forest floor below. 
Building a stereo computer into these two-eyed creatures must have been irre-
sistible to natural selection, but it could have worked only if the disparities 
were calculated over thousands of bits of visual texture. (Pinker, Mind 233)
It is no dismissal of evolutionary theory to say that in this passage it is transformed 
into an ideology by means of which Pinker generates not science, but science fic-
tion. There is no evidence for the truth of his conjecture. How could there be?
Pinker’s unwavering view is that the mind is the product of an evolution that 
is wholly materialistic. Although he seems blind to the unfortunate implications 
of this view, he puts his finger directly on their cause, the problem of conscious-
ness, without which morality — the choice of right from wrong — is impossible 
to imagine:
No account of the causal effects of the cingulate sulcus [area of the brain] can 
explain how choices are not caused at all, hence something we can be held 
responsible for. Theories of evolution of the moral sense can explain why we 
condemn evil acts against ourselves and our kith and kin, but cannot explain 
the conviction, as unshakable as our grasp of geometry, that some acts are 
inherently wrong, even if their net effects are neutral or beneficial to overall 
well-being. (Pinker, Mind 561)
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It is the philosopher Thomas Nagel who makes the appropriate inference: No 
theory of evolution can be correct that views it solely as a material process 
(Pinker, Mind 50). If we are conscious, and if consciousness is a consequence of 
our evolutionary history, then the precursor of consciousness in all its immateri-
ality must have been present at the big bang: “intentionality, thought, and action 
resist psycho-physical reduction and can exist only in the lives of beings that are 
capable of consciousness” (Nagel 68).
There is a final problem, one with the computational theory of mind itself. 
Pinker, a dedicated advocate of this theory, sees the mind as an organ “packed 
with high-tech systems” (Pinker, Mind 4). But surely Jerry Fodor is right to find 
this analogy between human and natural engineering less than compelling. 
How, he asks, can Pinker assert how hopeless we are when it comes to building 
a serviceable robot — one that can put away the dishes — and at the same time 
contend that we know that the mind works just like a robot’s control system? 
(37). Pinker does not have a theory of how the mind works; he has a model for 
the way some parts of the brain work, a model that passes the test of science. 
How the Mind Works champions a computation theory that is unable to explain 
why we can use a knife and fork and robots cannot, one that favors evolutionary 
theory of mind that cannot explain how consciousness evolves from a primal 
soup of elementary particles. But Pinker’s employment of the scientific sublime 
throughout How the Mind Works may easily give his readers the impression that 
science supports the sweeping claims he sometimes makes.
Violence
In the Rwanda genocide of 1994, as many as one million died, approximately ten 
percent of the population; in the Syrian civil war, ongoing in 2017, over 400,000 
have died, approximately two percent of the population. In the United States, 
ten percent of the population would mean thirty-two million deaths, two per-
cent over six million. In the face of atrocities so devastating, Pinker’s claim in 
The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined that violence has 
declined seems open to question. Yet his ninety-five graphs and tables, strate-
gically placed throughout his book, tell the same story: violence has declined. 
Asked in an interview why an experimental psychologist felt he could write about 
history, Pinker focused on these very graphs and tables as the heart of his book, 
defending himself on scientific grounds: “Better Angels concentrates on quanti-
tative history: studies based on datasets that allow one to plot a graph over time. 
This involves the everyday statistical and methodological tools of social science, 
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which I’ve used since I was an undergraduate — concepts such as sampling, dis-
tributions, time series, multiple regression, and distinguishing correlation from 
causation” (“Steven Pinker”). It is by this means that Pinker proves that your 
chance of meeting a violent death has greatly diminished over time. The scientific 
sublime has been properly evoked.
In table 2.1, the death tolls for historical large-scale atrocities are given as 
two values: estimated toll from historical records and that same toll adjusted 
to the world’s population in the mid-twentieth century (I have rearranged the 
order of Pinker’s original table from a given cause’s unadjusted to adjusted rank). 
The most startling number in this startling list is the 36 million deaths in the 
An Lushan Revolt during China’s Tang Dynasty. Scaled up to account for pop-
ulation growth, we have the mid-twentieth-century equivalent of 429 million 
deaths, a staggering number greater than the entire populations of the United 
States and Canada combined, and far greater than the total death toll from both 
world wars. It would seem that Pinker has indeed discovered an astonishing pat-
tern in human history.
Or has he? Has the sublime, so skillfully employed to convince, really 
produced a historical truth? Operational definition is surely among the meth-
odological tools of the social science Pinker employs. But neither from his tables 
and figures nor from his text can an operational definition of violence be derived. 
Wars and preventable famines are both consequences of state power, but only 
the former involves violence. Nor is slavery primarily an exercise in violence, 
though human beings are enslaved as its consequence, and slavery leaves slaves 
open to violence exercised with impunity. Moreover, Pinker’s own figures can 
be differently aggregated so as to tell another, less optimistic story. Any account 
of twentieth-century violence must notice that two world wars, Mao’s famine, 
Stalin’s persecutions, the Congo war, and the Russian civil war accounted for 
147 million deaths, all in only five decades. By contrast, the Mongol conquests 
(adjusted rank no. 2) resulted in 40 million deaths (278 million equivalent) in 
163 years. Indeed, six of the top ten in Pinker’s murderers’ row of mass violence 
span more than a century. Moreover, the statistic of 36 million deaths in the 
nine years of the An Lushan Revolt is controversial, as Pinker admits. That total 
is based on a highly questionable census taken at the rebellion’s end, with the 
reigning Tang Empire in disarray and greatly shrunk in size. A more conservative 
estimate is 13 million unadjusted (“List of Wars”).
Added to these problems are Pinker’s omissions. If Pinker sees slavery as a 
form of violence, now thankfully eliminated for the most part, why does he omit 
child labor and child soldiering, two forms of enslavement still with us? Why 
Table 2.1 Historical Death Tolls Adjusted to World 
Population in Mid-Twentieth Century
Unadjusted 







4 An Lushan Revolt 8th 36,000,000 429,000,000 1
3 Mongol Conquests 13th 40,000,000 278,000,000 2
9 Mideast Slave Trade 7th–19th 19,000,000 132,000,000 3
5 Fall of the Ming 
Dynasty
17th 25,000,000 112,000,000 4
15 Fall of Rome 3rd–5th 8,000,000 105,000,000 5
11 Timur Lenk 
(Tamerlane)
14th–15th 17,000,000 100,000,000 6
7 Annihilation of the 
American Indians
15th–19th 20,000,000 92,000,000 7
10 Atlantic Slave Trade 15th–19th 18,000,000 83,000,000 8
1 Second World War 20th 55,000,000 55,000,000 9
6 Taiping Rebellion 19th 20,000,000 40,000,000 10
2 Mao Zedong (mostly 
government-caused 
famine)
20th 40,000,000 40,000,000 11
12 British India (mostly 
preventable  
famine)
19th 17,000,000 35,000,000 12
17 Thirty Years’ War 17th 7,000,000 32,000,000 13
18 Russia’s Time of 
Troubles
16th–17th 5,000,000 23,000,000 14
8 Josef Stalin 20th 20,000,000 20,000,000 15
13 First World War 20th 15,000,000 15,000,000 16
21 French Wars of 
Religion
16th 3,000,000 14,000,000 17
16 Congo Free State 19th–20th 8,000,000 12,000,000 18
19 Napoleonic Wars 19th 4,000,000 11,000,000 19
14 Russian Civil War 20th 9,000,000 9,000,000 20
20 Chinese Civil War 20th 3,000,000 3,000,000 21
Source: Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, Viking, 2011, 
p. 195.
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does he omit the deaths resulting from America’s love affair with the private 
automobile, the state’s decision to exercise its muscle in favor of unsafe over safe 
transportation, in effect to license a form of violence? These categories show that 
we may not be less, only differently violent, the victims of new expressions of vio-
lence shaped by changing social, political, and economic circumstances.
The questionable aspects of Pinker’s claim extend to his explanation. While 
in the last 200,000 years we have not evolved anatomically, we have, Pinker avers, 
evolved socially and politically: gradually, reason has triumphed over irrational-
ity. Indeed, “once a society has a degree of civilization in place, it is reason that 
offers the greatest hope for further reducing violence” (Pinker, Better Angels 
668). The prospects of a reduction in violence seem particularly bright because 
we are getting smarter. While it is true that we are getting better at IQ tests, a 
phenomenon known as the Flynn effect, we cannot infer from this that human 
intelligence is actually increasing. Flynn agrees: “Can anyone take seriously the 
notion that the generation born in 1937 was that much more intelligent than the 
generation born in 1907, to say nothing of the generation born in 1877?” (Flynn 
7). The Flynn effect is only about what intelligent tests measure.
In any case, getting smarter does not mean getting nicer. Take practical rea-
son, our ability to deal more and more effectively with manufacturing problems. 
This is an area where we have undoubtedly improved over time. But the same 
assembly line that produced Model T Fords made the Holocaust possible. Nor 
is being smart necessarily correlated with being free from socially harmful bias: 
Martin Heidegger and Gottlob Frege are two philosophers with deservedly tow-
ering reputations: both were antisemites. Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot were poets 
and critics of distinction: both were antisemites. Pinker’s employment of the sci-
entific sublime throughout The Better Angels of Our Nature may easily give his 
readers the impression that legitimately contestable claims about the betterment 
of humanity have been scientifically settled.
Conclusion
A well-respected experimental psychologist, Steven Pinker burst upon the scene 
with his first book, The Language Instinct, a masterly performance that made us 
feel that our unique ability to speak and understand language was a daily miracle 
linguistic science had completely unraveled. His second popular science book, 
How the Mind Works, was another blockbuster; it went beyond his area of imme-
diate competence, presenting us with a completely worked-out computational 
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theory of mind. The Better Angels of Our Nature reinterpreted history, insisting 
that, contrary to popular belief, violence had diminished over time. Every one 
of Pinker’s major works shared a single overriding assumption: science could be 
relied on to shed significant light on subjects far removed from the laboratory or 
the observatory; science could astonish us by its revelations about language, about 
the mind, about human behavior generally, and about violence in particular. In 
each of these cases, Pinker’s rhetorical skills enhance his subject matter; he makes 
learning a pleasure. The scientific sublime is legitimately invoked and evoked.
Pinker has become a global celebrity, as his book sales and YouTube videos 
attest; he has charisma, as anyone can see from any of these videos. He is also a 
leading figure in a fairly recent cultural phenomenon: a large group of promi-
nent scientists who write best-selling books on science. It takes nothing from 
Pinker’s books to say that they consistently violate a rule that another scientist 
of note, Richard Feynman, followed in his popular science writing: Never stray 
from knowledge that could legitimately appear in a textbook for undergraduates 
as well-established science. While Pinker’s frequent violation of this principle in 
no way constitutes a criticism of his achievement — he has many interesting and 
provocative things to say on a wide variety of subjects — it does indicate that he 
should be read with caution. We must treat with skepticism his view that ordi-
nary readers can decide between rival theories of language generation and the 
origin of concepts, that a computer model can explain how the mind works, and 
that we live in a safer world because we are smarter than our ancestors. In each 
of these cases, we may well be prompted to ask whether the scientific sublime has 
been legitimately invoked and evoked.
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This chapter explores the concept of architectonic discourses and the 
extremisms to which they are prone. Taking Aristotle’s distinction between 
discourses that offer sure and certain systems to guide distinctions and those 
dis courses (primarily rhetoric and dialectic) that manage decisions that are 
contingent and uncertain, the author explores a range of discourses that have 
historically claimed to be architectonic, or ruling, discourses. The dangers 
of extremism in such discourses are illustrated in a brief analysis of a website 
opposing childhood vaccinations.
Popular culture and popular discourse are full of claims, implied or explicit, 
about what we can know and how we can know it. Religious zealots claim 
a confi dent certainty for their beliefs, while committed atheists claim an 
equally confident status for their rejection of spiritual belief. Scientists and 
medical personnel issue ex cathedra opinions about the flu, Ebola, and other 
diseases. Business schools make a nice return on the promise of dependable 
systems for knowing how to lead. Education schools claim to possess reliable 
methods for imparting knowledge. Television is full of pundits who will give 
you the right way to diet, to raise children, or to lose weight. Everywhere we are 
faced with choice, and everywhere we are offered ways to make those choices 
with confidence. And yet for all of these claims, many entertain skepticism 
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as to the reliability of sure and certain systems for acquiring knowledge and 
making decisions.
Knowledge, Decisions, and Extremisms
What can humans know with some measure of confident certainty, and 
what can we know that must always be largely contingent, exigent, and — in a 
word — arguable? This fundamental question engaged the ancient Greeks, as it 
has every civilization. There were many among the group of philosophers and 
teachers called the sophists who believed that knowledge must be largely, and in 
every field, uncertain and contingent. Susan Jarrett calls our attention to “the 
sophists’ rejection of transcendent truths and eternal values” (2). Mark Backman 
argues that this way of thinking “grounds reality in the relativity of truth” (7). 
Certainty is an illusion, many of them argued. The sophists “acquired a reputa-
tion for a kind of intellectual disorderly conduct” in proclaiming a doctrine that 
“what is gained in knowledge . . . is tempered by the realization of inadequacy 
and impotence” (4). For the prominent sophist Protagoras, “absolute truth was 
unknowable and perhaps nonexistent. Man is the measure and measurer of all 
things” (Kennedy 13). Prominent among the sophists were those who taught 
the art of rhetoric, for if we cannot be sure of what to do in the choices that 
confront us, then we must argue among ourselves to decide prudent courses of 
action. Thus, Plato depicts the fifth and fourth century BCE sophist Gorgias as 
advertising his course of public speaking by offering in public demonstrations to 
speak on any topic whatsoever that anybody might pose to him.
Consider the implications of such a stance, beyond its obvious advertising 
value for Gorgias’s school. It was clearly “a claim of omniscience” grounded in 
rhetorical facility (Jarrett 65). If one offers to engage in rhetoric — to give a pub-
lic speech — on any topic whatsoever, one is declaring that any topic that can 
possibly come up is uncertain and contingent. One might ask him about moral 
decisions, about mathematical formulae, or matters of astronomy, and his answer 
would be couched in a speech. In Backman’s view, Gorgias’s posture was com-
monly shared among sophists, whose way of thinking “is shaped by the principles 
and techniques of persuasive communication” (6). I think we might see this 
willingness to treat every kind of issue as rhetorical as a kind of extremism of 
rhetoric. As one might imagine, this stance appalled Plato.
Plato, for his part, took the diametrically opposed stance that sure and cer-
tain knowledge is entirely and for every question possible. For Plato, “truth was 
absolute and knowable” (Kennedy 14). His philosophy became what we know 
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as idealism (Brummett 46). One may not always “get there,” but through his 
method of philosophical dialectic, an understanding of the dimension of ideal 
forms may be approached. This means, clearly, that knotty problems of moral 
and ethical choice, of prudent public decisions, of charting a path through the 
underbrush of personal issues, all these admit of the possibility of knowledge 
as certain as geometric or mathematical knowledge — at least in principle. For 
Plato, “there were sure and certain unchanging truths to be discovered about 
every question” (Brummett 47). If this sounds as extreme as the diametrically 
opposed sophists, let us at least keep in mind that a belief that sure and certain 
knowledge is possible has informed a great deal of popular, philosophical, and 
scientific inquiry to this day.
Reacting to C. P. Snow’s idea of “two cultures,” some of the essays in this 
volume address, from a different angle, the choices that the sophists and Plato 
seem to present to us. Those two cultures may be seen as represented by the 
sophists and Plato. Richard van Oort’s essay here recasts Snow’s distinction as a 
question of how one explains the origins of language. Ronald Soetaert and Kris 
Rutten’s essay also problematizes Snow’s distinction and shifts it to a discussion 
of narrative and rhetoric. In both essays, the question of whether answers to fun-
damental questions can and must be arguable or can and must be settled by sure 
and certain systems is relevant.
Along came Plato’s student Aristotle, who must have been a great dis-
appointment to the old professor. At the start of his celebrated treatise on 
Rhetoric, Aristotle rearranges these issues fundamentally between the sophists 
and Plato. He begins: “Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are 
concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all 
men and belong to no definite science” (19). Aristotle declares that Plato’s talky 
method of dialectic is but the counterpart of, and no better than, the other 
talky method of rhetoric. Both are means of arriving at decisions about what to 
do in life through talking it out, either in the give and take of dialectic or the 
more extended exchanges of rhetoric. The counterparts, rhetoric and dialectic, 
are to help us in making decisions for which we have no sure and certain systems 
to guide us, or as George Kennedy put it, questions that “are not part of any spe-
cialized science” (19). If we face a question for which there is a sure and certain 
system, we should resort to that generator of reliably certain knowledge. Why 
argue about the area of a circle when geometry gives us a sure and certain way to 
that knowledge? On the other hand, why seek sure and certain systems for set-
tling moral, ethical, and public policy issues if there are no such systems for the 
messy side of life?
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Aristotle’s distinction seems entirely reasonable, but human nature being 
what it is, the distinction sets up a great temptation. That is, the temptation to 
seek sure and certain systems for the comfort they bring, and to misapply them 
to questions that should instead be settled rhetorically. For sure, there are many 
hardy humans who do not want certainty in any question of life, who revel in 
the contingent, whose shibboleth is always, “it depends.” I believe there are far 
more people in our dangerous, nervous, shifty, and contentious age who would 
be happy with a slogan, a formula, a word of authority to tell them what to do. 
Scan the self-help section of a bookstore, or an online service, and see the vast 
array of books offering sure and certain guides for childrearing, success in busi-
ness, riches in the stock market, and what have you.
That way lies another extremism. This extremism consists not in resorting 
to sure and certain systems to guide decisions, but instead in resorting to sure 
and certain systems to guide decisions that ought to be decided rhetorically. This 
extremism is a poverty of rhetoric. Extremism is what happens when one eschews 
the responsibility to talk, to argue, to reason together, in favor of the quick and 
easy but illusory satisfaction of deferring responsibility to the authority of a 
dogma, a pontiff, a formula that is out of its league. The problem lies in knowing 
where the dividing line is, and in not succumbing to the extremist temptation 
to settle rhetorical, contingent issues with some kind of law. But remember that, 
as with the sophists, extremism can also be an imperialism of rhetoric, a belief 
that everything whatsoever can be argued about. Those who do not know when 
to give up arguing in the face of settled knowledge informed by sure and certain 
systems are extremists as well.
To define extremism in terms of rhetoric and its proper purview shows us 
that rhetoric is more than simply a technique or practice of communication. As 
Backman argued, “rhetoric is essentially an attitude about public expression and 
the nature of the world. It resides at the crux of the relationship between lan-
guage and reality” (11). Yes, rhetoric is the ability to craft arguments and make 
speeches, the technique of creating advertisements and interpersonal appeals, the 
practice of influencing others. It is also a critical faculty, for Aristotle defined it 
as the ability to observe in any particular case what are the available means of 
persuasion — and such a definition bespeaks analytical and critical ability at least 
as much as the ability actually to speak and to argue (24). I am describing here 
a wider, more immanent, more structuring vision of rhetoric: a way of being in 
and thinking about the world. A rhetorical way of living is a way of accepting the 
contingency and uncertainty of life’s choices; it keeps to a minimum those deci-
sions for which we turn to sure and certain sciences or ways of knowing; and it 
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approaches life as largely an adventure in choosing among uncertain choices, an 
adventure in making those choices with others through shared, ongoing, suasive 
communication.
Architectonic Systems and Their Extremisms
As a way of living and being, rhetoric is what the philosopher Richard McKeon 
called “architectonic”: it structures other discourses and other ways of thinking. 
An architectonic way of thinking is a way of making decisions across the broad 
sweep of experience. When we speak and think rhetorically about personal rela-
tionships, politics, war, peace, finance, and so forth, we think about the means of 
persuasion in every case, the means of persuasively finding common ground for 
shared action, and the means by which we jointly and individually take respon-
sibility for the conclusions we talk ourselves into. To think about how to give 
a eulogy, how to prepare a business presentation, or how to conclude a sale is 
rhetorical but not quite yet architectonic; we must go deeper. Underneath all, a 
rhetorical way of living assumes that most of those decisions are contingent and 
arguable, and thus eschews dogma and strident certainty as much as possible. 
This commitment abandons the search for foundational certainty in every ques-
tion that has plagued so much philosophy over the centuries. A rhetorical way of 
living does not see uncertainty, doubt, and ambiguity as the fly in the ointment 
of epistemology, it sees epistemology as a pot of fly ointment.
Throughout history in the West, there have been a few great systems of 
thought that were taken to be architectonic. Of course, any system of thought 
may be so taken. One could structure the world and thought about it culinarily, 
or in terms of tobacco, I suppose. But the most likely systems to be architectonic 
are those with as little subject matter of their own as possible. A system that is 
widely capable of structuring but that imposes very little of its own subject — that 
is what makes a system architectonic.
Any architectonic system of discourse is prey to extremism, if understood as 
the application of a discursive system in inappropriate ways to matters for which 
other systems are better suited. Of course, what is appropriate or not, overreach-
ing or not, is a matter of some dispute. But I think it is much easier to fall prey to 
extremism if one sends one’s discursive commitment on a mission to conquer the 
world, than if that system is assigned a more restricted and local task.
We have discussed two such systems already: one is philosophy, to which we 
will turn in a moment, and the other is rhetoric of course, which has no subject 
matter of its own. Gorgias claimed to speak about anything at all, and he could 
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do that because, unlike, let us say, economics, which insists on its own content 
area and information, rhetoric has no such content. If I were to tell you, “be rhe-
torical,” you could not proceed. Yet, paradoxically, I can tell you “be rhetorical 
about X,” where X is nearly any subject matter at all, and you could, like Gorgias, 
proceed to give an argument, a speech, a persuasive appeal about X. That does not 
mean that one should do so. If a rhetorical definition of extremism is to hyper-
extend a claim of sure and certain systems into domains that are uncertain and 
contingent, there is likewise a disease of rhetoric to be found in the impulse to be 
contentious about matters for which there are sure and certain systems to settle 
the matter. But for most everyday decisions, and as Aristotle noted above, for 
those decisions that come within the understanding and experience of most peo-
ple, rhetoric can be architectonic.
Marcus Tullius Cicero’s vision of the orator in his treatise by the same name 
imagines the ideal civic leader as one who is trained rhetorically, and who can 
approach any subject at all — but rhetorically (De Oratore). Even the knowledge 
made of sure and certain systems such as biology or mathematics may be sub-
sumed architectonically by rhetoric, depending upon careful use. In the United 
States today, the sure and certain knowledge that childhood vaccination pre-
vents serious diseases like measles, and is very unlikely to cause autism, evidently 
needs rhetorical help to persuade the recalcitrant and fretful to vaccinate their 
children. And so an architectonic use of rhetoric might take the sure and certain 
(for the moment, at least) conclusions of, in this example, medical science and 
still think about how those conclusions can be spread persuasively. The question 
of whether to build a bridge may need some sure and certain knowledge from the 
definite system of engineering, but the architectonic rhetorician will be thinking 
all the time about how to “sell” such a bridge to the public.
The second great architectonic system to which we have briefly alluded is 
philosophy, writ large. I realize the distinction between philosophy and rheto ric 
is problematic for some, and one may recall Calvin Schrag’s placement of rheto-
ric at the “end of philosophy.” Of course, there are many philosophies, and not all 
are in agreement, but the general method of rational argument and exchange so 
as to pursue some kind of truth standard, exemplified in Plato’s dialectic, is surely 
what we might call philosophical. To be clear, to think architectonically using 
philosophy does not quite mean to be an idealist, a pragmatist, a phenomenologist, 
and so forth. Those are particular philosophical methods. To be architectoni-
cally philosophical goes to a way of living and being in the world as surely as is 
architectonic rhetoric: the commitment to arguing and exchanging rationally, 
examining premises underlying claims, and thinking about contradictions and 
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consistencies in discursive claims, to which I alluded above. This way of living 
and being, of habitually thinking about the world, is what I mean here by philos-
ophy, and by philosophy used architectonically.
As a side note, there are those who argue that the sophists were likewise 
philosophers, and not only rhetoricians (Jarratt). This claim is just, and I would 
answer it by saying that some of those called sophists were clearly what we might 
call philosophers (e.g., Protagoras) and some who were called sophists were 
clearly rhetoricians (e.g., Gorgias). For the sake of argument I am dividing the 
world of discourse in ways that actual thinkers and writers did not necessarily 
sort out into so neatly, but would plead in my defense that there are always hybrid 
ways of thinking, and that one might think rhetorically at times and philosoph-
ically at other times.
If I cannot reasonably tell you to “be rhetorical,” then I would have not 
much more success in telling you to “be philosophical.” I must give you a subject 
matter to which you might apply the methods of whatever your philosophy may 
be. Philosophy, also, may take the results of sure and certain systems and reason 
about them; if we know with some certainty that vaccinations prevent childhood 
diseases, then is it ethical to require that all children be so vaccinated? What 
are the civic and familial duties of parents in this regard? The architectonically 
thinking philosopher will be engaged with questions like that, making use of 
the sure and certain knowledge offered by medicine. Like rhetoric, philosophy 
may become an extremism if it attempts to decide questions for which we have 
other sure and certain systems to guide us, but it may certainly explore systems of 
reasoning and it may explore implications of those sure and certain systems. To 
be clear, philosophy, or a particular philosophy, may conclude that it does have a 
sure and certain system to guide knowledge, in that it reasons better or proceeds 
from superior premises. I am arguing that extremism occurs when that surety 
and certainty is extended to matters for which there are other systems with better 
claims to surety and certainty.
A third system of thinking and of discourse that I will now mention is also 
often but not always used architectonically, and that is religion, in all its varied 
versions. One hesitates even to bring up the term for fear of definitional tangles, 
but let us take a garden variety meaning of it, that religion is a system of thought 
meant to explain ultimate, foundational meanings grounded in transcendent, 
metaphysical, spiritual, and cosmic terms. We may argue over what exactly reli-
gion means, but if one were to give you a choice, “Jainism or the rules of tennis,” 
I think there would be little genuine disagreement as to which is the religion. As 
with rhetoric and philosophy, religion is, broadly speaking, a way of knowing 
46 Part 1 • Chapter 3
and being in the world. If phenomenology is one variation that a philosophical 
way of thinking and being might take, then Catholicism or Hinduism are vari-
ations that a religious way of thinking and being might take. So it may be more 
accurate, if we want to understand religious thinking as architectonic, to see it as 
a way of living and being that is fundamentally an attunement to spirit, to meta-
physical dimensions of life and experience, to mystery, to transcendent structures 
of consciousness and influence.
Now, I have known ordinary people for whom religion is architectonic. One 
cannot bid these folks good morning without receiving a reply couched in reli-
gious terms, such as “a good morning to do the Lord’s work.” One might well 
argue that the great religious systems, especially as embodied in institutions, 
can be used architectonically and have an explanation and an answer for every 
issue, question, or decision one could put to them. As with rhetoric and philoso-
phy, religion per se has no subject matter, but instead bodies forth in the subject 
matter of a specific religion, and even then can be applied with astonishing, and 
perhaps worrying, ease to any issue that might come up. You won’t get very far 
telling someone “be religious,” but if you say, “what’s the Catholic take on this,” 
the answer will be quickly forthcoming, no matter what the “this” may be.
The architectonic uses of religion can become extremist when they are 
applied to questions for which there are sure and certain systems that are not reli-
gious in nature. Religion has, of course, its own sureties, but when they encroach 
inappropriately on the better-founded sureties of other systems of thought, 
extremism ensues. Examples would include those who see an outbreak of measles 
following the reluctance of parents to vaccinate their children as God’s venge-
ful will (when medical science has a well established pathology of measles), or 
who see God’s hand in a storm that devastates an area they regard as particularly 
sinful and apostate (when meteorology has a well established model of weather 
patterns). As with rhetoric and philosophy, this does not mean that there can be 
no religious treatment of the products of sure and certain systems. Religion can 
see God as the transcendent foundation from which the laws of nature spring. 
Religion can take what we know about vaccinations and suggest what our duties 
are as Methodists, or Buddhists, or Rastafarians given that knowledge.
Can science be used as a fourth architectonic system? Some have done so, 
such as the logical positivists of the first half of the twentieth century. The ques-
tion raises the issue of what science is, and if used architectonically, will it mean 
something deeper than the particular sciences of, for example, botany or chem-
istry. Like rhetoric, philosophy, and religion, architectonic science is a way of 
thinking and being in the world, which manifests itself in physics, astronomy, 
biology, and so on. What is the fundamental way of thinking architectonically 
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through science? More complete answers to that question will be found in the 
other chapters in this volume, but to provide a working meaning, architectonic 
science is a commitment to objectivity, a commitment to methods, ideas, and 
conclusions that are objectively and communally examinable, the effacement of 
self (including emotions and biases) in deference to method and community, and 
perhaps most of all, a commitment to skepticism and doubt. Doubt is the spec-
ter that haunts every scientific inquiry, and levels of confidence that any given 
finding cannot be doubted, cannot be the result of chance, are the hallmark of 
science especially in regards to experiments. If a scientist declares a finding at the 
level of .0001, she is saying there is very little reason to doubt that the finding is 
random or the result of chance.
Just as all our architectonic systems have their extremisms and diseases, a 
surfeit of skepticism can be harmful as well. The Renaissance philosopher and 
rhetorician Giambattista Vico said of the skeptical scientific systems of his day,
Philosophical criticism is the subject which we compel our youths to take up 
first. Now, such speculative criticism, the main purpose of which is to cleanse 
its fundamental truths not only of all falsity, but also of the mere suspicion 
of error, places upon the same plane of falsity not only false thinking, but 
also those secondary verities and ideas which are based on probability alone, 
and commands us to clear our minds of them. Such an approach is distinctly 
harmful, since training in common sense is essential to the education of ado-
lescents. (On 13)
He argues a rhetorical training is precisely what induces common sense, an abil-
ity to make decisions in the absence of certainty. Common sense is the judicious, 
prudent balancing of skepticism with affirmation. And indeed, rhetoric has 
always studied what may be said on both sides of any issue. Vico advocates a rhe-
torical training that teaches, first, affirmation, and then the skepticism needed to 
question claims.
Complications and Cautions
Here I want to register some caveats and cautions as to what I have argued above. 
In the first place, I want to be clear that there are other systems of thought and 
discourse that may also be used architectonically, at the same time that I want 
to say that the four systems I have reviewed need not be used architectonically 
even if they often are. And I want to stress that although I began with a rhetor-
ical definition of extremism, I want to claim that the discursive world is full of 
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extremisms, which I have come around to defining as extending one’s architec-
tonic system into a realm for which the wider culture considers it inapplicable.
I also want to caution the reader that sure and certain systems change their 
conclusions from time to time; where once science produced phlogiston and 
ether, now it does not. And entire sure and certain systems themselves change. 
Few people think that astrology or phrenology produce such knowledge now, 
even if some thought so in the past. A sure and certain system is always culturally 
validated, cordoned off from serious doubt for a moment, treated as a settled 
and sedimented path to knowledge, but that cultural validation can change. 
Sometimes the reasons for validating or invalidating a system are ideological, as 
in the church’s quarrel with Galileo, both claiming sure and certain systems at 
the same time. And surely the use of any discourse architectonically is influenced 
by ideology as well.
We should also briefly raise the question of how a system works architec-
tonically if it is not verbal, for all the systems we have considered so far were 
at least symbolic if not verbal. This raises the obvious question as to whether 
art, or perhaps more accurately aesthetics, can be an architectonic system. How 
can we be architectonic with symbols yet not with language? Mathematics may 
be used architectonically; I have heard, perhaps apocryphally, of departments of 
mathematics whose faculty claimed they could render the Gettysburg Address 
into mathematical terms, which is surely architectonic. I leave it to the reader 
to consider whether that is an extremism. What can we say of varieties of mys-
tic religion which claim no symbolic mediation in the direct experience of the 
divine? I do not intend to settle these questions, but merely to raise the issue to 
be taken up at another time.
Finally, a judgment of extremism in relationship to an architectonic system 
and its relationship to sure and certain systems may not be as clear in practice as 
in principle. Another way to put this is to say that here I have articulated some 
very broad and sweeping principles for which one may find many exceptions and 
gradations. Let me caution the reader that whatever value one finds in views of 
extremism must be tempered by the examination of the details of particular 
grounded uses of systems of discourse.
Examples
Let me note that at least two other essays in this volume explore textual examples 
that illustrate the principles discussed here. David J. Tietge argues that Disney 
nature films shift the treatment of nature from scientific to rhetorical, specifically 
commodified, terms. And Alan G. Gross raises questions about Steven Pinker’s 
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attempt to handle arguable issues such as history and language as if they could be 
addressed better through the sure and certain methods of science.
I myself want, by way of example and illustration, to examine a particular 
discourse that may be extremist in its moving in on what the rest of the culture 
might take to be sure and certain systems. I call the reader’s attention to a web-
page, Vaccines: A Religious Contention, that appears to be grounded in religion 
as an architectonic system that attacks the sure and certain systems of medical 
science, at least at this point in our cultural history. A screen copy of this page 
is included in the appendix. Settled medical science argues that vaccinations are 
important preventatives of disease and are important measures in preserving 
public health. The reader may be interested to note that although the burden 
of the page’s argument is clearly religious, citing the traditions of many faiths, it 
concludes by claiming to be another one of our architectonic systems, namely, 
philosophy.
There is an interesting anonymity about this article. It appears on the Vaccine 
Awareness Network. If one clicks on that link from this page one comes to the 
home page for the network but finds out no more about who actually is speaking 
here. At the start of the current page under examination is a photograph of a 
young girl, with the caption, “Alicia playing Mary, Jesus’s Mother, in a play.” We 
don’t know who Alicia is, but presumably she is the child of the author of this 
article. An implied frame of family and parental responsibility is thus established 
from the start.
By claiming the mantle of a network, and by selective citation of some com-
ments from “members” of the public or the network, the impression is created of 
a community of discourse, holding similar beliefs. What will be an opposition 
between religious and scientific discourses is explicitly announced on this home 
page, with this quotation: “Qui medice vivit misere vivit — Roman saying, ‘He 
who Lives Medically Lives Miserably.’ ” Once into the page that is the specific 
focus of examination here, it is clear that the religious is opposed to the medical 
and thus to the scientific.
The article opens by grounding itself in religious ways of thinking: Christian, 
Jewish, Buddhist, Mormon, even atheism, which after all is a system of thought 
oriented toward religion. The author identifies himself or herself as originally 
Greek Orthodox. It is in reference to these religious doctrines that the central 
theme of the article is introduced, which is a religious prohibition against putting 
into the body that which is bad for it. In contrast to the immunizations offered by 
medical science, the religious alternative of “spiritual immunization is offered.” 
The very start of the article quotes one Dr. Golden who says, “To someone whose 
god is science, vaccination makes sense. But to someone whose god is God, it is 
50 Part 1 • Chapter 3
appalling.” Note that the identification of the two systems of discourse, science 
and religion, as capable of being taken as “god” is about as architectonic as it gets. 
Thus the article explicitly opposes religious and scientific ways of thinking, with 
clear implications that this is done at the level of the architectonic.
The author acknowledges that “there was no vaccination in biblical times,” 
and launches into a reading of various religious texts on a theme of prohibiting 
putting harmful substances into the body. Note that this exercise, although it 
will mention other religions, is explicitly connected to the Bible from the very 
start, and thus, Christianity. What follows is an interesting combination of quo-
tations from canonical scripture (Deuteronomy, Genesis) as well as apocryphal 
texts (Wisdom of Sirach). References that appear to be to scholarly or scientific 
sources, such as an article by Tim O’Shea, or a reference to the Encylopaedia 
Brittanica, are cited as if to subsume scientific discourse within the religious 
orientation of this article. Note also that at the end of the article, in discussing 
Islam, a Muslim author, Dr. Aisha Hamdan, with scholarly credentials is enlisted 
to make the statement, and she concludes thus: “We must believe in the perfec-
tion of Allah’s creation and understand that immunizations are in no way able 
to improve upon it. Chances are that they will only disturb the system and intro-
duce an imperfection (which is already being determined by research).” Note the 
reference to “research,” which here is anticipated and indeed subsumed by reli-
gious thinking.
Religious thinking is used to power some big leaps of exegesis. The Book of 
Acts is quoted to the effect that we must obey God rather than men. But then 
vaccination is mentioned as a man-made substance, and not a natural function 
given by God. Of course, so are cherry pie, cheeseburgers, and buttermilk, but the 
author is picking carefully the human products she opposes. Religious belief is 
shown in every case to obviate medical vaccinations through the superior means 
of spiritual vaccination, although exactly what that might be is not made clear.
The kind of Christianity that makes the author’s system of thought 
becomes clearer as it is set apart by sections, first from Mormonism, then Roman 
Catholicism, and then the Jehovah’s Witnesses, before leaping the pale entirely 
to examine non-Christian religions. A kind of protestant, evangelical Christian 
system of thought is thus implied by this structure of religious discourse. The 
article ranges widely over other religions, and in a friendly way, but the struc-
turing of the religions confessing Christ at the beginning reveals the author’s 
orientation.
My claim that this article is extremist because it moves in on a terrain 
that is properly left to scientific discourse — that it in fact attempts to subsume 
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scientific discourse and the appearance of that discourse onto its own religious 
terrain — may well be controversial. As noted above, what counts as extremism is 
often culturally and ideologically determined. But I think at the very least a kind 
of discursive imperialism may be claimed for the stance this article takes, and I 
would claim that is imperialist as a result of an overreaching architectonic use of 
religious discourse.
Conclusion
The search for an architectonic discourse is a natural human yearning. Especially 
in times of great change, competing loyalties, and the collapse of magisterial 
means for deciding among the claims of many discourses, the temptation is great 
to embrace a discourse architectonically. Consider this essay as a plea to take any 
discourse architectonically with a great deal of caution. I’m not advising one to 
be un- or anti-architectonic, but simply to be cautious when doing so. History 
has seen too many burnings, too many wars, and too much incivility engendered 
by certainty. Even a commitment to the uncertainties of rhetoric can become a 
kind of certainty, an extremism of not yielding to the settled conclusions of sure 
and certain systems. Picking a judicious and prudent path among discourses is 
difficult, and the path sometimes becomes unclear, but we live in a world where I 
think it is the wisest path to pursue.
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Chapter 4
Science and the Idea of Culture
Richard van Oort
Abstract
This chapter argues that the conflict between the sciences and the human-
ities is best understood not in terms of local cultural differences between 
scientists and humanists (C. P. Snow’s “two cultures”), but rather in terms of 
the more fundamental problem of language origin. Is language an extension 
of animal communication systems, or is it something radically different? Is 
it explainable in purely Darwinian terms, or is it an evolutionary anomaly 
without precedent in history? The view of culture we adopt depends on how 
we answer this basic anthropological question.
A major theme running through all the essays in this volume is the influence 
of culture and society on science. Maarten Boudry and Massimo Pigliucci are 
merely more explicit than most when they conclude their contribution by saying 
that “science is social to the bone.” Like all the authors in this volume, I take it 
as given that science exists only within the context of human beings and there-
fore deserves to be considered from a specifically anthropological perspective. 
More precisely, I think we can sharpen the debate about the cultural and social 
foundations of science by considering it within the context of the debate about 
the origin and function of culture. If culture is indispensable to science, then the 
success of the latter is tied to the success of the former. But what is culture and 
how do we explain its historical success? This is a specifically anthropological 
question — and it deserves a specifically anthropological answer.
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It is tempting to superimpose our anthropological intuitions about culture 
onto our idea of science. Isn’t science itself a kind of culture? After all, scientists 
have to interact with one another, and the concepts they use tend to be highly 
specific to the research communities they inhabit. Surely we can therefore speak 
of scientists as possessing a distinct culture, one that is not readily understood by 
outsiders unfamiliar with the specialized knowledge of the scientific community.
That scientists do possess a distinct and specialized culture was the view of 
C. P. Snow in his much discussed and now classic 1959 lecture at Cambridge 
University on the “Two Cultures.” Snow pitted scientists against humanist 
intellectuals. What Snow regarded as regrettable was the mutual distrust and 
suspicion between the two groups. Humanists spoke one language, scientists 
another. Snow’s sympathies were firmly with the scientists. They were the more 
progressive community — not in any political sense, but in the sense that his-
tory was on their side. It is often forgotten that the underlying theme of Snow’s 
essay was not the rather toothless idea that humanists and scientists needed 
to start talking to one another. Rather, it was the notion that humanists had 
become obsolete in a world driven by science and technology. Snow’s essay was 
an attempt to historicize and explain this situation. Of course, there was a moral 
point to Snow’s discussion. The scientific and technological revolutions of the 
West had brought unprecedented prosperity to those lucky enough to be living 
in that part of the world that had undergone the miracle of industrialization and 
the subsequent consumer revolution. How could undeveloped countries catch 
up with their more technologically advanced counterparts so that they too could 
share in the wealth, comfort, and convenience of modern culture? Seen against 
the backdrop of this larger picture, humanist intellectuals came off as rather 
complacent, if not downright backward, in their attachment to a conception of 
culture that seemed strangely at odds with the wonders of modernization.
In this sense one must regard F. R. Leavis’s attack on Snow as unsurprising. 
A lecturer in English at Cambridge, Leavis had remained silent in the immedi-
ate aftermath of Snow’s lecture, despite the national and international attention 
the talk had attracted. But in 1962, on the occasion of the Richmond Lecture 
at Downing College, he could contain himself no longer. In a scathing riposte 
(later published in The Spectator as “The Significance of C. P. Snow: The Two 
Cultures?”), Leavis described Snow as “portentously ignorant” (53) and a “non-
entity” (57), a man who had absolutely no talent or originality for either science 
or culture (Snow was a novelist as well as a scientist), but was instead a mere 
cipher for larger forces which he did not understand and therefore could not 
explain. In short, Snow was a fraud and an impostor.
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Leavis’s ad hominem attack was unnecessary (and indeed quite beside the 
point), but the notion that Snow was riding the wake of a wave he did not cre-
ate and therefore could not take credit for was certainly accurate. In pointing 
out the superior cognitive power of science over the humanities, Snow was 
stating the obvious. The merit of his discussion was less in making this particu-
lar claim, which was self-evidently true, than in the minimal fuss with which the 
claim was presented. Unlike Leavis’s assessment of the situation, there was noth-
ing ill-tempered or defensive about Snow’s recognition of the imbalance between 
the sciences and humanities. Of course, once this imbalance is recognized and 
owned up to, anxiety is inevitable. Self-doubt and self-justification set in. What 
is the point of the humanities? Despite their very different temperaments, both 
Snow and Leavis were responding to the same general anxiety about the function 
of the humanities in a scientific culture. Science generates no similar anxiety or 
hand-wringing. Its long list of achievements in producing prosperity has secured 
its position at the leading edge of serious cognition in society.
Next to this list of achievements, the record of humanists is much less 
impressive. What concepts do humanists possess that guarantee their indispens-
ability? Snow strongly implied that there were in fact no equivalently powerful 
humanist concepts. This was indeed the point of Leavis’s heated attack. As far 
as Leavis was concerned, Snow was an ignoramus who hadn’t the faintest clue 
about what constituted genuine cultural value. The aggressiveness of Leavis’s 
position was of a piece with his aesthetic modernism. Modernists tended to see 
themselves as the last guardians of high culture in a world polluted by the sen-
timentality and clichés of consumer culture. Hence they defined themselves in 
opposition to the cultural products of the marketplace. Whatever culture is, it is 
most definitely not that.
Here it is necessary to define the notion of culture more precisely. The 
concept remains rather ill-defined in Snow’s essay. It is, for example, not at all 
clear whether it is helpful to speak of scientists as possessing a culture that can 
be opposed to the culture of humanists. While it is obvious that the concepts 
underpinning scientific knowledge are quite different from those underpinning 
humanist knowledge, the nature of this difference needs to be clarified.
In a book published five years after Snow’s lecture, the anthropologist and 
philosopher Ernest Gellner took up the same topic in the context of a discus-
sion of the wider philosophical implications of the historical transformation 
Snow had identified. In Thought and Change (1964), Gellner describes the dif-
ference between the sciences and the humanities in a characteristically stark and 
lucid fashion. The concepts of science, he says, are technical and difficult for a 
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nonspecialist to understand; but they are cognitively powerful (i.e., they are 
demonstratively powerful in explaining nature, thus enabling us to manipulate it 
with increasing precision and effectiveness). The concepts of the humanities, on 
the other hand, are nontechnical and relatively easy to understand, but they are 
“cognitively feeble” (203) (i.e., humanist knowledge is powerless when it comes 
to explaining and manipulating the physical world). More to the point, the fun-
damental concepts underlying humanist knowledge are easily accessible because 
they concern all humanity.
This point is perhaps too easily forgotten. Humanists, in their haste to 
emulate scientists, have been quick to produce their own kinds of specialized 
knowledge. This is understandable, but the situation is not really analogous to 
scientific knowledge. There is nothing to be gained in cognitive or explanatory 
power by adding layers of technical concepts or specialized jargon to humanist 
knowledge. It is for this reason that Snow’s idea of the two cultures is inadequate 
as an attempt to describe the difference between the two kinds of knowledge. 
What is needed is not merely a sense of science and the humanities as two dif-
ferent cultures, but an awareness of the anthropological origin of culture itself. 
Missing from Snow’s discussion is the idea that culture defines not merely a 
community of like-minded individuals, whether they be humanists or scien-
tists, but the role of culture in our very definition of humanity. Leavis, it must be 
admitted, understood this aspect of the problem better than Snow. But Leavis’s 
conception of culture remains too bound to the high cultural tradition to pro-
vide us with a theory adequate to the task of explaining the cultural origins of 
humanity. Hence Leavis’s rebuttal merely had the effect of accentuating the very 
difference Snow emphasized in his lecture.
How then are we to explain not just the differences between particular cul-
tures but the origin of culture upon which those differences are based? Compared 
to other animals, humans are notoriously unconstrained by their biology when it 
comes to their social behavior. You can take an infant from one kind of society, 
say, modern industrial society, and place it in another kind of society, say, an 
Amazonian tribe, and it will easily acquire the cultural behavior of that partic-
ular community. Obviously, the situation can be reversed: the tribal baby could 
be adopted into the home of well-to-do lawyers in London. It could then make 
its expected passage through Eton and Oxford and become a successful barrister. 
There are no biological constraints on whether the baby becomes a tribal shaman 
or a barrister.
This kind of biological or genetic flexibility is rather unusual. It does not exist 
in insect societies and it exists only very minimally among social animals such as 
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chimpanzees. For example, chimpanzees use certain kinds of rudimentary tools. 
They fish for termites with sticks and they crack open nuts with stones. The sticks 
must be slender enough and long enough to reach deep into the termite mound, 
and the stones must be carefully selected for their appropriateness for the task 
of hammering nuts. Tool use is not something that is given by the chimpanzee’s 
biology; it is a learned behavior, and this creates the conditions for some minimal 
or incipient variation in behavior among individuals (i.e., some individuals will 
be more adept at using these tools than others). In some groups we can assume 
that more efficient habits of termite fishing or nut cracking will catch on, and 
these groups will be selected for in the Darwinian contest of survival. Surely the 
origin of human culture is to be found in these kinds of examples from chim-
panzee life.
There is one major difficulty with this view and it concerns the appropri-
ateness of the analogy itself. Can one really describe chimpanzee tool use as 
analogous to human culture? Are not the differences more striking than the sim-
ilarities? For instance, why does chimpanzee culture remain obstinately stuck 
at the level of fishing for termites and cracking nuts with stones? What pre-
vents chimpanzees from building on this rudimentary technology in the same 
way humans do? It is an obvious fact that cultural variation among humans is 
immense. There is a big difference between a stone chopper and a computer. Why 
don’t we observe the same kind of variation among chimpanzees?
In his classic anthropological study of religion, The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life, Émile Durkheim argued that the purely instrumental or positiv-
ist approach was the wrong way to go about explaining human culture. Culture 
is not a technology that allows humans to manipulate their environment more 
effectively. Rather, it is a way of constraining individual behavior by imposing on 
the world of everyday perception a symbolic reality that exists only relative to the 
group of which the individual is a participating member. This is how Durkheim 
defined the sacred. The sacred is what the individual is initiated into by virtue 
of membership in the community. Durkheim called this process “collective rep-
resentation.” Psychologists today call it “collective intentionality.” Whatever we 
choose to call it, it appears to be unique to humans.
How did this collective imposition of the sacred onto the world of individ-
ual experience originate? This is a much less easy question to answer. But the 
question is worth asking because it allows us to see in a particularly vivid fashion 
the relevance of the humanities to fundamental anthropological inquiry.
The scientific answer to this question has already been given. Human cul-
ture is an amplification of the many learned behaviors observable in other social 
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species. With sufficient time, no doubt the chimpanzees, too, will start modify-
ing their sticks and stones into more complex technological forms and, presto, 
eventually they too will have cultures as variable and complex as humans. The 
trouble with this answer is that there is absolutely no evidence for it. Chimpanzees 
have been studied intensively for the last fifty years or so, but revealing though 
these studies have been, they have not led to the discovery of the “missing link” 
between humans and apes. Durkheim did not have the benefit of the ethologi-
cal data available to scientists today, but his basic intuition about the anomaly 
of human culture when compared to animal social systems remains as relevant 
today as it was when he inveighed against the uncritical empiricism of Max 
Müller and the Victorian anthropologists. Language simply does not work in the 
same way that animal signal systems work. Words are not created by generalizing 
from one’s perceptual experiences. A prelinguistic infant left to grow up alone on 
a desert island will not acquire language from its solitary perceptual experiences.
One of the best recent explanations of the difference between language and 
animal communication systems comes from the evolutionary anthropologist 
and neuroscientist Terrence Deacon. In The Symbolic Species (1997), Deacon 
argues that all communication systems use iconic and indexical reference strat-
egies, but only one (language) makes use of symbolic reference. For example, 
in order to interpret smoke as an index of fire, one must be able to generalize 
from previous experiences of smoke and fire. The perception of smoke is iconic 
of previous experiences of smoke. The index is an abstraction from previous 
iconic experiences. That is, on the basis of only a limited amount of information 
(smoke), one infers the presence of the missing element (fire). Smoke indicates 
not just earlier perceptual experiences of smoke (smoke is iconic of smoke), but 
something which is perceptually absent (fire).
Indexical signal systems can be quite powerful. The famous case of vervet 
monkey alarm calls, for example, is wholly describable within the framework of 
indexical and iconic reference. These calls have evolved to refer to distinct cate-
gories of predator: leopard, eagle, and snake. Each call generates a distinct flight 
response in the monkey. Leopards can be evaded by climbing into the outer 
branches of a tree where the leopard is too large to follow. But this is the worst 
place to go if an eagle is attacking, so an eagle alarm call prompts the monkey 
to hide in the denser foliage at the center of the tree where eagles cannot fly. 
Meanwhile, the best response to the alarm call for a snake is to stand still and 
scour the ground to look for the offending animal (vervet monkeys do this by 
standing upright on their hind legs).
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It is tempting to interpret these alarm calls as precursors of words because 
they appear to possess two key features of words: arbitrariness and displacement. 
There is no necessary connection between the call and its referent (arbitrariness), 
and the sign works independently of the presence of the predator (displacement). 
When researchers play a tape recording of the call, the monkeys respond with the 
appropriate flight pattern. As Deacon shows, however, these calls are still fun-
damentally indexical in structure. They have evolved over many generations to 
produce a highly predictable response pattern in the monkey. Deacon also shows 
that indexical calls can be genetically assimilated. That is, these calls are hard-
wired into each individual vervet brain. Juvenile vervets do not learn to produce 
alarm calls by imitating other vervets. In this sense vervet alarm calls are more 
like screams than words. If for some reason leopards, eagles, and snakes were to 
vanish from the habitat of vervet monkeys, the reference power of these calls 
would disappear because there would be no selection pressure on them. Notice 
that this is not the same for words, which continue to exist even when they can-
not be verified. How many of us can claim to have seen or spoken to God? Despite 
the poverty of the stimulus, we still seem to be able to understand the word.
According to Deacon, the key to understanding the difference between a 
word and a vervet monkey alarm call is the way in which reference is structured 
in each case. What makes the alarm call “stick” to its object is the physical conti-
guity between sign and object. Researchers can dupe the monkey into believing 
that there is a leopard present in the bushes by reproducing the appropriate alarm 
call on a tape recorder, but this deception functions against the background of 
the real call which must refer to real leopards if the call is to survive over the 
course of multiple generations. In contrast, what keeps the reference of words in 
place is not a one-to-one correlation between the sign and its worldly object. It is 
something much more abstract. A word has meaning; it points to a general idea. 
But what keeps the idea in place? The idea is kept in place by the relationships 
among the words themselves. Words possess a grammar or syntax — a set of com-
binatory rules — that guide reference to the external world. Thus words possess 
a dual reference. They refer to objects in the real world. But the way in which 
they refer to the world is not via a one-to-one indexical correlation between sign 
and referent but by the relationships among the words themselves. This is what 
Deacon means by symbolic reference. Symbolic reference is the relationship 
among abstract symbols or tokens that in the course of human ontogeny takes 
increasing precedence over the more basic indexical and iconic reference strate-
gies of our perceptual systems.
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But how did this type of reference system ever get off the ground in the first 
place? This is a problem very few of the scientific specialists regard as a problem 
at all. Deacon is a rare exception. Almost alone among scientists, he sees that 
humanity is a radical outlier when it comes to its use of symbolic reference strat-
egies. This presents a genuine problem for science, and for evolutionary theory in 
particular. In adopting such an anomalous reference system, humans are not just 
a super-intelligent ape but a whole new phylum. Deacon insists on this point: “It 
is not just the origins of our biological species that we seek to explain, but the 
origin of our novel form of mind. Biologically, we are just another ape. Mentally, 
we are a new phylum of organisms. In these two seemingly incommensurate facts 
lies a conundrum that must be resolved before we have an adequate explanation 
of what it means to be human” (Symbolic Species 23).
Deacon sees with great clarity the anomaly of human origin. From a strictly 
biological point of view, there is no anomaly. Humans originated the way all spe-
cies originated, that is, through a relatively slow process of genetic change and 
selection. Hence the intense interest today in chimpanzees and other nonhuman 
primates. They represent our closest living link to our hominid ancestors. But 
at some point in human evolution, genetic change was superseded by cultural 
change. This change gave birth to a whole new category of being, namely, human 
consciousness. To what extent is this new consciousness describable by the sci-
ences of biology, chemistry, and physics?
This question takes us back to the debate between Snow and Leavis con-
cerning the use of the humanities. Despite the more up-to-date terms in which I 
have presented the question, the debate has not changed a great deal in its overall 
tone. Science continues to be progressive, which is to say, it continues to make 
discoveries which unlock more and more of nature’s secrets. Meanwhile, the 
humanities continue to suffer from an inferiority complex, which tends to mani-
fest itself in various forms of science envy and pseudoscience. Indeed, I think the 
inferiority complex of humanists is a great deal more pronounced today than it 
was when Snow first delivered his lecture on the two cultures. (For an excellent 
account of the invidious creep of scientism into the humanities, see Raymond 
Tallis’s Aping Mankind.)
What the reference to the problem of human origin enables us to see more 
clearly is the limits of science when it comes to explaining human conscious-
ness. It is in the nature of the case that human origin cannot be explained 
exclusively on the basis of human biology. And the reason for this is that human 
origin is defined by human culture, and human culture is not reducible to the 
genetic mechanisms of evolutionary theory. More specifically, human culture 
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is not reducible to the genetically assimilable indexical sign systems used by all 
other animals, including our closest living relatives, chimpanzees. As Deacon 
shows, symbolic learning strategies are massively counterintuitive for chimps. It 
requires considerable external social support from their human trainers to get 
chimpanzees to set aside their indexical reference strategies in order to adopt the 
counterintuitive reference strategy of symbols.
These language-training experiments are highly illuminating because they 
show that, contrary to the Chomskian view that there must be some preexisting 
“language module” in the brain, the brain is actually not the key factor in the 
origin of language. Rather, it is the outside-the-brain context of human social 
organization. Early hominid ecology provided the social conditions in which 
it became possible to ignore the exigencies of indexical reference. This set up a 
feedback loop in which the ability to use symbols was selected for genetically. 
As Deacon nicely expresses the process of brain-language coevolution, language 
adapted itself to the hominid brain and the hominid brain adapted itself to lan-
guage. But the crucial factor in starting the entire coevolutionary process was 
the internal social arrangement of the human community itself. As Eric Gans 
has suggested, only a species for whom the most urgent problem was internal 
conflict between group members rather than external competition with other 
species could make the shift from indexical to symbolic reference strategies (The 
Scenic Imagination 202–09). Unlike vervet alarm calls, words are not directed 
in the first place toward external threats. Rather, they are directed toward the 
group itself. As Durkheim realized, the symbols of human culture are in the first 
place symbols of group membership. They indicate the individual’s attachment 
to a community of others who share the same collective view. These symbols of 
membership convert individual intentionality into collective intentionality, the 
“me” into a “we.”
As an example of what I am talking about, consider the elementary gesture 
of ostensive pointing. It is commonly believed that pointing is a natural ges-
ture that comes as easily to chimpanzees and dogs as it does to humans. This 
is not the case. Human pointing is not an index. When a dog points its nose in 
the direction of a duck in the reeds, its stance can be interpreted as an indexical 
sign of the duck. Likewise, when a chimpanzee reaches for a banana, its reach 
can be interpreted as an index of the banana. Laboratory chimpanzees, just like 
trained dogs, frequently use such gestures to indicate their desire for something. 
The chimp will point to the candy it wants, just as the dog will scratch at the door 
to indicate that it wishes to go outside. But only humans engage in pointing in 
order to share information for someone else’s benefit. This is what we mean by 
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pointing. When the baby reaches for its bottle, it is not pointing in this sense. 
Rather, it is expressing its desire, in the same manner as the dog that wishes to go 
outside, or the chimp that wants the candy. But when the child points to the car 
keys under the table, she is not expressing her desire for the keys but indicating 
the presence of something she believes her mother to be looking for.
The cognitive psychologist Michael Tomasello notes that this kind of point-
ing assumes a fairly high level of intersubjective complexity. More precisely, it 
requires both child and mother to engage in scenes of joint attention and joint 
intentionality (Human Thinking 32–79). The child must be able to differentiate 
her perspective from that of her mother. Furthermore, she must be able to adopt 
her mother’s point of view. She must be able to put herself in her mother’s shoes, 
and imagine what she is thinking. While trained chimpanzees frequently point 
to indicate that they want something, they never engage in cooperative pointing 
with either their trainers or other chimpanzees. For example, when a chimpan-
zee is faced with the task of guessing which bucket has food in it, it will not 
respond to the trainer who points to the bucket with the food. Instead it selects 
randomly. As Tomasello explains, the chimpanzee doesn’t understand cooper-
ative pointing because it does not engage in scenes of joint attention and joint 
intention (52). Chimpanzees have no conception of the “we” of collective inten-
tionality. In order to see that you are trying to indicate the presence of something 
for my benefit, I must be able to distinguish between your perspective and mine 
and, what is more, that you are aware of this and wish to help me. But this is 
possible only if we collectively represent the food as a shared goal of our activ-
ity. Human pointing is an elementary form of symbolic reference, and therefore 
of language.
We are now in a position to see the inadequacy of Snow’s idea of science as 
a self-contained culture. Culture, as Durkheim recognized, is concerned with 
establishing solidarity and community. Science cannot be described as having 
this as one of its aims. On the contrary, science is (notoriously) free of such explicit 
social or moral aims. Science is a method rather than a religion, philosophy, or 
moral worldview. The question one should therefore ask is not, “Is science a kind 
of culture?” but “What kind of society is capable of relaxing its cultural attach-
ments sufficiently to allow for science?” For better or worse, this is the kind of 
society in which we now live. It is a pluralistic society that lacks a clearly defined 
common culture to which all of its members can feel a cozy moral kinship. This 
is one of its problems. The sense of belonging is faint, if not completely absent. 
But in this kind of society, science can flourish. When concepts are not graded by 
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their proximity to the sacred or the Great Chain of Being, when they are graded 
by their correspondence to reality rather than their correspondence to what the 
chief or king or priest says, then cognition can separate itself from the sacred. 
But this is not the same thing as saying that science is a kind of culture. The fact 
that science flourishes only in a society that equalizes the relationships among 
concepts is, of course, enormously significant. But this equalization of concepts 
is not something that science itself can take credit for. Moral equalization is a 
product of the culture that preceded the scientific and technological revolutions 
in the West. Why this occurred when it did is a complex story. What concerns us 
here, however, are not the details of that story but the results.
As a general rule, culture is concerned with constraining individual desire. 
This is true of both hunter-gatherer societies and agrarian societies. Industrial or 
scientific society is exceptional in the sense that ethical and conceptual constraint 
is significantly relaxed. The cognitive ethic of agrarian society is rigidly hierar-
chical. Social stability is prized above all else. In contrast, industrial society is 
highly mobile and egalitarian. Individual identities are not rigidly tied to kinship 
or social status. Instead they are open and changing. This mobility reflects the 
opening of the cognitive and economic spheres to experimentation and choice. 
What is sacralized is method rather than concepts. Indeed, the sacralization of 
concepts takes a backseat to method. Gellner associates this liberation of cogni-
tion and production with “a rather special new and inwardly imposed restraint” 
(Anthropology 59). This new form of internal constraint is a “second-order sacral-
ization of procedural propriety,” which Gellner describes as “the rule of treating 
like cases alike, of conceptual tidiness, of the unification of referential concepts 
in an ideally unified system, and of their separation, to a remarkable extent, from 
the markers delimiting social conduct” (Anthropology 60).
The consequence of this liberation of cognition from cultural constraint is 
that our social rituals are no longer taken very seriously. Serious cognition today 
is associated with science, not with moral philosophy or theological doctrine. Yet 
science cannot tell us how to live. We still use the old rituals and ethical concepts, 
even if these no longer have the authority they once used to. As Gellner puts it, 
the link between serious cognition and daily life is “wobbly,” because “the supe-
rior kind of truth available in science is both unstable and largely lacking in any 
clear social implications” (Conditions 94).
So we continue to use the ethical concepts inherited from our prescientific 
cultural traditions but in a climate where respect for these cultural concepts is 
not automatic. One may speak of the decline of religious culture, but this process 
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is better described as an internalization of the sacred rather than a decline. As 
Snow pointed out, when disease and famine are no longer the pressing social 
concerns they used to be (thanks to modern science and technology), cultural 
constraint on desire begins to look rather quaint.
But this is not quite to concede a total victory for the sciences. When it 
comes to explaining culture, science will inevitably press up against its limits. For 
the concept of culture is meaningful only to those who also participate in it. This 
is the central paradox of culture. Culture depends upon biology because culture 
requires brains and brains are the products of biological evolution. But culture is 
also an institutional fact, in the sense described by John Searle. Searle distin-
guishes between the “brute” facts of physics, chemistry, and biology and the 
“institutional” facts of our social systems. Institutional facts occur when a social 
function is imposed on a brute fact. Searle’s favorite example is money, but the key 
evolutionary step occurs with the origin of collective intentionality: “the truly 
radical break with other forms of life comes when humans, through collective 
intentionality, impose functions on phenomena where the function cannot be 
achieved solely in virtue of physics and chemistry but requires continued human 
cooperation in the specific forms of recognition, acceptance, and acknowledg-
ment of a new status to which a function is assigned” (Construction 40).
As Searle makes clear, institutional facts require language. An increasing 
number of scientists are beginning to realize this fact about human culture. “It 
is simply not possible,” Deacon writes, “to understand human anatomy, human 
neurobiology, or human psychology without recognizing that they have all been 
shaped by something that could best be described as an idea: the idea of symbolic 
reference. Though symbolic thinking can be entirely personal and private, sym-
bolic reference is intrinsically social. Not only do we individually gain access to 
this powerful mode of representation through interactions with other members 
of the society in which we are born, but symbols themselves can be traced to a 
social origin” (409–10).
Snow criticized humanists for failing to take an interest in the work of 
their colleagues in the sciences. For the reasons Gellner states, genuine dialogue 
between humanists and scientists is rare. But there is one area in which dialogue 
seems both desirable and necessary. The problem of human origin concerns both 
parties alike. The sooner humanists recognize their stake in this fundamental 
question, the sooner they will be able to overcome their anxiety about the func-
tion of the humanities in a culture that privileges science as the only form of 
serious cognition.
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A Rhetorical Analysis of the Two 
Cultures in Literary Fiction
Ronald Soetaert and Kris Rutten
Abstract
This chapter reconstructs the debate between and about the “two cultures” 
from a rhetorical perspective. Science and literature are described as partic-
ular terministic screens, and the binary oppositions between these different 
“ways of seeing” are problematized. The major focus is on the importance of 
rhetoric and narrative in general and the role and function of the human-
ities — literary culture — in particular. Two novels (Saturday and The 
Children Act) are analyzed as a case study to reflect upon how the novelist 
Ian McEwan problematizes and thematizes the confrontation between art 
and science.
The Two Cultures
In this chapter we focus on the “two cultures” coined by C. P. Snow in 1959 
to describe the gap between literary intellectuals and scientists. In its afterlife, 
the concept survived as a trope framing the debate between the humanities and 
science. We — the authors — belong to the first tribe (the humanities) and in our 
research and teaching we argue for the importance of narrative and rhetoric. In 
what follows, we thematize and problematize specific binary oppositions in gen-
eral and we analyze two novels of Ian McEwan in particular as a case study to 
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reflect upon how a modern novelist deals with the ongoing debate between the 
two cultures.
As a scientist and literary author, Snow knew both academic tribes and could 
testify — as a kind of anthropologist — about the divide between them. Snow 
argues that the “members” rarely encounter each other in a fruitful dialogue or 
conversation. He warns that this indifference between the two cultures could 
become an obstacle for dealing with society’s major problems. Rhetorically, Snow 
addresses his colleagues from literary departments and makes them responsible 
for this absence of dialogue. An often quoted passage from the essay summarizes 
the major problem the author puts on the agenda: “A good many times I have 
been present at gatherings of people who, by the standards of the traditional cul-
ture, are thought highly educated and who have with considerable gusto been 
expressing their incredulity of scientists. Once or twice I have been provoked 
and have asked the company how many of them could describe the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics. The response was cold: it was also negative. Yet I was ask-
ing something which is the scientific equivalent of: Have you read a work of 
Shakespeare’s?” (The Two Cultures 14–15).
From a rhetorical perspective, Snow creates a scapegoat: the traditional 
humanistic literary scholar who lacks informed knowledge and so becomes out 
of tune in a world that has changed and is changing driven by major revolutions 
inspired by science and technology. It is difficult to deny — even for the hard-
boiled humanist — that scientific and technological revolutions have changed 
society and have brought prosperity and comfort for those who can benefit 
from them. Probably traditional humanists can feel offended by two major sug-
gestions: their lack of knowledge about science and the superiority of scientific 
knowledge. Although the debate of the two cultures can be described as a con-
frontation between science and the humanities, Snow mainly focuses on a gap 
between scientists and literary intellectuals. And indeed, the debate was further 
framed this way by the reaction of Cambridge literature professor F. R. Leavis, 
who attacked Snow with a number of ad hominem arguments: Snow was “por-
tentously ignorant” about culture in general, “intellectually as undistinguished 
as it is possible to be” (54), and as a novelist, “[could not] be said to know what a 
novel is” (53–54). Leavis defends the major value of the humanities inspired by 
the attack — which he takes personally — from Snow. But there is more: Leavis 
was deeply concerned about Snow’s ideas about education in general and his 
utilitarian perspectives on economic development in particular (see Hughson 
and Tapsel for a discussion about the rhetoric of Leavis; see also van Oort in 
this volume).
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In hindsight, Leavis makes a critical point that today is still high on the 
educational and political agenda: an economic logic based on technological 
development can hardly be considered the only mission for education. For exam-
ple, Gert Biesta recently argued for the importance of value judgments “that are 
not informed by instrumental values but by what we might best call ultimate val-
ues” — a Burkean adjective — in this case, “values about the aims and purposes of 
education” (35–36; see also Jennifer Richards). The arguments of Leavis echo a 
concern we have to deal with today: science and technology should be confronted 
with social, political, and cultural values to avoid an overoptimistic technocratic 
naivety. So, the argumentation goes further and deeper, and becomes more rele-
vant than the personal attack of Leavis on Snow.
The debate about the two cultures reappeared on the agenda in what has 
been coined “the science wars.” This controversy started in the 1990s with an 
attack on postmodern and poststructural thinking, and constructionism in gen-
eral. It is a debate that also focuses on the nature of scientific research and theory 
and the status of the scientific method based on objectivity. It is very difficult to 
summarize this controversy in a fair way because both participants very often 
complain that the other did not understand or present their position in a correct 
way. The trope “the science war” can make us wonder about who started the war. 
From the perspective of science, it could be argued that the war began from the 
moment that scientific research was described as a series of changing paradigms 
(Thomas Kuhn). All this (and much more of course) inspired postmodern think-
ing that focused on the idea that scientific theories were social constructs (again 
problematizing objective scientific knowledge) on a complex continuum with 
some midway views. The attack focuses on postmodern anti-intellectualism and 
relativism as a “flight from reason” (Gross et al.). The science wars, then, can be 
described as a kind of revival of the two cultures controversy.
Third Culture
It seems difficult to avoid binary thinking in this debate. But how do we deal 
with binaries? Even Snow (The Two Cultures 9) was aware of the drawbacks of 
binary thinking, because the number two “is a very dangerous number: that is 
why the dialectic is a dangerous process. Attempts to divide anything into two 
ought to be regarded with much suspicion.” And he further elaborates: “The 
clashing point of two subjects, two disciplines, two cultures — of two galaxies, 
so far as that goes — ought to produce creative chances. In the history of mental 
activity that has been where some of the breakthroughs came. The chances are 
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there now. But they are there, as it were, in a vacuum, because those in the two 
cultures can’t talk to each other. It is bizarre how very little of twentieth-century 
science has been assimilated into twentieth-century art” (The Two Cultures 16). 
Later in The Two Cultures and a Second Look, Snow suggests the importance of 
a possible mediating “third culture,” a zone in which the humanities and sci-
ence would communicate in equal dialogue. John Brockman took this statement 
from Snow pleading for “the third culture thinker” as the new public intellec-
tual: “a synthesizer, a publicist, a communicator” (Brockman The Third Culture 
19). From this perspective, scientists communicate directly to the general pub-
lic. The project is also inspired by how science and technology affect our culture 
by posing a central problem: “What we’ve lacked is an intellectual culture able 
to transform its own premises as fast as our technologies are transforming us” 
(Brockman, qtd. in Leggiere).
This idea was the basis for Brockman’s project, Edge, the Third Culture, 
with major scientists who published under this umbrella: evolutionary biologists 
such as Stephen Gould and Richard Dawkins, mathematicians such as Marvin 
Minski and Roger Penrose, physicists such as Paul Davies, philosopher Daniel 
Dennett, and novelists such as Ian McEwan. All are committed Darwinians 
inspired by perspectives of evolutionary biology and Darwin’s natural selection. 
From the same Darwinian perspective, literary criticism coined “evolutionary 
literary criticism,” inspired by the idea of looking for an evolutionary explana-
tion of literature (with E. O. Wilson as a major influence and Joseph Caroll as 
a major promoter). Again, a Darwinian perspective is a major inspiration com-
bined with strong criticism against constructionist, poststructuralist accounts 
of scientific discourse as linguistically determined (see, for example, the Sokal 
Hoax as a major attack).
Last but not least, we should mention the perspective of New Humanism, a 
movement made famous by Richard Dawkins (The God Delusion), mainly argued 
for by attacking beliefs in God and advocating rationalism (see for example the 
British Humanist Association website). And we should add New Atheism as a 
similar contemporary movement in which “new” refers to more publicly oriented 
publications focusing on an aggressive stance against all beliefs in God as erro-
neous and even dangerous for society. Central here is the dichotomy between 
religion and science. And we could add more perspectives to problematize the 
binary model. As Stephen Jay Gould writes, all these extensions of perspectives 
lead to “the death of the dichotomous model that had sparked all the contro-
versy in the first place! Thus, I view the history of discussion about Snow’s ‘Two 
Cultures’ as a lesson in the fallacies and dangers of dichotomy (while I obviously 
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do not deny the value of such simplification in provoking discussion and better 
resolution)” (94).
Indeed, we can wonder what the validity is of all these binaries and how they 
create caricatures of a debate that is more complex. Even Snow became aware of the 
danger and he “explored the middle ground between these artificial end points” 
(Gould 94). Gould pleads for a more nuanced perspective by paying attention to 
“a vast mass of scholars, probably constituting the great majority in a continuum 
that certainly cannot be defined by the rare extremes of each terminus” (94).
Binaries
We structure the world through language in binaries, and whenever there is 
such a polar opposition, one of the two assumes a role of dominance — overtly 
or covertly — over the other (deconstruction can be described as a critical reflec-
tion about this process). So even if we try to overturn the traditional opposition 
(for example a scientific perspective is superior to a humanistic perspective or a 
humanistic perspective overrules scientific perspectives), then this “just means 
that the underdog is defined as overdog, and we are still left with thinking in 
terms of dominance or hierarchy” (Elbow 51). Peter Elbow argues that the ques-
tion is “not whether to deal with dichotomies but how to deal with them,” and 
he suggests five options: “(1) choose one side as right or better. This is ‘either/
or’ thinking; (2) work out a compromise or a dialectical synthesis, that is, find a 
third term; (3) deny there is any conflict; (4) affirm both sides of the dichotomy 
as equally true, necessary, important, or correct; and (5) reframe the conflict so 
there are more than two sides” (54).
Elbow analyzes the different options and describes the first three as the most 
habitual way to deal with binaries, but he prefers the last two as more interest-
ing perspectives. And he further argues, against any possible reproach, that he is 
“saving binary thinking.” We concur with his argument: “Just so long as there’s 
more than one! If we can see three or five sides, that’s good — so long as that 
multiplicity isn’t a cover for letting one side be the real winner.” His real goal is 
“not to have pairs but to get away from simple, single truth — to have situations of 
balance, irresolution, nonclosure, nonconsensus, nonwinning” (Elbow 51). And 
we could not agree more with the kind of perspective that evolves from such an 
attitude, that is, “affirming both sides of a dichotomy as equally true or import-
ant, even if they are contradictory” (Elbow 51).
We should be careful here and Elbow certainly is; he does not go so far to 
say it is possible or necessary to balance every dichotomy: “it sometimes makes 
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sense to choose one side as right, the other wrong.” There are indeed good and 
bad dichotomies: “I’m just pleading for more effort to notice the many situa-
tions where the easy, good/bad distinction gets us in trouble and we need balance 
and irresolution” (54). The same perspective could be true for a constructionist 
perspective. In The Social Construction of What, Ian Hacking describes the con-
structionist perspective as a “primer for noncombatants” in the war by focusing 
on the different senses of the word “construction,” and indeed the book helps 
“the anti-constructionists get clearer on the actual contours of their enemy’s 
position” (Andrew Pickering qtd. in “The Social Construction”). Hereby Hacking 
defends the importance of such a perspective but also criticizes the aggrandiza-
tion of the concept in the transformation of the construction of “everything.” 
Paul Boghossian describes this perspective as follows: “As Hacking rightly 
emphasizes, however, it is one thing to say that true and false beliefs should be 
treated symmetrically and quite another to say that justified and unjustified ones 
should be so treated. While it may be plausible to ignore the truth or falsity of 
what I believe in explaining why I came to believe it, it is not plausible to ignore 
whether I had any evidence for believing it” (7). Probably the main argument 
is that through the lens of social constructionism we focus not only on worldly 
aspects — facts — but on our beliefs of them.
In Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, Stephen Toulmin situ-
ates the two cultures debate in a historical evolution by making a distinction 
between the two cultures as they originated in the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies. Richard Rorty synthesized the view of Toulmin as a way of defending 
the humanistic literary tradition: “By showing how different the last three 
centuries would have been if Montaigne, rather than Descartes, had been 
taken as a starting point, Toulmin helps destroy the illusion that the Cartesian 
quest for certainty is intrinsic to the nature of science or philosophy” (qtd. in 
“Cosmopolis”). Toulmin argues for a tolerant perspective: “We are not compelled 
to choose between 16th-century humanism and 17th-century exact science: 
rather, we need to hang on to the positive achievements of them both” (71). The 
task, therefore, is neither to reject modernity nor to cling to it in its historic form: 
it is “rather, to reform, and even reclaim, our inherited modernity, by humaniz-
ing it” (71). As part of this humanizing perspective, Toulmin adds: “Since the 
mid-1960s, rhetoric has begun to regain its respectability as a topic of literary 
and linguistic analysis, and it now shares with narrative an attention for which 
they both waited a long time” (187). In the next part, we focus on the impor-
tance of rhetoric and narrative for our discussion in general and for the role and 
function of the humanities in particular.
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Rhetoric/Narrative
In what follows, we introduce rhetoric as part of a broader perspective that can 
be summarized as a rhetorical and narrative turn in the humanities and the social 
sciences. The “rhetorical turn” is inspired by the idea that we all have become a 
kind of homo rhetoricus, since we have become self-conscious about how language 
constructs reality (on this, see also Brummett in this volume). Such a perspective 
implies a metaperspective synthesized by Kenneth Burke as “a way of seeing is 
also a way of not seeing” (Language 49). Rhetoric makes us aware that ways of 
seeing the world can be considered as rationalizations. Burke described human 
beings as symbol using and misusing animals, and so he describes human action 
in symbolic terms in general with a central focus on the importance of language 
and culture in particular. For Burke, human beings experience their generic ani-
mality in terms of a specific symbolicity (A Grammar).
Inspired by Burke, Clifford Geertz described the human being as “an animal 
suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun,” and he takes “culture to 
be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in 
search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.” From this perspective, 
culture is described with the metaphor of a “text” (“the culture of a people is an 
ensemble of texts”) (452). In Living and Learning as Semiotic Engagement, Andrew 
Stables suggests that this perspective opens new approaches to knowledge: “if the 
world is a text, then literary studies may be the way to understand it” (2). In his 
introduction to Stables’s book, Richard Smith problematizes the fact that the hard 
sciences have become our primary model of knowledge and understanding and 
wonders “what a difference it would make if this model, were, say, literary criti-
cism” (i). This perspective suggests a “reading” of the world in the same way that “a 
good reading of a poem, novel or film is . . . one that opens up further discussion, 
offering new insights to be debated or even new concepts in which to conduct the 
debate” (ii) (see also Rutten and Soetaert, “Signs and Symbols”). From the same 
perspective, Richard van Oort (2004) argues, “the human is a text to be inter-
preted, not because there is ‘nothing outside the text’ but because without the text 
there is no humanity. To the biologist or physicist (as for any natural scientist), it is 
certainly absurd to claim there is nothing outside the text. But to those concerned 
centrally with the study of the human (that is, those in the humanities and the 
‘anthropological’ social sciences), it is literally quite true that without the mediat-
ing presence of the originary scene of symbolic representation — ‘textuality,’ if one 
likes — there is no humanity and therefore no object of study” (638–39). (For an 
extended discussion on this see Rutten and Soetaert, “Signs and Symbols.”)
74 Part 1 • Chapter 5
From this perspective, the rhetorical turn can be linked with the narrative 
turn. Burke’s study of rhetoric starts from an analysis of literature and drama as 
tools to comment on society and the nature of human symbol use in general (on 
this, see also Tietge in this issue). Burke described literature as “all medicine” and 
“equipment for living”: “sizing up situations in various ways and keeping up with 
correspondingly various attitudes” (Philosophy 304). He compares the analysis 
of literature as a form of sociological criticism and so relates the metaphor of 
equipment to an ethical turn in literary theory, criticism, and education. The 
role of criticism and education — all kinds of reflection — can be summarized in 
another motto: we have to become symbol-wise (Enoch). But as symbol-using 
animals we should add we are all story-telling animals (MacIntyre). Walter Fisher 
introduced an extension of Burke’s description of human beings by suggesting 
the narrative paradigm as an alternative to the rational paradigm. The metaphor 
“homo narrans” has become a master metaphor suggesting that human beings 
tell stories to describe, interpret, and evaluate the world they inhabit. As far as 
the narrative turn is concerned, we should mention the work of Jerome Bruner as 
one of the founding fathers defending the importance of narratives as a mode of 
knowing. Bruner confronted two complementary modes of knowing of indeed 
two cultures: the “logico-scientific mode” and the “narrative mode” (Bruner x). 
The logico-scientific mode focuses on general and empirically tested truths. The 
narrative mode looks for the motives of human actions (what and why?) and the 
context in which these actions took place (where and when?) (see also Rutten and 
Soetaert, “Narrative and Rhetorical Approaches”).
Ian McEwan
In what follows, we will introduce Ian McEwan’s work as a case study — or as 
equipment — to explore the confrontation between different perspectives “on” 
and “in” the two cultures. First, we want to situate the position of McEwan in 
the debate about the two cultures that we reconstructed above. We argue that 
he participates explicitly and implicitly in this ongoing debate. As a public intel-
lectual and essayist he echoes some of the critical and even sneering arguments 
of Snow against the literary intellectuals. McEwan seems to identify more with 
scientists than with his literary colleagues. As a novelist he is presented and pres-
ents himself as a fellow traveler with the Edge authors, and publishes on their 
website (see, e.g., “On Being Original in Science in Art”) and he is introduced in 
the anthology as one of the usual suspects (see his introduction in Brockman). 
McEwan also publishes under the umbrella of evolutionary literary criticism (e.g., 
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his chapter in Gotschall and Wilson’s classic, The Literary Animal). McEwan 
also takes part — as a public intellectual — in the recent revival of humanism. 
He is announced on the website of the British Humanist Association as “Writer 
and distinguished supporter of Humanism.” In the periodical, The Humanist, 
his novel was recently announced as follows: “Humanists sit up and take 
notice — The Children Act is a cautionary tale for those of us who would encour-
age people doubting their faith to explore those doubts” (Kalmanson).
McEwan is also linked with the New Atheist movement in general (see, e.g., 
Dawkins’s seminal work, The God Delusion) and The New Atheist Novel in partic-
ular (Bradley and Tate). McEwan describes 9/11 as a ground-breaking moment 
in his thinking about religion: “When those planes hit those buildings and thou-
sands of innocent people died and tens, twenties, hundreds of thousands of people 
started to grieve, I felt, more than ever, confirmed in my unbelief. What God, 
what loving God, could possibly allow this to happen?” (Whitney). A momentum 
McEwan compares with how the death of his favorite daughter deeply changed 
Charles Darwin. He further argues that the secular spirit (inspired by science) is 
superior for making reasonable judgments and defends atheism and the secular 
state against religious “attacks.” So McEwan belongs to the “Third Culture Club” 
of scientists, linguists, and philosopher-scientists but still plays his role as a novel-
ist. This creates a paradox because he is at the same time a novelist, writing fiction 
(belonging to the humanities), and a defender of the superiority and importance of 
science. It is not in the scope of this chapter, but in his later novels scientific issues 
play an important role, for example, science and superstition (Enduring Love), the 
new physics (The Child in Time), and ecological problems (Solar). About Solar, 
McEwan reflects on how we should talk about the state we have got ourselves into, 
“as a very successful, fossil-fuel-burning civilization?” (qtd. in Detmers et al. 210). 
The question how we can change ourselves is described as a matter of human nature 
and then literature appears as a tool for reflection: “There’s all the science to con-
sider, but finally there is a massive issue of politics and ethics” (Tonkin I Hang On).
As we already argued, McEwan’s work can be linked with the debate about 
the two cultures, but Snow published his ideas in the genre of the essay, and 
although McEwan also wrote essayistic reflections, his main work consists of 
novels. Although these fictional works have essayistic characteristics, he belongs 
to the category of those authors who “accommodate facts and arguments into 
a prose that resists being candidly discursive” (Robson). At the same time, he 
problematizes and thematizes the role of narratives in general and literature in 
particular. Very often, themes that are central in constructionism and postmod-
ernism play a central role, for example, Joe Rose in Enduring Love elaborates on 
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the axiom that “there can be no thought without language” and even implic-
itly refers to the Snow debate: “Did the scientific illiterates who ran this place 
and who dared to call themselves educated people, really believe that literature 
was the greatest intellectual achievement of our civilization?” (Enduring Love 
45–46). The power of stories is problematized: “What I liked here was how the 
power and attractions of narrative had clouded judgment” (Enduring Love 41) 
(see also Amigoni; Carbonell).
McEwan thematizes and problematizes literature in his work. He remains 
fascinated by the question: what is the role of art in general and the human-
ities in particular? McEwan testifies: “I hold to the view that novelists can go 
to places that might be parallel to a scientific investigation, and can never really 
be replaced by it: the investigation into our natures; our condition; what we’re 
like in specific circumstances” (qtd. in “Ian McEwan”). The idea that novelists 
have their own place to participate in the debate about the two cultures inspired 
Amigoni in arguing, “The crucial point about humans is that they are necessarily 
in two places at the same time — the order of nature, and the fields of inherited 
social practice and culture, and much of the most exciting work currently is con-
cerned to break down the conceptual divide between the two . . . Even so, the 
orders and branching of biogenetic evolution and cultural-linguistic evolution 
will continue to work in different ways” (Amigoni 166). In what follows we will 
elaborate on how “cultural-linguistic” research is done by McEwan, focusing on 
the importance of narrative and rhetoric. We concur with Amigoni who further 
writes, “If the Third Culture contends that culture is now science, then McEwan’s 
fiction subtly and respectfully contests this view by seeming to suggest that it is 
necessary to be in two places at the same time — literature and science — when 
reflecting on where, as a species, our narratives are taking us” (166).
In the next part, we will focus on two novels — Saturday and The Children 
Act as case studies. In Saturday McEwan immerses himself in brain surgery, 
whereas in The Children Act he focuses on the rhetoric of the law. In an interview 
(McCrum) McEwan testified, “I love professions,” and, “I’ve always liked research, 
and I love people’s expertise.” McEwan describes the training and the occupation 
(the terministic screens) of his characters in a narrative form as a trained inca-
pacity or an occupational psychosis. Burke (Language 45) introduced the concept 
“terministic screen” to describe the way we select symbols — a discourse — to frame 
reality. Particular screens create a particular way of seeing, thinking, and acting. 
Terministic screens can also be described as a “trained incapacity” — another cen-
tral concept from Burke in which he focuses on how language and stories allow 
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us to think and to act in a particular way, but also prevent us from choosing alter-
native ways. A similar concept is “occupational psychosis,” described as “a certain 
way of thinking that went with a certain way of living” (Permanence 240). Later 
in this chapter, we will illustrate how McEwan confronts different terministic 
screens, inspired by a particular training or psychosis.
Saturday
Saturday is narrated by Henry Perowne, a neurologist, and follows one dramatic 
day in his life. In the background there is a political confrontation, foregrounded 
in debates with his daughter inspired by the world after 9/11. Because of the 
perspective of our chapter we focus on the conflict between the two cultures on 
different levels in the story. First, the family level, which is presented through 
the worldview (terministic screen) of Perowne and the confrontation with his 
children. Perowne espouses scientific positivism as an essential aspect of his pro-
fession as a neurosurgeon: “A man who attempts to ease the miseries of failing 
minds by repairing brains is bound to respect the material world” (Saturday 67). 
But Perowne is also a man of two cultures. In his family, artistic types surround 
him and he wants to learn from them or at least understand what drives them. As 
a father and family man he listens to the jazz band of his son, reads the book list 
suggested by his daughter, and also wonders what drives his father-in-law John 
Grammaticus (what’s in a name?), a poet, or anyway a kind of literary bohemian. 
The characters appear as pawns in a game, in an ongoing debate between the two 
cultures: science and art.
The daughter plays a major part in the story and can be interpreted as an 
antagonistic character representing the perspective of the humanities in gen-
eral and literary culture in particular. She more or less educates the father (or 
humanizes him, one could argue) by presenting him with a reading list because 
he lacks “imagination,” which makes him a “coarse, unredeemable materialist” 
(Saturday 134). Perowne is doubtful about what literature can mean for him, 
compared with his daughter who believes in the saving powers of literature. Are 
we story-telling animals? McEwan seems to argue that some of us are not, and 
Perowne is presented as the “living proof ” that people can live without stories 
(Saturday 68). The discussion is presented through a dialogue between father 
and daughter. Perowne asks her not to suggest novels with a magic realistic touch 
anymore: “Please, no more ghosts, angels, satans or metamorphoses. When any-
thing can happen, nothing much matters. It’s all kitsch to me.” And the daughter 
answers: “You ninny,” she reproved him on a postcard, “you Gradgrind. It’s 
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literature, not physics” (Saturday 66–67). So Perowne does not just read the 
novels but he also is a reluctant, critical reader who problematizes “his” literary 
education, complaining that his daughter Daisy’s “reading lists have persuaded 
him that fiction is too humanly flawed, too sprawling and hit-and-miss to inspire 
uncomplicated wonder at the magnificence of human ingenuity, of the impossi-
ble dazzlingly achieved” (Saturday 67). On the other hand, it is through a novel 
that these questions about novels are posed. Apart from problematizing the 
function of reading literature, McEwan thematizes postmodern literary cultural 
perspectives and attitudes. The father also educates the daughter (or the scientist 
educates the literary humanities).
McEwan uses his story to educate the reader about the science wars and 
argues against particular aspects of the humanities in general and postmod-
ernism in particular. McEwan/Perowne refers to a debate with his daughter 
about postmodern, constructivist perspectives on what he considers his own 
field or scene: madness as a social construct (echoing ideas from postmodern-
ism in general and probably Foucault in particular, but also focusing on the 
teaching of literature at university level): “In her second year at Oxford, daz-
zled by some handsome fool of a teacher, Daisy tried to convince her father 
that madness was a social construct, a wheeze by means of which the rich — he 
may have got this wrong — squeezed the poor. Father and daughter engaged in 
one of their energetic arguments which ended with Henry, in a rhetorical coup, 
offering her a tour of a closed psychiatric wing. Resolutely, she accepted, and 
then the matter was forgotten” (Saturday 92). So McEwan — through a con-
frontation between his characters, father and daughter — rhetorically wins the 
argument between realism and constructionism, between science and (some 
extreme aspects of) postmodernism.
Probably another example of the superiority of science could be the fact that 
Perowne recognizes the neurological conditions of a dangerous man, Baxter, who 
attacks him in the street. As a brain specialist, he notices Baxter’s odd movements 
and diagnoses these as the effects of Huntington’s disease: “Your father had it. 
Now you’ve got it too.” (Saturday 95). Perowne explains that there are new medi-
cations for curing this disease, and he can escape, thanks to this deus ex machina. 
And the same perspective is more or less repeated in the book’s final chapter: again 
the doctor tries to convince Baxter of the state of his illness and the fact that he 
can be cured. But he uses this knowledge to eliminate his attacker. Later, he won-
ders if he has broken the moral code as a doctor, sinned against the Hippocratic 
oath. But in the last episode, we can see how he follows his Hippocratic oath 
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when he drives to the hospital to perform emergency surgery on the man who 
assaulted him and his family and even tried to rape his daughter.
The last scene also contains an ultimate reflection on the function of art. 
The attacker has entered the house of the Perownes and threatens to rape the 
daughter. The tension is created in a stereotypical scene: a dangerous mentally 
deranged man with a knife against a nice, vulnerably naked woman. And then 
a deus ex machina is introduced to save the situation. The daughter recites a 
Victorian poem, Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach,” and this creates a miraculous 
transformation in the character of the attacker. He is so moved by the poem that 
he leaves his victim alone: “It’s beautiful. You know that, don’t you. It’s beauti-
ful.” Can such a scene be read as the proof of the importance of poetry? As an 
illustration of the liberating and humanizing qualities of literature? Can liter-
ature be described as a way to stimulate empathy even for a mind as deranged 
as Baxter’s? Can we believe this denouement? Can we believe in the civilizing 
effect of literature on the brain level? As a reader, you cannot help thinking 
about Perowne’s own words: “It’s all kitsch to me.” In fact, such a story is exactly 
what Perowne despises in literary fiction. And yet the transformation of Baxter 
teaches Perowne (and of course the reader too) about this other perspective on 
life or this other literacy.
It is probably not just a coincidence that McEwan has chosen a poem by 
Matthew Arnold. On the level of the story, it teaches us something about cul-
tural literacy. Baxter, an uneducated thug, thinks the poem has been written by 
the daughter and even Perowne — who as her father has read all her poems — is 
not aware it is not a poem of his daughter’s and is affected by the words. What 
point is McEwan trying to make? “Is he commenting on literature’s life-changing 
abilities? Is the novel’s denouement — Baxter’s under Perowne’s knife — meant 
to indicate that the sciences have the same life-changing capacity as poetry?” 
(Fang). That kind of question focuses on the function of literature in general 
but also on the possible function of literature as “medicine.” The importance of 
a literary education as part of medical training (or any other profession) is high 
on the educational agenda today. In previous works McEwan has focused on this 
question. For example, in Atonement a similar case was presented through the 
character of Robbie Turner, who started studying English literature but changed 
his mind and decided to study medicine. This binary opposition is transformed 
into a fruitful dialogue: “For this was the point, surely: he would be a better doc-
tor for having read literature. What deep readings his modified sensibility might 
make of human suffering, of the self-destructive folly or sheer bad luck that drive 
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men towards ill health! Birth, death and frailty in between. Rise and fall — this 
was the doctor’s business, and it was literature’s too” (Atonement 93).
If literature is described as equipment — or as a possible medicine, we can 
wonder what kind of evidence-based research will back up this hypothesis from 
a more scientific, empirical perspective. McEwan shows the complexity. As 
Jane Mcnaughton argues: “Saturday does not make a convincing case for the 
efficacy of a literary education for doctors.” Indeed, “Perowne can live without 
fiction and is clearly able to be responsive to his patients’ stories without first 
having his sensibilities refined by literature” (qtd. in Fischer 108). Fischer fur-
ther comments, “Ian McEwan’s Saturday is a particularly rewarding novel for 
discussions within the medical humanities — not because it provides answers 
about the relative value of literature and medicine or any concrete advice for 
doctors, but because it illustrates the interface between these worlds, the novel 
also highlights the radical differences between them. Most remarkably, Saturday 
contains an implicit critique of ingenuous readings that disregard the specificity 
of literary communication” (108). But the importance of Saturday is that the 
novel “provides a meditation on how we might further bridge the gap between 
the humanities and the sciences of mind through cautious collaborations based 
on the biological rootedness of storytelling, the centrality of feeling to thinking, 
and a shared empiricism that embraces human activities of interpretation bal-
anced by testing, calibration, and revision” (Thrailkill 171). Anyway, Perowne 
tells a story doubting the importance of storytelling. He does a rhetorical reading 
of the perspectives of others, he tries to understand their ways of seeing, prob-
lematizes the binaries, and learns the rhetorical lesson as expressed by Burke: 
“a way of seeing is a way of not seeing” (Language 49). The novel can thus be read 
as equipment for living.
The Children Act
The second novel we discuss, The Children Act, can be described as “in a sense a 
companion piece to Saturday” (Gardner) because the novel again focuses on a 
pro fession and the relation between the two (and even more) cultures: science 
(again represented by medicine), art, and religion (confronted with the secular 
law). Apart from the thematic parallels, the main characters live in the same 
class or social world and in both stories medicine plays a role (both cases of 
medical emergency). The novel tells the story of Fiona Maye, who is trained as 
a lawyer and works as a high court judge dealing with cases in the family court. 
The story opens with the crisis in her (childless) marriage because her husband 
argues that he — in his early sixties — is entitled to enjoy a more passionate affair 
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with a younger woman (his 28-year-old statistician). The novel can also be read 
from the perspective of terministic screens, law and art, which dominate her 
life, or as an occupational psychosis or trained incapacity which inspires her 
actions. The real plot starts with the fact that Fiona has to deal with an urgent 
case and has to make a decision whether a young boy (a few months shy of his 
eighteenth birthday) with leukemia should be forced to undergo a blood trans-
fusion that is necessary to save his life but which his religion, Jehovah’s Witness, 
prohibits. Should the secular court overrule the faith of the family and the boy? 
The doctors feel they cannot follow the religious arguments because it is against 
their Hippocratic Oath (an echo from Saturday). But the judge has to decide. 
We are between a religious and a scientific or secular (medical) perspective. So 
McEwan adds a third player in the two cultures debate: religion. But the novel 
also deals with humanism in general and with an aspect of traditional human-
ism: the importance of kindness.
Fiona appears to be kind, decent (in her work) and faithful (in her marriage), 
but this combination seems problematic: she cares too much for others and in the 
long run this is “imperiling her marriage” and “preventing her ever getting round 
to having children of her own” (Leith). She is described as if she belongs to the 
law “as some women had once been brides of Christ” (McEwan, The Children Act 
45). She represents the secular Western Enlightenment, the “good Englishman” 
as portrayed in Dickens’ Bleak House: “John Jarndyce of Bleak House, the soul 
of kindness” (Wilentz).
The words “kind” and “reasonable” are buzzwords throughout the novel. 
Yet, as McEwan illustrates, both concepts are complicated. Complicated when 
confronted with religion: Orthodox Jews or Catholics make decisions for their 
children so as not to interfere with God’s purpose. Complicated because argu-
ing with the family seems complex: the reasonable arguments of Fiona do not 
change the opinions of the boy and his family; they even make them stronger. 
Complicated also because indeed, “the problem is that kindness is voluntary, 
unwarranted by law” (Wood), and how far does engagement reach? We do not 
want to spoil the plot, but although she does help the boy on a professional 
level, at a certain moment she fails him — a poet, a musician — on a personal level. 
Intervening seems complex. Although the novel focuses on the particular law 
case in which Fiona is involved, it leads to a much wider political question. How 
far can we go in intervening? Is it right to “intervene” to save a life?
The novel can be read as “a kind of fable about Faith versus Science and the 
State” (Friedell), but is more than “a feelgood fable of secular enlightenment” 
(Tonkin “The Children”). The story does not give solutions, but thematizes and 
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problematizes major issues. As we have discussed, a major topic is the binary 
between science and religion. But there is more: the whole story is also embed-
ded in the debate between religion versus humanism, and in a sense about the 
confrontation of the humanities and art in particular. Apart from the contro-
versy between science and religion, art plays a central role in the novel in the lives 
of the main characters. As in Saturday, poetry plays a role in The Children Act, 
more precisely, Yeats’s “Down By the Salley Gardens” creates a bridge between 
the lawyer and the boy. Moreover, the boy appears to be a gifted poet and Fiona 
appreciates his romantic poetry.
Music again plays a central role in the story. The focus is on classical music 
and especially on a concert as a major event in Fiona’s life, in which she plays 
with her lawyer colleagues. The scene in which she performs Schubert success-
fully tells us something about the function of art: she forgets about her duties 
as a judge because she is absorbed by the music and her responsibilities towards 
her fellow musicians, the audience, and the composer. Her mind is filled with 
Mahler and Schubert. McEwan confronts the two cultures (law and music) in 
Fiona. She gives an excellent performance but hardly enjoys the applause, because 
she is thinking about other duties she has to fulfill: she did not succeed in res-
cuing the boy who trusted her. The relation between art and life appear to be 
complex and hard to measure. There is also a confrontation between jazz and 
classical music, which teaches us something about the character and profession 
of Fiona’s trained incapacity, that is, she can’t play jazz: “No pulse, no instinct 
for syncopation, no freedom, her fingers numbly obedient to the time signature 
and notes as written. That is why she was studying law, she told her lover. Respect 
for rules” (Children Act 193). McEwan confronts both perspectives as a trained 
incapacity or an occupational psychosis through musical preferences.
In general, the novel focuses on the ethical decisions we inevitably have to 
make in life. The story illustrates the complexity of rules and interventions, com-
bines the personal and the social, and gets inside the law and can be read as a 
kind of ethnography or, indeed, equipment. It shows the power and complex-
ity of storifying the world: “The Children Act presents a scenario in which the 
virtues of the secular life, poetry included, fight against the consolations of reli-
gious belief and no winner is declared. All the things that Fiona lives by — most 
importantly, music and the law — are found in some way wanting. It may be a 
different, more supple and surprising argument but it is an argument nonethe-
less” (Robson). Again, the role of art is thematized in the novel, and both novels 
thematize the role of literature: “McEwan may disdain belief in the supernatural, 
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but the powers he claims on behalf of literature must also be taken on faith” 
(Friedell).
Conclusions
As far as the debate between the two cultures is concerned, McEwan seems to fol-
low the suggestions of Snow in trying to bridge the gap between them: “Although 
he never explicitly refers to C. P. Snow, it seems that of all contemporary novel-
ists writing today, he is the most devoted follower of Snow’s recommendations” 
(Fabiszak et al. 449). On the other hand, he follows up the arguments of Leavis 
and reflects upon the function of literature. 
McEwan participates in the debate about the two cultures with novels with 
essayistic ambition on the one hand, but on the other hand, as we already stated 
above, he accommodates facts and arguments “into a prose that resists being can-
didly discursive” (Robson). The fact that McEwan uses the novel as a vehicle to 
reflect upon the relation between art and science implies that he uses the novel 
as a kind of allegory to discuss major social and cultural problems. Both works of 
McEwan that we discussed can be read as part of an ethical turn in literature and 
a revival of humanism in twenty-first-century literature. Both novels reflect upon 
traditional humanistic values in general and the function of literature in partic-
ular. In an interview McEwan presents a perspective on the purpose of the novel:
The novel is famously good at revealing, through various literary conven-
tions, a train of thought, or a state of mind. You can live inside somebody 
else’s head . . . I think that quality of penetration into other consciousnesses 
lies at the heart of its moral quest. Knowing, or sensing what it’s like to be 
someone else I think is at the foundations of morality. I don’t think the 
novel is particularly good or interesting when it instructs us how to live, so I 
don’t think of it as moral in that sense. But certainly when it shows us inti-
mately, from the inside, other people, it then does extend our sensibilities. 
(“Ian McEwan”)
From this perspective of “extending our sensibilities,” McEwan’s work can be 
read as an analysis of the struggle between sense (rationalism) and sensibility 
(emotionalism) (De Canha), so he problematizes and thematizes the perspectives 
of the two cultures confronting the reader with “a perspective of perspectives” 
(Burke, Grammar of Motives 513) through literature.
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The Missing Link and Human Origins: 
Understanding an Evolutionary Icon
Peter C. Kjærgaard
Abstract
In the history of evolutionary theory no single topic has attracted so much 
attention and caused so much public debate as the question of human ori-
gins. In the discussions following the discovery of hominin fossils in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the idea of the missing link 
between humans and animals turned into what has historically become one 
of the most powerful icons of evolution. Until the mid-twentieth century, 
however, both adherents and critics of evolution hailed the missing link as a 
crucial proof of the correctness of the theory of human evolution. It contin-
ued to be a hot topic in public debates and, as such, a good selling point for 
popular science books equally exploited by journalists, professional science 
writers, and scientists. Despite the fact that the idea of a missing link as a 
necessary piece of evidence for human evolution bears no meaning in con-
temporary science, it is wrong to think that it has no relevance. The missing 
link’s lasting effects on public understanding of human evolution has made it 
far more than a mere cultural product, and thus it continues to be a problem 
in public engagement. This chapter presents a brief history of the missing link 
as an evolutionary icon in popular and scientific contexts.
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No Need for Introduction
In a decisive scene in the animated blockbuster film Monsters versus Aliens, the 
transformed giant, Susan, feels compelled to point out to her fellow monsters 
how special they are. While addressing a bigmouthed and somewhat reckless 
character she exclaims: “And you, you hardly need an introduction. You’re the 
missing link!”1 Indeed, the missing link does not need an introduction for a 
twenty-first-century audience. We know the missing link and we even know him 
so well that we are able to recognize him — almost always a male — in multiple 
forms and contexts. Invoked in the nineteenth century, cultivated and celebrated 
in the twentieth century, and all too familiar in the twenty-first century, the 
missing link has been and still is one of the most powerful icons of evolution.
The missing link, everybody knows, is the key to the riddle, the final piece of 
the puzzle, the evidence that links us humans to the rest of the animal kingdom 
and finally proves the connection to our evolutionary past. In popular culture, 
the missing link is all that, epitomized as the ultimate proof of human evolution. 
Surely, missing links understood as gaps in the fossil record are not exclusive to 
the human story, and other species’ missing links have routinely been reported 
and duly discussed. But the big prize, the winner-takes-all of paleontology, has 
always been connected to our own story. And for all things unique — such as 
freedom, liberty, culture, national identity, god, and human — the missing link 
takes multiple forms. We know the idea of the missing link. We understand it 
and can relate to it depending upon our own context. But we always recognize it, 
just as we recognize and can relate to the ideas of freedom, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness, and yet interpret them in so many different ways. The missing link 
is a potent idea, a concept and an icon that has captivated public imagination for 
now about 150 years. As Susan, the giant animated woman said, the missing link 
hardly needs an introduction. What the missing link needs, however, is history 
and context.
Shortly after the publication of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859 
the missing link became a household expression in scientific and public debate 
about human origins. Satirical journals such as Punch made casual references 
to the missing link from the 1860s. The Times reported in 1866 that “the 
Darwinians” were searching for it, and the expression was regularly invoked at 
meetings of The Anthropological Society in London (see, e.g., “The Missing Link,” 
“The Domestic,” “The Fifeshire,” “Reports”). In the 1890s the Dutch physician 
Eugène Dubois set out on an expedition with the explicit aim of finding the 
missing link and to prove the theory of evolution true. The English biologist 
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E. Ray Lankester seconded its importance in 1915 in the discussions about “the 
Piltdown Man,” and in 1924 it played a decisive role as the American funda-
mentalist William Jennings Bryan thundered against evolution. That same year 
the anatomist and Australian expat Raymond Dart discovered Australopithecus 
africanus in fossil rich rocks brought to him in his home in South Africa. He 
was convinced himself that he finally found the missing link (Dart; Kjærgaard, 
“Hurrah”; Lankester; Numbers, The Creationists; Reader; Shipman).
By finding the first fossil evidence of ancestral humans in Africa, Dart’s dis-
covery has been seen as marking the beginning of the modern study of human 
origins and the gradual dismissal of the missing link as a scientific problem. Yet, 
the missing link continued to turn up in various contexts from the scientific 
literature to popular culture and debates about science and religion. Scientists, 
capitalizing on the idea, found the missing link to be a good way to attract a 
larger audience for their popular writings. In that sense there is a direct line from 
Raymond Dart’s memoirs, Adventures with the Missing Link, to Colin Tudge’s The 
Link: Uncovering Our Earliest Ancestor, accompanying the study of Darwinius 
masillae in 2009 (Dart and Craig; Tudge and Young; Franzen et al.). Embracing 
the concept for a popular audience and dismissing it in scientific circles, however, 
has made the missing link ambivalent, if not directly damaging, with respect to 
public understanding of evolution. Simultaneously endorsing and relegating the 
missing link has thus added to the already many mixed messages about evolution 
in the public sphere, making it notoriously difficult to assume the authoritative 
position of a scientific consensus in the context of public engagement.
Common Misconceptions about Evolution
Rejecting the necessity for critical evidence in the shape of not yet discovered 
fossils, on the one hand, while capitalizing on the idea of a missing link, on the 
other, has accordingly reinforced the public image of a scientific community 
divided on a key point in evolutionary theory. As such, it ties directly into a series 
of widespread myths and misconceptions about evolution. Many originating 
already in the nineteenth century, some of these myths are maintained today by 
anti-evolutionist partisans through websites and other media, but mostly they 
are a result of basic misunderstandings about how scientific knowledge is pro-
duced and confusion about standard concepts of evolutionary theory. They range 
from believing that the theory of evolution is an explanation for the origin of life 
to difficulties in understanding natural selection and common ancestry. They 
appear in the classroom, in media coverage of topics related to evolution, and in 
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public debates. Creationist propaganda, then, does not pose the biggest problem 
in education and public engagement.
However, the great pedagogical potential in these misconceptions should not 
be underestimated. Challenging them has proven to be a useful tool in education 
and public understanding of evolution. One of the reasons why this approach 
has been successful is because challenging widely held beliefs about evolution 
feeds straight into students’ and audiences’ preconceived notions, taking advan-
tage of a natural engagement in questions directly relevant to individuals and 
specific life situations. Some university-based public engagement projects at, for 
example, University of California, Berkeley, and Aarhus University, have inte-
grated this as a part of their online evolution outreach commitment.2 Others 
have experimented with the approach in different contexts, bringing it into the 
classroom from primary school children to undergraduate students at univer-
sities, and taken it as a starting point for engaging in public debates (see, e.g., 
Abraham et al.; Andersen et al. Andrews et al.; BouJaoude et al.; Branch and 
Meikle; Cunningham and Wescott; Gregory; Nadelson; Nehm et al.; Numbers, 
Galileo; Pazza et al.; Sinatra et al.; Thagard and Findlay). One of the import-
ant lessons from these studies is that regional and national contexts matter in 
identifying and overcoming the barriers in student and public understanding 
of evolution. On the other hand, there are certain conceptions and ideas that, 
despite locally different interpretations, come across and form a general pattern 
of misunderstanding:
• Evolution is like climbing a ladder
• Evolution is just a matter of chance
• Organisms are always fighting and trying hard to adapt
• Natural selection gives organisms exactly what they need
• Evolution is “just” a theory
• The theory is threatened by gaps in the fossil record
• There is widespread scientific doubt about evolution
• The theory has a shaky foundation
• It is not a science because it cannot be observed or tested
• Evolution is incomplete, unable to give a full picture
• The theory is flawed, but scientists are not willing to admit it
• It is necessary to keep a balanced view of evolution and creation
The question of human origins is generally identified as one of the main 
barriers in public understanding of evolution, and many misconceptions feed 
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directly upon this problem (Blancke et al.; Szerszynski; Numbers, Science 
11–37). This was already the case in the immediate public aftermath of the pub-
lication of Darwin’s Origin of Species (Ellegård 332). The general question of 
gaps in the fossil record is pertinent in this context as the missing link signifies 
the fossil evidence of the connection between humans and all other animals. It 
has been seen as a threat to human uniqueness, the scientific proof to dismiss 
a hierarchical structure of nature, and something that will change our under-
standing of humanity and what makes us human. The missing link continues 
to play this role as it challenges our perception of the animal-human boundary 
and of who we are (Corbey). Thus, this particular alleged gap in the fossil record 
has received remarkable attention in the cultural history of evolutionary theory. 
It relates to the idea of progress and the notion that evolution is like going up a 
ladder. Modern humans represent the final stage, with each intermediate stage 
representing earlier and more primitive ancestors. The missing link would be the 
stage just after the one in which the great apes stopped evolving and remained 
the apes they were as the path was cleared for Homo sapiens. Already in the nine-
teenth century, following the frontispiece of Thomas Henry Huxley’s Man’s 
Place in Nature, published in 1863, the image of a line of apes leading up to mod-
ern humans became synonymous with human evolution in a popular context. 
Huxley had chosen a series of ape skeletons from gibbons, orangutans, chimpan-
zees, and gorillas to compare with a human skeleton to illustrate the similarities 
and close family ties among the primates. As more primate fossils were discov-
ered, the apes were substituted with potential human ancestors. Over the next 
century and a half this image went through thousands of variations and is still 
today easily recognizable across cultural and geographical contexts (figure 6.1). It 
fits the popular image of the caveman and occasional cavewoman. The assump-
tions underlying these depictions are not limited to popular contexts, however, 
and have had a serious influence on scientific interpretations of fossil evidence, 
artifacts, and reconstructions of prehistoric life (Berman; Wiber).
Gaps in the Fossil Record
Missing links were known before Darwin. The idea of arranging animals 
hierarchically in a nature’s ladder, scala naturae, dates back to Aristotelian classi-
fication systems and was later used as a foundation for European taxonomy. The 
Great Chain of Being made order out of nature, while also pointing to poten-
tial gaps in the chain. In Vestiges of Creation, published anonymously in 1844, 
Robert Chambers used “missing links” to denote gaps in the fossil record in an 
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evolutionary framework. Th e expression, however, was already widely used in 
other contexts and had no particular bearing on natural history. Like so many 
other words and expressions, it continued to have multiple uses and meanings 
(Kjærgaard, “Hurrah”).3
However, aft er the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, missing links 
were more oft en tied to questions of evolution, in particular human evolution, 
as the issue of gaps in the fossil record entered a discussion of the validity of 
evolutionary theory. In the following decades of the nineteenth century, it was 
a serious concern for a number of naturalists, but eventually the argument died 
out as a scientifi c problem. In popular and nonspecialist contexts, however, it 
remained a contentious matter through the twentieth century and still plays a 
role in the twenty-fi rst-century public understanding of evolution. In creationist 
arguments it has continued to be one of the key objections to the empirical foun-
dation of the theory for more than a century and a half.
Darwin himself addressed the question already in the fi rst edition of Origin 
of Species: “As on the theory of natural selection an interminable number of inter-
mediate forms must have existed, linking together all the species in each group by 
gradations as fi ne as our present varieties, it may be asked, why do we not see those 
linking forms all around us?” He considered this to be “the most obvious and 
forcible of the many objections which may be urged against my theory” (Darwin 
462–63). His answer was that the geological record was far more imperfect than 
most contemporary geologists were prepared to believe. Th e museum collections 
represented but an insignifi cant fraction of extant and extinct species. Although 
Figure 6.1 A Google images search of the term “human evolution.” Identical search results 
is achieved from all continents.
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more fossils would be found, adding to the great picture, sometimes with speci-
mens that could be considered linking two previously identified species, one had 
to accept that the fossil record was not complete and could, thus, not form a 
complete picture of an unbroken chain. Nor was this necessary, Darwin argued, 
as the converging evidence, which included but was far from reduced to the fossil 
record, pointed to gradual change over very long spans of time as the only pos-
sible explanation for the variation of life on earth. The argument of converging 
evidence demonstrated the power of an interdisciplinary approach that has been 
at the core of evolutionary studies ever since. It rendered redundant the idea of a 
need for one decisive piece of evidence to prove the theory. Finding a missing link 
would not prove evolutionary theory correct once and for all; and not being able 
to produce one did not challenge the theory either.
Religiously motivated criticism of Darwin proved to be largely immune 
to the argument of insignificance of missing links for evolutionary theory. 
Converging evidence or not, Darwin’s readers were asking for an answer to 
the question of where the links were, why they were missing, and what one was 
expected to do about it. Commenting on discussions between Thomas Henry 
Huxley and Robert Owen at the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science meeting in Cambridge in 1862, a strong argument for human unique-
ness was made in a leader in The Times: “It is conceivable, though improbable 
in the highest degree, that scientific research may discover what has presumptu-
ously been called the ‘missing link’ between the human skeleton and the skeleton 
of the highest class of apes” (“London”). Although the immediate cause was the 
ongoing debate between evolutionary champion Huxley and critical anatomist 
Owen, the broad target was Darwin and his followers. Owen was given all the 
credit as the highest authority, while Huxley and the evolutionists were dis-
missed as “no basis but a set of disputed facts which cannot possibly prove more 
that that something which was not human once existed in human shape. It is one 
thing to show that a brute may have organs as perfect as man; it is another thing 
to prove that man is nothing but a highly educated brute” (“London”; see also 
Kjærgaard, “Hurrah” 89–91). The argument against the evolutionary hypothesis 
and implications for ideas about humanity’s place in nature resonated well in the 
conservative press. It was copied verbatim a few days later in News of the World 
and variations continued to play a role in the network of debates in numerous 
media and on several platforms.
The missing link arguments in the British periodical press against evolution 
in the years following the publication of Origin of Species fall into six catego-
ries: arguments regarding transitional forms among extant species, experimental 
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evidence, historical evidence, paleontological evidence, insufficiency of geologi-
cal time, and want of contemporary species turning into other species (Ellegård 
216–41). Generally the evolutionary explanation was seen as altogether hypo-
thetical and lacking positive evidence. Critics pointed out that one did not see 
the innumerable transitional forms among present species and that no one had 
ever witnessed one species transforming into another. No whale ever turned into 
a monkey, for example. There was neither experimental nor historical evidence to 
support the claims, and furthermore, it was argued from many sides, there sim-
ply was not time enough in the history of the earth to produce the innumerable 
missing links.
The most important argument, however, remained the problem of gaps in 
the fossil record. The inclination to make positive conclusions from negative evi-
dence worked well in the popular press and made the missing link argument 
an effective rhetorical device for anti-Darwinians. As all of the arguments were 
based on misunderstanding both the theory of evolution itself and the implica-
tions it had, the most effective strategy to answer the critics seemed to be more 
and better information. Supporters of evolutionary theory certainly tried that, 
but were largely unsuccessful in the parts of the periodical press already prej-
udiced against the theory. The more biased against Darwin’s ideas a journal 
or magazine was, the less likely was it to print impartial information. Despite 
the surge in the sheer number of periodicals in this period and the liveliness of 
debates, discussions tended to keep within rather conservative boundaries, main-
taining positions and conforming opinions. Attitudes did not change quickly 
within individual periodicals, neither among the editors and members of the 
writing staff, nor among their readers (Kjærgaard, “Within”).
Based upon his pioneering study of Darwin and the general reader in the 
British periodical press, Alvar Ellegård concluded that “anti-Darwinianism 
led to the Darwinian theory to be caricatured, and the caricature perpetuated 
anti-Darwinism” (241). As most of the periodicals ran a protective editorial line 
pandering to the cultural and religious prejudices of their readers, many of the 
arguments were never tried in an open academic environment leading, indeed, to 
parallel discussions in public culture and conservative Christian groups with little 
connection to the consensus forming in the scientific establishment. Originating 
in the nineteenth century, this trend has continued to play an important role 
into the twenty-first century, propagating discussions about missing links and 
gaps in the fossil record as problems for evolutionary theory, even though such 
objections have long been obsolete in science.
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Initially, however, the issue of gaps in the fossil record was taken seriously 
by members of the scientific community and among the more adventurous it 
was regarded as a challenge to be met. The search was in full swing, and in the 
decades following the publication of Origin of Species, paleontological accolades 
were intimately linked to finding missing links. The sensational unearthing of 
Archaeopteryx from Bavarian limestone in 1861 was a great encouragement in 
that regard. With wings, feathers, and hollow bones like a bird, and teeth, legs, 
and a tail like a dinosaur, it immediately became a fossil celebrity and one of the 
earliest icons of evolution (Wellnhofer). As missing links go, Archaeopteryx was 
great, but the scientific community and the public were still waiting for the ulti-
mate prize, the missing link, the human species’ immediate ancestor and direct 
link to a simian origin.
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there were many contend-
ers, both in the scientific world and in popular culture. Indeed, the idea quickly 
assumed a life of its own, independently of scientific discussions and findings, 
but it was still a powerful and influential paleontological hypothesis feeding 
back into scientific circles profoundly shaping interpretations, aspirations, and 
individual careers. Out of a nineteenth-century fascination with the exotic, the 
unfamiliar, and sometime the dangerous, represented in traveling exhibitions of 
peoples from around the world, bizarre skeletal constructions, and monkeys and 
apes on display, the missing link grew into a familiar cultural idea appearing in 
illustrations, cartoons, photographs, articles, short stories, novels, popular science 
writings, advertisements, and eventually in radio programs, television shows, 
films, and a multitude of twenty-first-century electronic media (Kjærgaard, 
“Hurrah”; Clark, God; “You Are Here”; Edwards; Voss; Goodall) (see figure 6.2).
The Missing Link in Popular Culture
Even though it is with great familiarity that the missing link is introduced in 
Monsters vs. Aliens, there is something not quite right here. We are looking at a 
20,000-year-old fish-ape hybrid that scientists found in a block of ice where he 
had been hibernating in a good long cryosleep. As the scientists thawed the ice 
he came back to life, a bit out of shape and with back problems, but otherwise 
fit for a monster fight and starting out scaring the wits out of people on holiday 
at a place that used to be his natural habitat; a lagoon thousands of years ago, a 
resort today. All is good fun loaded with irony and references to popular culture 
such as the 1950s horror classic Creature from the Black Lagoon.4 But the film 
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twisted the standard missing link and replants it in a context that, despite the 
monster theme, was inoffensive for an American market heavily influenced by 
anti-evolution sentiments ranging from mild scepticism to aggressive creation-
ism. A missing link not insisting upon an ape ancestry and a deep evolutionary 
past is simply a lot safer for family entertainment than a traditional missing link. 
Here were no hairy reminders of simian relatives. Dreamworks’ missing link is 
fun, green, and harmless, a monster for love and laughter. That has definitely not 
always been the case for the missing link.
As the shady nanny Debbie Jelinsky watched Fester Addams emerging from 
the rubble of the suburbian mansion she had just blown to pieces in Addams 
Family Values (1993), she exclaimed: “Oh, do I love you? Look at yourself! You’re 
a nightmare. You’re the missing link. You shouldn’t be married. You should be 
studied.”5 Although sympathy lies with Fester, we understand Debbie’s meta-
phor. It works because we recognize the missing link as an abhorring creature, 
equally an object of disgust and of scrutiny, and most certainly not an object of 
love. The history of the missing link is a history of this dialectics of repulsion and 
fascination that, curiously, has functioned well in popular culture as well as in 
the scientific literature from the nineteenth into the twenty-first century.
The idea of the monstrous and the powerful iconography of the half-human 
and half-animal that has played such an important role in cultural representations 
Figure 6.2 A Google NGram search of the term “missing link” in digitized books from 
1800 to 2000 demonstrate a surge following the publication of Charles Darwin’s Origin of 
Species, peaking in the years after Darwin’s death and the continued public debate about evo-
lution and humans’ place in nature. Over a century it remains stable to climb again from 
the 1970s, coinciding with a renewed focus on human evolution through highly publicized 
fossil remains such as the Australopithus afarensis known as “Lucy” and others, and a series of 
creationist court cases. The graph is not cleaned for nonevolutionary references to “missing 
links.” The term is indeed used in other contexts, but the vast majority of references are in the 
context of evolution.
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and mythology from the Egyptians to the Greeks to the early modern period, 
through the enlightenment to the nineteenth century, all along generating scien-
tific scrutiny and public fascination, was appropriated across the board in popular 
culture to discuss evolution and humans’ place in nature. The missing link was 
perfect to capture deep ancestry and the complexity involved in negotiating the 
human-animal boundary (Corbey; Corbey and Theunissen). Movie-makers 
quickly saw the potential and seized the missing link as a popular sidekick or 
sometimes central character, but mostly among the villains in Tinseltown.
Thomas Edison’s stop motion short, The Dinosaur and the Missing Link: A 
Prehistoric Tragedy (1917), is a classic comic hero tale. The missing link, a goril-
la-like creature with the name Wild Willie, goes down to the river to catch a 
few snakes for dinner. Unfortunately he mistakes a dinosaur tail for a snake and 
hits it with a rock. The dinosaur does not take kindly to the attack and kills the 
missing link. The hero comes by, finds the dead missing link, takes the honor and 
gets the girl, the young and beautiful Araminta Rockface. Already an integrated 
part of popular culture, the fictional prehistoric world of cavemen and dinosaurs 
living in the same primitive environment was a perfect setting for encounters 
with the missing link. With an easily identifiable iconography, prehistory thus 
became a space for sex, satire, and discussions of gender, race, ethnicity, soci-
ety, and social norms (Berman; Clark, God; “You Are Here”; Moser, “Visual”; 
Ancestral; Wiber).
The missing link on film — always male — continued to be the bad guy. 
Sometimes comic, sometimes scary, he invariably invited viewers to look their 
own primitive past straight in the eyes. As such, the missing link was more of a 
contemporary cultural reflection than an artistic exploration of a scientific notion 
of deep evolutionary ancestry. Too esoteric to constitute a subgenre, missing link 
films were closely related to ape movies and prehistoric fantasies. Often consti-
tuting a theme, a sidekick, or supporting character, the missing link served as an 
opportunity to negotiate the human-animal boundary and the use of prehistory 
as a mirror to reflect contemporary issues. Ape movies from King Kong (1933, 
1976, 2005) to Planet of the Apes (1968, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 2001, 2011, 
2014) routinely integrated missing link themes as a connecting point between 
humanity and animal nature. In the original Planet of the Apes (1968), the female 
ape scientist, Dr. Zira, hypothesizes that the stranded astronaut Taylor could be 
the missing link between unevolved primates and apes, reiterating the theory of 
her fiancé, the ape archaeologist Dr. Cornelius, that apes evolved from a lower 
order of primates, possibly humans. The ironic twist on the widespread popu-
lar understanding of human evolution as a matter of humans descending from 
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extant apes was taken further as Zira and Cornelius were charged with scientific 
heresy for suggesting such an idea. The missing link theme lived on in the series 
echoing the original 1968 protest from the astronaut — “I am not the missing 
link!” — in Tim Burton’s 2001 adaptation.
Independence, the right to be a species in itself not defined by humans or 
humanity, and the claim to be recognized as an individual lies at the heart of 
the popular reconstruction of the missing link. It is always in vain, however. The 
missing link always loses. Brute, beast, noble savage, the missing link is relevant 
only because it is linked to human history. In itself it is nothing. This might not 
be fair, but this is how it is. When things are turned upside-down and humans 
are seen as missing links in the Planet of the Apes series, it points to the injustice 
of classifying everything in the world according to our own standards. It works 
because it reflects how we view the rest of the animal world. Mostly, however, in 
popular culture the missing link is spectacular, extraordinary, challenging, but 
rarely ironic.
A notable exception is an advertising campaign by the American car 
insurance company, Geico, from the 1990s. Playing on sensitivity to political 
correctness, the company’s faux campaign introduced the slogan, “so easy a cave-
man could do it,” by a sleazy advertising agent in a supposedly authentic film 
studio. A cameraman who turned out to be Neanderthal walked out on the set 
with the words “Not cool!” The campaign became quite successful using civilized 
Neanderthals as an ironic take on our perception of ourselves and minorities. It 
worked because the image of the primitive caveman is so ingrained in popular 
culture that no explanation was needed. They were Neanderthals. They could 
just as well have been missing links, and in a way they were.
Live missing links were often put on display at fairs and on tours in the nine-
teenth and twentieth century. It was part of the tradition of traveling exhibitions 
featuring peoples from around the world in traditional clothing, with cultural 
artifacts showing stereotypical images of exotic ethnic groups to Europeans 
and North Americans. A famous example of a “living missing link” is Krao. 
She was a child suffering from hypertrichosis, abnormal hair growth, who was 
brought from her native Laos to Europe by the Norwegian naturalist and col-
lector Carl Bock, author of The Head-Hunters of Borneo. She was taken on by 
William Leonard Hunt, who under the pseudonym Signor Farini capitalized on 
evolutionary ideas and promoted her as “The Missing Link: A Living Proof of 
Darwin’s Theory of the Descent of Man.” She was introduced to the London 
public in 1882. Two years later she was a box office success touring the United 
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States. She kept her public role as an accomplished “missing link” for over forty 
years, speaking five languages and playing the piano (Goodall 74–79).
Krao was not alone. Numerous hairy and indigenous people were put on 
display. In southern states in the US, African Americans occasionally played the 
same role at fairs, and apes, mostly chimpanzees, were promoted to prove evo-
lution or simply to raise attention. Combining sensationalism and evolutionary 
theory, and often including racial hierarchies, living missing links were exploited 
to make money on curiosity, prejudice, and a Eurocentric feeling of superior-
ity. It included all the well-known colonial elements of racism and abuse. It was 
terrifying and comforting at the same time, reminding viewers of the animal 
nature and potential origins of humanity while assuring them that they were 
safely civilized.
The End of the Missing Link
Scientifically, it makes no sense to talk about one missing link, or missing links 
in general. Darwin and his contemporaries did, but they worked within a differ-
ent conceptual framework, with the Great Chain of Being still being something 
that had to be addressed. And even nineteenth-century evolutionary naturalists 
were often wary of using the term, many fully aware of the misrepresentation and 
potential dangers of emphasizing particular fossils as more special than others. 
From an evolutionary perspective, every single creature and every single plant 
is just as special as another. What makes some stand out is our understanding 
and limited fossil evidence — the gaps in the fossil record. Darwin was con-
cerned about how to handle them, but less from a scientific point of view and 
more from the perspective of how it would be perceived. In that sense he was 
very much aware of the power of public understanding of science, even though 
that term only became a household phrase by the end of the twentieth century. 
Evolution means gradual change over time. It emphasizes continuity rather than 
breaks. Even the theory of punctuated equilibrium suggesting isolated episodes 
of rapid speciation between long periods of little happening, initially proposed 
by Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldridge in 1972, does not imply discontinuity. 
Evolutionary bottlenecks triggered by environmental, geological, or anthropo-
genic causes do not mean that one moment you have one species and the next 
you have another completely different one. It means that certain populations are 
favored, more or less depending on external factors, and that certain traits of 
isolated groups can thus be boosted. Already Darwin knew that. It also means 
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that no single species represents all the change misconstrued in the idea of transi-
tional forms. There is no quadruped ape one moment and a bipedal ape another. 
Despite that, the missing link is alive and well. Sometimes inevitably so owing 
to a hyperbolic sensationalistic press more interested in grabbing attention than 
communicating complex research results. But sometimes also because scientists 
behave opportunistically and employ missing links to achieve short term goals 
(Kjærgaard, “The Darwin” and “Ida”).
Measuring the impact and significance of the missing link is difficult. 
Despite its scientific irrelevance it is hard to get rid of. In the context of evolu-
tionary thinking, it has had a rich life spanning three centuries and there are 
no signs of it disappearing. As a standard reference used to debunk evolution it 
continues to play a central role in creationist arguments. In public discourse out-
side religious contexts it persists in capturing popular imagination. A familiar 
shorthand in the media it remains a point of reference, and it is still a successful 
attention grabber for scientists who wish to tap into the news stream. There is no 
such thing as a missing link in evolutionary theory. And yet there is no end to it.
Notes
1. The hugely popular Monsters vs. Aliens from DreamWorks Animation, directed 
by Conrad Vernon and Rob Letterman, was released in the early spring of 2009. It 
became the second highest grossing animated film in North America that year and 
the third highest worldwide.
2. Berkeley’s Understanding Evolution has a section on misconceptions with En-
glish, Spanish, and Turkish versions (http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary 
/misconceptions_faq.php). Aarhus University’s evolution.dk presents a slightly dif-
ferent approach, incorporating design and language adjusted to meet the target 
audience among secondary school children (http:/evolution.dk/myter). The Danish 
Darwin Archive presents common Darwin myths, available both in English and 
Danish (http://darwinarkivet.dk/en/myths).
3. Caution is required to avoid presentism in conceptual history. Historians, and 
perhaps especially intellectual historians, tend to overemphasize conceptual inter-
pretations in their fixed sense, thus confirming what they are looking for and 
overlooking different uses that are abundant. See, for example, Patricia Seed’s excel-
lent history of the concept ”Modern” (Seed).
4. Creature from the Black Lagoon was directed by Jack Arnold and released by Universal 
International Pictures in 1954.
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5. Addams Family Values was directed by Barry Sonnenfeld and released by Paramount 
Pictures.
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Part 2
Cognitive Perspectives
The cognitive science of science investigates how human minds generate, process, 
sustain, and transform scientific concepts. The basic idea is that the human mind 
does not constitute a blank slate, but comes equipped with intuitive expectations 
about relevant domains of the world around us. In science, these intuitions play a 
twofold role. On the one hand, they pose cognitive obstacles that scientists need 
to overcome using various tools. On the other, when addressed appropriately, 
they function as scaffolds for a scientific understanding of the world. Thus, a 
cognitive approach also sheds important new light on the rhetorical perspectives 
developed in the first section of this volume. Science educators and communi-
cators tend to explain highly counterintuitive scientific concepts and theories 
by employing intuitively appealing and thus more easily digestible arguments, 
images, and metaphors. By so transforming scientific concepts, they aim at 
recruiting people’s intuitions to instill a scientific understanding of the world 
around us. However, this strategy generates rather than avoids intuitive inter-
pretations of scientific concepts and theories. Each of the contributions to this 
section examines and discusses one or both of the roles intuition plays in the 
development, communication, and understanding of science. As such, the vol-
ume contributes to the burgeoning field that investigates the impact of human 




Suspicion toward Science and the Role 
of Automatic Intuitions about Origins
Elisa Järnefelt
Abstract
This chapter discusses how early developing automatic intuitions about pur-
posefully made and functionally fixed natural phenomena can affect people’s 
understanding and receptivity to scientific concepts, such as evolution and 
anthropogenic climate change, that involve abandoning many of the automatic 
hunches that people spontaneously possess about their environment. In addi-
tion to discussing these automatic intuitions, this chapter also considers how 
these intuitions may play a role in people’s trust of the scientists who form 
and present the scientific information to the public, and how scientists could 
tackle the challenge of communicating about science to the public in an accu-
rate and welcoming way.
Sometimes, being a scientist is a difficult thing. After publishing On the Origin 
of Species in 1859, Charles Darwin was not ed only in academic circles. He served 
also as a constant inspiration for the numerous cartoons and caricatures pre-
sented in popular culture. These drawings often depict Darwin as an ape, or an 
ape that is Darwin’s close relative just a few generations away. In other drawings, 
evolution is depicted as a nonsensical dream or hallucination in which a worm 
evolves into an ape that develops into a human that finally turns into Darwin, or 
in which a fork transforms into a man, an oyster into a woman, and a wine bottle 
into a priest who marries the man and the woman. (Browne; Bryant) As is often 
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the case with caricatures or parodies, besides being comical, these drawings have 
a cruel intention (Browne). Transforming a person or an idea into a joke sends a 
powerful message; it can diminish the authority or trustworthiness of the person 
as a reliable informant and question whether her or his ideas should be taken 
seriously. Darwin was neither the only nor the last naturalist whose credibility 
and reliability has been questioned in such a manner. More recently, for example, 
environmental scientists have experienced their fair share of doubt and distrust; 
particular groups do not just doubt the existence of anthropogenic climate 
change but feature it as pseudoscience, hoax, or conspiracy theory (Hmielowski 
et al.; Leiserowitz; Lewandowsky et al.). The similarities between the theories 
of evolution and anthropogenic climate change do not end here. In addition to 
suspicion toward naturalists and scientists, everyday reasoning about both con-
ceptions appears similar. Instead of understanding physical-causal mechanisms, 
both natural processes are often construed in terms of purposes and intentions. 
For example, adults commonly construe evolution as nature’s helpful response 
to animals’ wants or needs (e.g., Gregory; Kelemen, “Teleological”). Similarly, 
anthropogenic climate change is often understood in relation to a purposefully 
behaving being, such as Nature, Earth, or God (Corner et al.; Donner, “Domain” 
and “Making”; Mortreux and Barnett).
In this chapter I seek to understand why the reception of the theories of 
evolution and anthropogenic climate change share these similarities. Why 
does everyday reasoning about the origin of natural phenomena take a certain 
kind of shape? What makes an evolutionary or climate scientist suspicious and 
untrustworthy?
I start by assessing the previous notions that explain on a more general level 
what kind of information is more likely to succeed or fail in cultural transmis-
sion. After clarifying the essential role of automatic reasoning, I concentrate more 
specifically on the intuitions that both children and adults have about the ori-
gin of both living and nonliving natural phenomena. In reference to empirical 
research, I identify developmentally stable patterns in people’s reasoning that 
remain automatically active later in life: a tendency to assess nature as functioning 
purposefully toward ends that benefit nature and remain fixed, and a tendency to 
think that even though ordinary people cannot create nature, some other kinds 
of beings can. Finally, I assess how these intuitions, together with the way people 
assess novel arguments, are likely to play roles in ways people accept and reject 
information about evolution and anthropogenic climate change and calibrate 
their trust toward people who communicate these ideas. In the end, I make some 
suggestions concerning more successful communication of scientific information.
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The Shape of Culturally Successful Information
Why do people prefer and trust one kind of information over another? To bet-
ter answer this question, it is necessary to acknowledge the difference between 
automatic intuitions and reflection (Sperber, “Intuitive”). This division refers to 
people’s ability to form information via (at least) two different cognitive processes: 
system 1 and system 2. System 1 processes are instant, beyond one’s conscious 
control, and produce representations about immediate reality. System 2 processes 
require full attention, reflection, and effort and are more slow and sequential but 
also allow one to assess, consciously endorse, or momentarily inhibit ideas that 
are automatically formed via system 1 (J. Evans, “Dual-Processing”; Stanovich; 
Kahneman; see also E. M. Evans in this volume).
Even though people would like to think of themselves as being able to think 
freely, they are rather predictable when relying on system 1 processes that are 
formed without being taught to think in particular ways (Barrett and Kurzban; 
Boyer and Barrett). For example, from very early on, people tend to think that 
agents, apart from other physical objects, have goals and intentions (e.g., Spelke; 
Wellman), that objects serve specific functions (e.g., Kelemen and Carey), and 
that certain kinds of animals, for example, all bears, share something similar that 
causes them to be fundamentally different from other kinds of animals or natu-
ral entities, such as whales, beetles, or spruces (e.g., Atran; Gelman). Rather than 
neatly following the lines of philosophical ontology (e.g., living thing, human-
made artifact), system 1 automatic intuitions about the environment can be 
understood in terms of cognitive adaptations that refer to types of situations that 
have been stable in the human environment (e.g., detection of potential allies, 
prey or predator, identification of the potential function of an object). Simply 
put, humans, together with other animals, have fast acting intuitions — early 
developing and persistent tendencies through which they process information 
in particular ways — that can be understood to reflect recurring features of the 
environment (Boyer and Barrett).
One can wonder about the relevance of this — paying attention to 
the con tours of automatically forming reasoning about the environment — for the 
assessment of culturally transmitted information. After all, even though people 
have intuitive and spontaneous reactions, they do not just blindly react to envi-
ronmental stimuli but mostly rely on communicated information and are able to 
reflect upon their own thoughts to interpret the world around them via system 2. 
Partly, this is true. However, system 2 reflection does not occur in a vacuum 
apart from system 1 automatic reasoning; rather, the two modes of reasoning are 
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interrelated. No matter the amount of practice and effort, inhibiting or erasing 
automatic reasoning from one’s mind is impossible. Once the triggering stimulus 
appears, system 1 automatic hunches fire off “ballistically” in the absence of con-
scious control (Stanovich). Robert N. McCauley illustrates this with an example: 
one cannot avoid perceiving the Earth as flat while standing on the ground, no 
matter one’s ability to remind oneself that actually the Earth is a huge revolving 
spherical object that is revolving around another round object (Naturalness). It is 
not until the thought is cognized that individuals can consciously assess whether 
they agree or disagree with their automatic understanding of the environment 
(J. Evans, “Dual-Processing”; Kahneman; Stanovich).
Given the sensitivity of system 1 automatic hunches, people often end up 
unconsciously overrepresenting a wider range of environmental information in 
terms of these intuitions (Sperber and Hirschfeld). For example, without the 
need for explicit teaching, people are highly sensitive in detecting the faces of 
other people. Besides effortlessly recognizing human faces, one cannot avoid see-
ing faces in clouds, wall sockets, and burned toast (Guthrie). The sensitivity of 
system 1 has effects on system 2 processing and cultural transmission of infor-
mation as well. According to Dan Sperber (“The Modularity” and Explaining; 
Sperber and Hirschfeld), from the cognitive point of view, the differences in the 
ease of distribution of system 2 reflected ideas can be understood in terms of 
the contours of system 1 automatic intuitions; the reflective ideas that people 
easily recognize, adopt, and share are the ones that resemble initial reasoning 
domains. Social psychological research resonates with this; people are prone 
to show “confirmation bias,” “positivity bias,” or “my side bias” (e.g., J. Evans, 
Bias; Mercier and Heintz; Nickerson), meaning that they are overconfident in 
accepting information that is in line with their own reasoning and reject the 
information that potentially contradicts or falsifies their beliefs (Kahneman).
Sperber, together with Hugo Mercier (“Intuitive” and “Why”), discusses 
this kind of pattern in people’s reflection in reference to “epistemic vigilance” 
(Sperber et al., “Epistemic”). People are cautious toward information that is 
transmitted by other people. Reliance on abstract cultural information and not 
having to learn everything in the world firsthand is obviously a great advan-
tage. However, when relying on abstract communicated information or other 
people’s accounts of reality, one is at constant risk of hearing someone who is 
misinformed, or even worse, is intentionally deceptive and lying. Given this, 
Mercier and Sperber (“Intuitive” and “Why”; Mercier, “Reasoning” and “The 
Social”; Sperber et al., “Epistemic”) point out that people constantly watch over 
whether they can trust the information and the informant. What serves as an 
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instant anchor are the thoughts one already has — system 1 automatically formed 
intuitions. Young children are already selective in their trust and doubt reliable 
informants or majority opinion when it violates untaught intuitive assumptions 
about the environment (Clément et al.; Seston and Kelemen). Similarly, adults 
are less likely to accept information if it is not in line with instantly remem-
bered background information, if formation of spontaneous inferences based 
on the new information is difficult, and if the information is not accepted by 
most of their peers (Mercier, “Reasoning” and “The Social”; Mercier and Sperber, 
“Intuitive” and “Why”; Sperber et al., “Epistemic”).
When detecting incoherence in communicated information, one has to 
decide between two options: lower one’s trust in the speaker by doubting her 
or his competence or benevolence, or lower trust in oneself and revise one’s own 
beliefs (Mercier, “The Social”; Mercier and Sperber, “Intuitive”). Of these two 
options, the first one is rather easy and quick whereas the latter — active reeval-
uation of one’s own reasoning — is not likely to take place until one encounters 
a social disagreement and must defend one’s own reasoning. For example, both 
children and adults perform better in tasks that involve questioning their auto-
matic impressions if they have to find the solution in a group of members who 
initially disagree with one another. In contrast, a group of similarly minded peo-
ple more commonly ends up supporting the already existing opinion (Mercier, 
“Reasoning”; Schwind and Buder).
To return to the particular question concerning the suspiciousness of the 
theories of evolution and anthropogenic climate change: it is now clear that to 
make the first step in understanding the cognitive roots of this phenomenon, one 
has to understand more about people’s initial hunches on the origin of natural 
phenomena.
Initial Understanding about the Origin of Natural Phenomena
I approach this task on two levels. First, I review developmental research in order 
to see whether children’s reasoning about the origin of nature shows reliably 
occurring and recurring tendencies. After this, I assess recent empirical research 
that has been conducted among different groups of adults to see whether these 
early developing reasoning tendencies remain active later in life (see Blancke et 
al., “The Implications”; Bloom and Weisberg; Coley and Tanner, “Common”; 
Kelemen, “Are Children” and “Teleological” for partly related accounts).
In line with the previous section, when it comes to reasoning about the ori-
gin of various objects and phenomena (e.g., artifacts, animals, plants, landforms, 
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meteorological phenomena) as well as these entities’ functional features, chil-
dren’s reasoning does not align with the philosophically or scientifically correct 
ontology (Boyer and Barrett). This does not mean that children are not excel-
lent at, for example, separating artifacts and natural entities from one another 
(Gelman and Kremer). Neither does it mean that children would be unable to 
learn scientifically accurate physical-causal explanations about nature even at 
young age (e.g., Ganea et al.; Kelemen et al., “Young”). Instead, it means that 
children are prone to represent both artifacts and natural entities in a similar 
fashion, and that their intuitions about objects easily overextend beyond philo-
sophically correct ontological categories (artifacts vs. natural entities) (Kelemen, 
“Are Children”; see also Wolpert, Six).
Let me elaborate. From very early on, children tend to approach and rea-
son about both artifacts and natural entities in terms of intended functionality. 
These notions are not directly taught but formed in interactions with a typical 
human environment. For example, children are able to assess objects’ functional 
structure and usability as an indication of the designer’s intention (Kelemen 
et al., “The Designing”; see also, e.g., Casler and Kelemen, “Young”; Cimpian 
and Cadena; Phillips et al., “Learning” for examples of various implicit cues). In 
parallel to this, children often conceptualize not only artifacts but also natural 
entities as “made for” some specific functions that benefit the entity itself, other 
natural entities, or nature generally rather than endorse explanations referring 
to solely physical causes (e.g., DiYanni and Kelemen; Kelemen, “The Scope” and 
“Why” and “British”). However, rather than understanding everything in their 
environment as human-made (see Piaget), when reasoning about the origin of 
natural entities, children prefer ideas about superhuman or nonhuman beings, 
such as someone, God, or another natural entity (E. M. Evans, “Cognitive”; 
Gelman and Kremer; Kelemen and DiYanni; see Gervais et al. and Järnefelt for 
discussion).
In addition to being effortlessly formed, these intuitions about the intended 
purposes of both artifacts and natural entities are functionally fixed. This means 
that once a certain kind of object or entity is conceptualized as made for some 
purpose, children find it difficult to think that the object could serve any another 
function (e.g., Casler and Kelemen, “Young”; German and Barret; Kelemen and 
Carey; Vaesen). Here, the understanding of intentionality again plays a deter-
mining role. Around the age of five, children have come to realize that knowing 
the designer’s, rather than user’s, intention leads to knowing the true (fixed) 
function of an object (e.g., Kelemen and Carey). For example, if the object was 
originally designed to function as a clothes stretcher, it does not cease to be a 
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clothes stretcher even if someone later discovers it and uses it unknowingly for 
exercising his back (Kelemen, “Intuitive”). Again, in parallel, once children map 
a natural entity as a certain kind (i.e., as a member of certain generic species 
[Atran], such as a member of bears, oaks, or bats), they understand the kind as 
inherently immutable and fixed, and reject the idea of partial membership (e.g., 
Cimpian and Erickson; Gelman; Keil).
Recent research has continued to assess whether these reasoning tenden-
cies about fixed purposes and intentional design remain active on an automatic 
level of cognitive processing also in adulthood. That is, in case these concep-
tions have an automatic basis in the sense of unavoidable and constantly active 
system 1 processing, one should find that when relying on instantly forming cog-
nitive processing, adults also form these ideas unavoidably. However, in case these 
reasoning tendencies are examples of automatized reflective reasoning that has 
become effortless due to repeated practice, these views should be absent among 
those adults who have practiced thinking otherwise (see McCauley, Naturalness, 
for differences between automatic and automatized reasoning). So, what hap-
pens when adults, who have contradicting reflective views, are put into situations 
where they have to rely on automatic reasoning in order to provide an answer?
A first line of research has assessed the automaticity of teleo-functional rea-
soning (Kelemen and Rosset; Kelemen et al., “Professional”; see also Banerjee 
and Bloom; Casler and Kelemen, “Developmental”; Heywood and Bering; 
Lombrozo et al.). When answering under a restricted timeframe, even profes-
sional scientists show an increased tendency to agree with teleo-functional 
statements that describe living and nonliving nature to function toward self- or 
nature-serving ends. This means that even years of scientific education and the 
constant use of a physical-causal explanatory framework does not completely 
remove the instant appeal of teleo-functional ideas, such as “rain falls in order to 
allow plants to grow” or “the sun makes light so that plants can photosynthesize” 
(Kelemen et al., “Professional”; see also Kelemen and Rosset).
A second line of research has assessed whether the notion that some being 
created nature is similarly automatically formed (Järnefelt; Järnefelt et al.). Here 
the focus of attention has been on nonreligious individuals who explicitly dis-
agree with the idea that any kind of higher power, God, or gods have created 
nature. Studies in the United States and Finland show that, although religious 
adults endorse creation more than nonreligious adults do, when assessing pictures 
of living (e.g., giraffe, maple, pike) and nonliving (e.g., mountain, river, rainbow) 
nature, without having time to reflect upon one’s own reasoning, nonreligious 
adults show a tendency to increasingly understand nature as purposefully made 
116 Part 2 • Chapter 7
by some being. Responding to control items and to a separate control condition 
further clarifies that adults do not agree with just any stimuli, or with just any 
idea of a maker. In line with the distinction that children make, adults do not 
similarly think that ordinary people can originate natural phenomena (Järnefelt; 
Järnefelt et al.).
To combine and summarize these empirical findings, certain recurrent 
intuitions about the origin of natural phenomena can be recognized: (1) both 
children and adults have a tendency to assess nature as functioning purposefully 
toward ends that benefit nature and remain fixed, and (2) both children and 
adults have a tendency to think that even though ordinary people cannot create 
nature, some other kind of being can.
Echoes of Automatic Intuitions in Reasoning about 
Evolution and Anthropogenic Climate Change
How do patterns in everyday reasoning and suspicious reactions toward theories 
of evolution and anthropogenic climate change appear when assessing them in 
the light of automatic intuitions about purpose, functional fixedness, and inten-
tional design discussed in the previous section? Here I argue that the patterns in 
people’s acceptance and rejection of both of these theories become more under-
standable and predictable when assessed in reference to these intuitions. To 
illustrate this, I offer four examples of scientific conclusions that can be inferred 
based on the theories of evolution and anthropogenic climate change. After 
each conclusion below, I point out, in reference to current research, how people 
often reject or doubt these conclusions either partially or completely. I suggest 
that these patterns of rejection can be understood in reference to the previously 
discussed intuitions about intended functionality, as echoes of the contours of 
instant intuitive understanding of the origin of natural phenomena.
Conclusion 1: All natural entities are subject to change and extinction, despite 
the apparent benefits of their present functions.
Instead of accepting natural phenomena as ever changing, people are often 
more comfortable with accepting biological change within a kind as long as it 
does not lead to cessation of the function that the kind is understood to perform. 
For example, people more readily accept the idea that one kind of bear can evolve 
into another kind of bear than they do the idea of a common ancestry of bears 
and finches (e.g., E. M. Evans, “Conceptual”). In this line of reasoning, intuitive 
understanding of functionality and purpose is likely to play an informative role. 
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People often believe in function as the primary motor of adaptation (Kelemen, 
“Teleological”). This means that without knowing how to describe the actual 
mechanism of change, people often conclude that an entity’s current ability to 
perform a beneficial function is the sole factor in why the entity or its trait exists 
(Gregory; Kelemen, “Teleological”). Furthermore, offering a stark contradiction 
to both conceptions of evolutionary change and the predicted consequences of 
anthropogenic climate change, once a biological trait is recognized to carry a 
beneficial function (e.g., coloration for camouflage, thick blood for coping with 
parasites), it is more likely assumed to remain stable or fixed across time; not only 
is the further prospect of evolutionary change seen as unlikely but also the pros-
pect of extinction (Lombrozo and Rehder; see also Poling and Evans).
Conclusion 2: Nature’s functioning also affects humans, not just nature itself.
In line with the tendency to presume nature’s functioning as serving or 
benefiting nature itself (e.g., Kelemen, “Why”; Kelemen and Rosset), a distinc-
tion is often drawn between the sphere of nature and the sphere of humans. It 
is common to underestimate both the effects of evolution and anthropogenic 
climate change by excluding humans from being subject to either natural pro-
cess. For example, people often assume that evolution applies only to nonhuman 
entities or organisms that are distant from people’s habitat (e.g., E. M. Evans, 
“Conceptual”; Shtulman and Schulz; see Atran for a folk-biological taxonomy). 
Similarly, climate change is sometimes pictured as concerning only nonhuman 
animals and distant habitats (Doyle), and people often doubt that they have per-
sonally experienced global warming (Akerlof et al.).
Conclusion 3: Changes in nature can be explained without reference to a non-
human or superhuman being.
Reasoning about evolution and anthropogenic climate change solely in 
terms of nonagentive or unintentional physical-causal processes is relatively rare. 
Instead, people — in both religious and secular cultural contexts — are prone to 
mix ideas of supernatural beings together with conceptions of evolution and 
anthropogenic climate change. For example, both evolution and climate change 
are often seen as purposeful creations, or as phenomena that are ultimately 
in control of a supernatural being (e.g., Corner et al.; Donner, “Domain” and 
“Making”; Legare et al.; Mortreux and Barnett). In addition to ideas that are cul-
turally understood and labeled as religious, based on research, people commonly 
form ideas that share a similar cognitive structure about a being who is mysteri-
ously (Sperber, “Intuitive”) able to originate natural phenomena, although they 
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use scientific or secular vocabulary. For example, in the context of the theory of 
evolution, it is common to describe nature, natural entities, evolution, or natural 
selection in terms of purposefully behaving beings who create the features or 
entities that are purposeful in a particular situation (e.g., Blancke et al., “From 
Ends”; Kelemen, “Teleological”; Moore et al.). When reasoning about anthro-
pogenic climate change, people often assess nature or the Earth as a being that 
will eventually take care for natural entities or itself, and “always wins somehow” 
(Corner et al.; see also Connor and Higginbotham). Findings in studies about 
adults’ automatic tendency towards teleo-functional reasoning and understand-
ing of intentional design imply a potential relationship between these kinds of 
ideas and intuitive reasoning tendencies: beliefs in nature’s agentive powers (e.g., 
belief in nature as a powerful being) independently predict an increased ten-
dency to assess nature both as purposefully functioning (Kelemen and Rosset; 
Kelemen et al., “Professional”) and purposefully made (Järnefelt; Järnefelt et al.). 
Notably, this is the case also among those individuals who identify as atheists 
and strongly disbelieve in any kind of higher power, God, or gods (Järnefelt et 
al.). This suggests that even though religious and secular identities are tied to 
different kinds of explicit belief systems, from the cognitive perspective, every-
day understanding (in contrast to scientific understanding) about the origin of 
nature may be rather similar, even though people identify and label their views 
differently. Using scientific terminology does not yet guarantee that one rea-
sons accurately in reference to the particular scientific theory (see also Guillo, 
this volume).
Conclusion 4: Changes in nature are causally linked to human actions.
Finally, relating especially to reasoning about anthropogenic climate 
change, while having a strong intuitive preference to think that nature is not 
caused by human actions (e.g., Gelman and Kremer; Järnefelt; Järnefelt et al.), 
the core idea behind anthropogenic climate change — that humans have a causal 
effect on changes in sea levels, reflective properties of clouds, winds, wild fires, 
or total animal populations (Karl and Trenberth) — is not likely to make instant 
intuitive sense but instead sounds implausible (see also Donner, “Domain” and 
“Making”; Rudiak-Gould).
A Cautious Listener Makes a Suspicious Scientist
In relation to the notions concerning cautiousness toward information that 
contradicts automatic intuitions, presented in the beginning of this chapter, the 
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examples elucidate how the content of theories of evolution and anthropogenic 
climate change contradicts preexisting and instantly activating intuitions of 
nature’s apparent purpose and design. Without denying the existence of many 
other — both cognitive and cultural — components, it is likely that intuitions 
play a role in people’s suspicion toward both of these scientific theories.
However, in addition to violating or contradicting the intuitive content of 
information and eliciting cautiousness toward scientific ideas about the origin 
of natural phenomena, researchers also encounter another kind of disadvantage 
that is likely to even further elicit suspicion and distrust in listeners. As research 
shows (e.g., Kelemen et al., “Professional”; Coley and Tanner, “Relations”), it 
is good to remember that scientists are not in any way immune to these same 
automatic cognitive tendencies and confirmation biases. However, given that 
scientific reasoning takes place in an argumentative context, opportunities to 
restrict their everyday reasoning are greater; researchers have more chances 
to test their ideas in contexts in which they are more likely to experience dis-
agreements (e.g., peer-reviewed journals, conferences) and reflect upon their 
own arguments more than they would in an everyday interaction (Mercier and 
Heintz; see also McCauley, “Scientific”). Given that this argumentative space 
is not shared in mainstream culture where these ideas are communicated, for 
members of the public it may seem that scientists fail to sound consistent and 
coherent. Incoherence is again likely to prompt members of the public to revise 
their trust in the speaker rather than in their own thoughts (see, e.g., Mercier and 
Sperber, “Intuitive”). In line with this, research has found that, independently 
of their worldviews, people calibrate their understanding about anthropogenic 
climate change based on how same-minded or in agreement scientists appear 
over the matter (Lewandowsky et al.; see also Connor and Higginbotham) (see 
figure 7.1).
People may be even more tempted to recalibrate their trust in evolutionary 
and climate scientists in contexts where information about evolutionary pro-
cesses and anthropogenic climate change is used in practice and combined with 
technology. That is when science and scientists can appear as dangerous (Wolpert, 
Is Science). For example, this takes place both in the context of biotechnology and 
geoengineering. Interestingly, the resistance to both technological approaches 
is similar (Corner et al.). In the context of hybridization and cloning, opposi-
tion refers to these technologies as disgusting, unnatural, and immoral (e.g., 
Niemelä; see also Rozin). Even though the explanation behind negative reactions 
is likely to involve various components (e.g., negative associations to pesticides or 
occurrences in the history of science), acknowledgment of automatic intuitions 
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about fi xed functionality and design may off er one additional layer of under-
standing about people’s reactions. Namely, according to instant intuitions, it is 
not humans who create biological kinds, or mix one kind of an organism with 
another kind. Even though people seem to be open to artifi cial selection (e.g., 
breeding dogs) and hybridization within a kind (e.g., breeding mules that are the 
off spring of two horse-kind animals, donkey and horse), gene technology involv-
ing cloning and interspecies hybridization across diff erent kinds of animals (e.g., 
human vs. nonhuman animal) does not just violate the intuition of the nonhu-
man identity of the maker, but also damages the notion of benefi cial and fi xed 
functions that kinds are understood to perform (see also Niemelä). Similarly, 
at the heart of the rejection of the use of technology to counteract the eff ects of 
climate change is the idea of “messing with nature” — going against the natural 
order (or fi xed functionality) that nature has purposefully set. In this mental 
framework, defying the natural order is an immoral act that is understood to 
further elicit nature’s revenge (Corner et al.).
In sum, it is not necessarily a complete coincidence that scientists are some-
times accused of “playing God” (Wolpert, Is Science); scientists can develop 
Figure 7.1 Recalibration of the listener’s trust in scientifi c information about the 
origin of natural phenomena.
Individual's view of the 
environment
Automatic intuitions about 
the environment
Scientists offer information 
that contradicts with 
one’s own background 
information
In addition to this, 
the individual detects 
incoherence; it seems like 
the scientist(s) cannot 
decide what to think
Decrease of trust in 
the scientists and 
their theories
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ideas that in practice violate people’s automatic intuition of nature’s beneficial 
functionality and also their intuition that a nonhuman being originated natural 
phenomena. In line with Wolpert’s notion, here it is also good to emphasize that 
science and technology are not the same thing; evolutionary or environmental 
findings in science do not necessarily lead to technological applications, and evo-
lutionary and climate scientists are not unavoidably involved with engineering. 
However, this distinction may not be fully clear to the public (see also McCauley, 
Naturalness and “Scientific”).
Conclusion
In this chapter I have traced echoes of two automatic intuitions in reactions to the 
theories of evolution and anthropogenic climate change: (1) the understanding 
of nature as purposefully fixed in its beneficial functions that serve nature itself, 
and (2) the understanding of the origin of natural phenomena as purposefully 
created by some nonhuman or superhuman being. I conclude that these intu-
itions together with the cautiousness that people show toward novel arguments 
are likely to play significant roles in suspiciousness toward both the theories of 
evolution and anthropogenic climate change as well as toward the scientists who 
produce and communicate these theories to the public. How can scientists better 
communicate their findings and navigate through the potential prejudices that 
people hold?
Evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson (“Evolution”), who has initi-
ated a university-wide evolutionary studies program at Binghamton University 
called EvoS (“EvoS”), offers one kind of solution for better science commu-
nication. EvoS does not require any prerequisites and is open for all students 
across different faculties from sciences to humanities. As the very first step, the 
teaching starts by acknowledging, addressing, and challenging the negative 
associations and worries that people may have about evolutionary theory (e.g., 
immorality, determinism, eugenics). According to Wilson, when suspicions are 
discussed openly, for example, by assessing the wider historical perspective of 
utilizing theories as a tool for suppression, and by preliminarily discussing the 
idea that morality and social equality can also be approached from the perspec-
tive of modern evolutionary theory, students have the possibility to reflect on 
these associations by themselves and put them on hold. Students can shift their 
minds from an atmosphere of threat to an atmosphere of curiosity. After their 
worries are addressed, students can actually learn about the basic concepts of 
evolutionary theory (e.g., adaptation). After acquiring a broader understanding 
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of basic evolutionary concepts, a teacher discusses the more specific intricacies 
of these concepts (e.g., not everything is adaptive). Throughout the course, stu-
dents are treated as fellow scholars rather than passive receivers of information, 
for example, by inviting them to actively form predictions based on the new 
information they have learned, offering readings from primary research liter-
ature rather than textbooks, and asking them to explore their own topic from 
an evolutionary perspective. As a crucial component in this process, Wilson 
underlines the importance of the university’s ability to act as a collaborative 
unit. Understanding of evolutionary mechanisms offers an example of a com-
mon language that defies the common field-specific specialization and seclusion 
in research and allows interdisciplinary collaboration. This notion is further 
supported by coordinating university-wide talks, which show in practice how 
researchers, not just in the sciences, but also in social and behavioral sciences and 
humanities, can work with different aspects of the same explanatory framework 
and form a coherent unit.
One indication of the effectiveness of Wilson’s approach is that, based on 
the assessments conducted throughout the program, the factors that are com-
monly discussed as problematic or hampering an understanding of the theory of 
evolution (e.g., political or religious orientation), do not significantly affect the 
students’ views or understanding about evolution in this program. What matters 
more than their personal worldviews is that they are approached as fellow schol-
ars who are instructed about the basic concepts honestly and accurately.
In contrast to this, scientists and media often communicate about evolu-
tion by using machine and design metaphors, or intentional and teleological 
talk, for example, by referring to a personified nature or evolution that “designs” 
traits “for” some function (Padian; Pigliucci and Boudry; see also Fox Keller). 
Similarly, in the context of anthropogenic climate change, several scholars have 
suggested that as a tool to raise ecological awareness, one should use agentive 
reasoning in various ways, for example, to increase the sense of moral obligation 
toward a being who is external to nature (e.g., Markowitz and Shariff) or to elicit 
and strengthen the understanding of nature or the Earth as a being (e.g., Tam et 
al.; White). Interestingly, in practice, the effects on people’s personal lifestyles 
and behavior have remained basically nonexistent (Veldman et al.). For instance, 
even if agentive views have effects on the ways people describe nature or their 
actions toward nature, they do not necessarily have an effect on their willingness 
to adopt conservational habits in practice (e.g., Kalland; Obadia).
Similar to the form of visual representations of scientific concepts — dis-
cussed more at length by Andrew Shtulman in this volume — metaphors anchor 
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to the prior understanding that people have of a phenomena and can actively 
strengthen the misconceptions and interpretations that people form in reliance 
on their everyday reasoning. Although scientists and educators can use agentive 
language metaphorically (i.e., abandon agentive reasoning and explain evolu-
tion or anthropogenic climate change in reference to a physical mechanism if 
required), this does not mean that agentive metaphors or agentive reasoning 
serve as any kind of conceptual aid to the public. Quite the contrary, it is proba-
ble that, once being so in line with automatic intuitions about nature’s purposes 
and design, these kinds of expressions just strengthen and further anchor ideas to 
preexisting cognitive biases and impede learning about nature (see Ganea et al.; 
see also Blancke, Tanghe, and Braeckman; and Tietge, this volume).
To conclude, in the context of the understanding of both evolution and 
anthropogenic climate change, it seems that instead of using agentive or 
design metaphors, scientists should think of ways to use expressions that aid 
physical-causal reasoning, for example, by referring to more familiar physical pro-
cesses (Rudiak-Gould), given that understanding nonagentive or unintentional 
mechanisms is something where everyone needs cognitive help. In addition to 
enabling and paying more attention to accurate communication about the con-
tent of scientific theories and allowing individuals to properly reflect upon their 
automatic intuitions, in line with Wilson’s example (“Evolution”), scientists 
could better focus on offering students, and also the public outside of universities, 
an example of the university as a unit that is able to work in an interdisciplinary 
manner, despite the scientific critique toward colleagues’ ideas. In addition to 
being able to reflect the scientific conceptions by themselves, what seems to be 
at least as essential to decreasing people’s suspiciousness and increasing openness 
to learning this kind of information is an understanding of the special nature of 
the culture of science associated with scientific theories, and welcoming people 
to take actively part in it.
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Chapter 8
Bridging the Gap: From Intuitive to Scientific 
Reasoning — The Case of Evolution
E. Margaret Evans
Abstract
This chapter notes that the use of intuitions to jump-start more sophisticated 
reasoning has been proposed for mathematics. The question addressed is 
whether core intuitions can also jump-start biological reasoning. Intuitive 
ideas can offer an immediate action plan that facilitates a rapid appraisal of 
the human mind or the natural world. Yet, there is a downside, such as a 
reliance on what may be inaccurate scientific judgments based on cognitive 
predispositions such as anthropomorphic or essentialist reasoning. Studies 
conducted with museum visitors are used to support the argument that 
specific cognitive predispositions can both help and hinder understand-
ing. Further, this chapter claims that core intuitions can provide a series of 
stepping-stones, which, if navigated with care, may promote science learning.
The use of embodied intuitions to jump-start more sophisticated reasoning has 
been proposed for mathematics (Lakoff and Nunez). Can core intuitions also 
jump-start biological reasoning, in particular evolutionary reasoning? That is 
the question addressed in this chapter. Intuitive ideas can offer an immediate 
action plan (Kahneman), allowing us to make a rapid appraisal of the human 
mind or the natural world (e.g., a folk psychology or a folk biology: Wellman and 
Gelman). Yet, there is a downside, such as a reliance on what may be inaccurate 
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scientific judgments (Stanovich et al.) based on cognitive predispositions such 
as teleological or essentialist biases (E. Evans, “Emergence” and “Cognitive”). 
Studies conducted with museum visitors will be used to support the argument 
that cognitive predispositions can both help and hinder biological reasoning, 
with a focus on evolutionary concepts. From the perspective of the science 
learner, it is important to identify when and how this happens.
Museum visitors provide an ideal population for such studies, as they are 
less likely than the general US population to reject evolution on ideological or 
religious grounds (E. Evans et al., “Conceptual Guide”). Further, it is possible 
to carry out a fairly rapid assessment of visitors’ reasoning before and after vis-
its to exhibits on evolution; as well, the inclusion of different age groups makes 
it relatively easy to compare age- and experience-related changes in reasoning, 
simultaneously. Results from such studies can provide the basis for developmen-
tal learning trajectories. The main argument to be developed in this chapter 
is that to the extent that intuitive concepts provide a foundation for scientific 
reasoning (Duschl et al.), they should be incorporated into learning trajectories 
rather than treated as unwanted intrusions (e.g., Bishop and Anderson). Further, 
a developmental approach facilitates studies of the role that intuitive theories 
play in early science learning as well as their role as a default reasoning mode 
throughout the life span. A more nuanced understanding of intuitive reasoning 
modes would improve science learning more generally by providing a framework 
for closing the gap between intuitive and more reflective scientific reasoning (E. 
Evans et al., “Encountering”)
The focus of this chapter is on evolutionary concepts because they provide 
a compelling test case. While the historical (e.g., Quammen) and contempo-
rary (e.g., Miller et al.) evidence suggests that evolutionary ideas are rejected 
on ideological and religious grounds, many have argued that specific cognitive 
predispositions play a key role in this rejection. As demonstrated in historical 
(Blancke et al.) and contemporary populations, such biases render the human 
mind resistant to ideas of evolutionary change while also making it easier to 
accept the idea that the origin of life on earth was miraculous (see E. Evans, 
“Conceptual Change” for a summary). Before describing those teleological 
(Kelemen; Shtulman and Calabi) and essentialist (Coley and Muratore; Gelman 
and Rhodes) biases theorized to make evolutionary ideas untenable (Mayr), I 
briefly review the extant literature on intuitive and reflective (scientific) reason-
ing and consider how the two might compete or cooperate when students study 
counterintuitive topics, such as evolution.
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In Two Minds: Intuitive and Reflective Reasoning
The claim that there are “two minds in one brain” (J. Evans, Thinking Twice), 
the one intuitive and the other reflective, has been advanced by Jonathan Evans 
and Keith Stanovich, among others, with convergent evidence drawn from a 
variety of fields including neuroimaging, to support the basic concept (J. Evans 
and Stanovich). Following Jonathan Evans’s Thinking Twice, in this chapter the 
terms intuitive and reflective will refer to what has been variously called system 1/
system 2, type 1/type 2, and implicit/explicit processing. Linking this variety of 
proposals is a common thread. The intuitive brain is thought to be evolutionarily 
old while the reflective mind is more recent and may (arguably) be exclusively 
human; the former is a rapid parallel processor of implicit belief-based informa-
tion often at a preconscious level (sensations and feelings), while the latter is a 
low capacity, effortful serial information processor of explicit information, often 
(but not always) at a conscious or meta-reflective level (J. Evans, Thinking Twice; 
J. Evans and Stanovich). Importantly, unlike type 2/reflective processing, type 
1/intuitive processing is thought to be associative, operating independently of 
working memory and cognitive ability, while type 2 processing is rule based (J. 
Evans, “Dual-Process”; Stanovich et al., “Complexity”).
Anyone familiar with the work on the emergence of children’s theory of 
mind and executive function will recognize that according to any of these defi-
nitions the reflective mind is later developing, if assessed by children’s increasing 
ability to exercise effortful control over their thought processes and to read the 
minds of others (e.g., Wellman; Zelazo). Thus, a clear developmental prediction 
is that intuitive processes, particularly intuitive theories, are most likely to influ-
ence the very young science learner. However, intuitive theories also provide a 
default for any age group under circumstances when they have to process infor-
mation rapidly or are not explicitly instructed that they should be mindful of the 
problem (J. Evans and Stanovich).
Do intuitive and reflective reasoning processes compete with intuitions 
impeding an understanding of the issue at hand? The classic demonstration of 
such competition has been the case of the three-premise logical argument or syl-
logism (e.g., no A are B; some C are B; therefore, some A are not C) where the 
outcome is either logical but unbelievable or illogical and believable (J. Evans, 
Thinking Twice 114). In such studies, believable or unbelievable premises are 
substituted for A, B, or C. What tends to happen is that, with little reflection, 
participants will exhibit a belief bias and select the intuitively plausible but 
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logically incorrect solution (J. Evans, Thinking Twice). In this case the intuitive 
and reflective minds appear to compete, delivering different solutions depend-
ing on the wording of the problem and whether or not the participant exercises 
effortful control over his or her intuitive response. These kinds of studies also 
demonstrate, however, that the reflective mind can suppress the output of the 
intuitive mind, providing it is given the time to do so and the motivation (J. 
Evans, Thinking Twice).
How might they cooperate? With the development of expertise in any field, 
it is the reflective mind that appears to oversee the initially effortful acquisition 
of novel skills; as the skills become routinized they are gradually subsumed under 
the direction of the intuitive mind. The classic example of this transfer of skill 
is driving. What is at first a long slow and mindful process gradually becomes a 
skilled activity that is performed speedily and intuitively with little access to the 
reflective mind (J. Evans, Thinking Twice). If, however, a novel problem arises, an 
icy road or an unexpected hazard, then the reflective mind swings into action 
and analyzes the problem, providing a new plan of action. What is important 
to note here is that in general the intuitive mind delivers a fast, effective, and 
accurate performance, particularly for routine tasks, even though it might pro-
vide an incorrect predetermined response to a novel hazard. In decision making 
the intuitive mind draws on past experience, a lifetime of repeated associations 
between diverse activities, behaviors, and outcomes. In contrast, the reflective 
mind analyzes the immediate present or the possible future, running explicit 
simulations (what-ifs) of possible outcomes and planning actions based on these 
simulations (J. Evans and Stanovich).
This necessarily brief description of the two-mind theory raises a host 
of questions regarding the way in which an understanding of the joint actions of 
intuitive and reflective processes might be used to help improve the delivery 
and understanding of scientific knowledge. In terms of skill development, Sun 
et al. (“Interaction”) have suggested that implicit (procedural knowledge) and 
explicit (declarative) processes interact to produce learning; moreover, there 
are synergy effects. Although in the driving example just described the inter-
action would appear to be top-down, with the reflective mind jump-starting 
the process, Sun et al. present evidence supporting the argument that there are 
likely to be a variety of ways in which the two kinds of learning might inter-
act. Sometimes making the learning process explicit hampers learning; in other 
cases, implicit and explicit learning appear to be independent processes with 
different time courses. To model the possibilities, Sun et al. present a neural 
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network model with bottom-up intuitive processes as the driver, which accounts 
for different kinds of data, including cases in which learning occurs without 
conscious awareness. Two broad conclusions emphasized by these authors are 
the importance of modeling both implicit and explicit processes when studying 
learning and that bottom-up processes may be as important if not more so than 
top-down processes. Much of this research has focused on the learning of arti-
ficial grammars or similar problem sets where the influence of prior knowledge 
is not necessarily an issue, but what about problem sets where belief biases are 
viewed as a key concern, as is often the case for science understanding (Bloom 
and Weisberg)?
Initially, it would seem, the acquisition of scientific knowledge is likely to be 
effortful and slow as it is overseen by the reflective mind, particularly if it involves 
the suppression of intuitions that are at odds with scientific ideas. But once sci-
entific reasoning becomes routinized and effortless, what happens to these core 
intuitions? Are they supplanted? As the evidence indicates that the belief biases 
of the intuitive mind never disappear, even if they are temporarily suppressed 
(J. Evans and Stanovich), perhaps a better approach would be to investigate how 
they are implicated in the learning process.
For evolutionary reasoning, the basic claim advanced by many researchers 
is that belief biases or cognitive predispositions compete with and impede scien-
tific understanding (e.g., Kelemen; Gelman and Rhodes). If this is the case, one 
would predict that measures of belief bias would be negatively correlated with 
evolutionary reasoning. In the following sections, I demonstrate that this is not 
always the case, first for natural selection, and second, for common descent. In 
fact, I go further and argue that often such cognitive predispositions may jump-
start scientific reasoning in a bottom-up process.
The Role of a “Restricted Teleology” in an 
Understanding of Natural Selection
Even if a particular intuition appears early and is then supplanted by scientific 
concepts, this does not mean that the intuition impedes scientific understanding. 
All this suggests is that it is a default reasoning mode brought to bear on a partic-
ular topic when more reflective reasoning modes cannot be exercised for lack of 
knowledge, time, access, or processing capacity. Essentially, this is the argument 
that I pursue in my discussion of the effects of teleological and essentialist rea-
soning (see Jarnefelt et al., and Jarnefelt, this volume, for a different perspective). 
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Of course, this does not mean that the same intuition may be helpful rather than 
a hindrance; such a claim requires a more nuanced argument.
One of the problems with research on intuitive reasoning is that the target 
intuitions are often underanalyzed or blended in such a way that it makes it dif-
ficult to decipher the precise roles they actually play in student learning. This is 
particularly a problem with the extensive research on the role of teleological rea-
soning in students’ understanding of natural selection (E. Evans, “Conceptual 
Change”). Teleological reasoning is problematic because it implies purpose, 
progression, and intentional design, whereas natural selection exhibits none of 
these features — in fact the inverse is true. However, in studies investigating these 
effects, purpose and intention are routinely conflated. Students often reason that 
out of necessity an organism needs a particular trait in order to survive, in which 
case the trait satisfies an intrinsic purpose, called need-based reasoning. But, even 
if students lack knowledge of the mechanism by which traits evolve, it does not 
necessarily follow that they believe the trait is acquired through the intentional 
efforts of the organism, called desire- or want-based reasoning (E. Evans et al., 
“Encountering”). Or, even that an external agent such as God or mother nature 
designs the organism for a purpose (E. Evans, “Conceptual Change”). Fine-
grained analyses of these reasoning modes suggest the existence of a “restricted 
teleology,” whereby students may grasp the idea that an adaptation improves 
the survival of an organism without falling prey to anthropomorphic beliefs in 
which the organism or an external agent is able, like humans, to intentionally 
change the trait (E. Evans et al., “Encountering”).
In investigations of this line of reasoning, study participants should be given 
the opportunity to endorse or reject each of these reasoning modes in separate 
closed-ended questions. Ideally, to gain further insight into their underlying 
reasoning, they should also be asked open-ended questions. Using this range of 
measures, Evans and her colleagues have conducted a number of studies among 
museum visitors of different ages and found that with age and expertise visi-
tors increasingly distinguish between want- and need-based reasoning. Typically, 
younger school children conflate want- and need-based reasoning, endorsing 
both; thus, for this age-group, these modes are often significantly correlated 
(Legare et al.), as might be predicted from the research on young children’s tele-
ological reasoning (e.g., Kelemen). In contrast, older school children and adults 
often adopt a restricted teleological pattern, endorsing need-based reasoning 
while rejecting want-based reasoning (E. Evans et al., “Conceptual”; Spiegel et 
al.). For example, in a recent museum study (Horn et al.), 8- to 15-year-olds were 
presented with three diverse scenarios and asked to explain the adaptive changes 
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that occurred over time in the target species. Unlike their younger counterparts, 
the 11- to 15-year-olds rejected anthropomorphic explanations (e.g., the lizards 
changed over time because “they don’t like to get eaten”) and endorsed need-
based reasoning (e.g., “because the different kinds [of anoles] need to adapt to 
their different environments”). Critically, it is the latter pattern that is positively 
correlated with natural selection reasoning (Horn et al.; Spiegel et al.).
This overall pattern of results suggests that a restricted teleology could jump-
start natural selection understanding by drawing attention to the necessity of 
the adaptation for survival while increasing visitors’ sensitivity to natural mecha-
nisms that do not involve the intentional actions of the organism. However, such 
studies do not provide evidence of a causal effect. Under what contexts might a 
restricted teleology be useful to the learner?
As the research team for a multicomponent exhibit on evolution, Evans 
and her colleagues investigated this phenomenon in more detail by incorporat-
ing these types of scaffolds into the development of a narrative-based exhibition 
called “Charlie and Kiwi’s Evolutionary Adventure” (E. Evans et al., “Spiral”). 
This exhibit focused on the adventures of a young boy, Charlie, as he traveled 
back in time to discover why kiwis (including his stuffed kiwi) lacked the abil-
ity to fly and to find out what was so special about the ancestors of birds. In 
addition to a video theater experience, which conveyed the story of Charlie and 
Kiwi, the exhibition consisted of multiple components providing evidence of 
dinosaur-to-bird evolution. One of the challenges of an exhibition targeting 
school children was that the design team was inclined to use anthropomorphic 
language in the text, because it elicits interest and engages the young visitor. To 
assess how such language might affect understanding, the research team con-
ducted several studies indicating that a restricted teleology might be a more 
effective cognitive tool.
In an initial qualitative assessment of children’s understanding of natural 
selection, children were asked to recall the story of the Galapagos finches’ sur-
vival, after viewing an exhibit on that topic. The following examples of children’s 
language in their retelling provided converging evidence for the earlier findings 
(E. Evans et al., “Spiral” 49).
Interviewer: “Tell the story back to me.”
Six-year-old: “The finch wanted a bigger beak” [example of want-based 
reasoning]
Nine-year-old: “You don’t evolve because you want to . . . you evolve because 
you need to” [example of a restricted teleology]
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As a follow-up to these qualitative studies, the research team ran an experiment 
in which children were randomly assigned to three conditions, in each of which 
children were told a story about bird evolution and then asked to recall the story. 
In one condition the story was presented using the language of natural selec-
tion, in a second condition, want-based reasoning, and in the third, need-based 
reasoning (Legare et al., “Anthropomorphizing”). On a variety of measures, the 
5- to 7-year-olds were the most likely to use anthropomorphic reasoning and, 
overall, the anthropomorphic stories elicited the fewest scientific explanations. 
However, all children were more likely to use natural selection reasoning in their 
story recall if they had heard either the natural selection or the need-based sto-
ries, and this was especially true for the 9- to 12-year-olds.
This kind of evidence prompted the exhibit development team to ensure that 
the distinctions between want and need, in the form of a restricted teleology, 
were called out in the exhibit text and particularly in the video experience. For 
example, in Charlie’s time travels he met up with his great-great-great-grandfather 
(who looked remarkably like Charles Darwin), and in one scene, while the two 
time-travelers viewed a nest of baby dinosaurs, some of which had feathers, the 
great-great-great-grandfather said: “Animals can’t just grow feathers when they 
want to. They have to inherit them from their parents.” Later, in another scene, 
when the old man was explaining why kiwis could not fly, he said: “No, but you 
must understand, Charlie: every bird has what it needs for where and how it lives. 
It’s adapted to its environment” (E. Evans et al., “Spiral” figure 3.3). Note that 
in these examples, both intuitive and scientific explanations were incorporated 
into the text, thus merging top-down and bottom-up approaches into a single 
cognitive tool.
When the exhibition was complete, the research team ran a randomly 
assigned controlled study and found that the 5- to 7-year-olds who visited the 
target exhibit were much less likely than their peers who visited the control 
exhibit to endorse or use anthropomorphic language; additionally, the older 
children were more likely to use need-based reasoning and grasp the basics of 
natural selection than their peers who visited the control exhibit (E. Evans et al., 
“Spiral”). Such studies provide some evidence that when intuitive concepts are 
embedded in the narrative, be it in a curriculum or an exhibit, learners can tran-
scend the intuitive and integrate more scientific modes of reasoning into their 
explanations. First, however, it is necessary for learners to distinguish between 
a restricted teleology, in which adaptive traits serve the intrinsic purpose of the 
organism, and a teleology that is intertwined with intentional reasoning.
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The Role of an “Expanded Essentialism” in an 
Understanding of Common Descent
From the early days of research on cognitive biases that inhibit the understand-
ing of biological concepts, essentialism has occupied a special niche in the minds 
of psychological and biological researchers alike (see E. Evans, “Conceptual 
Change”). Ernst Mayr, the foremost evolutionary biologist, noted that prior 
to Darwin “[Platonic] essentialism dominated the thinking of the western 
world to a degree that is still not fully appreciated by the historians of ideas” 
(38). What should replace it? According to Mayr it should be population think-
ing. Instead of the Platonic system of a natural world made up of types or kinds, 
each with their own fixed eidos or essence, Darwin ushered in population think-
ing with its emphasis on individuals, each one of which differed from its neighbor. 
Such variation is a key component of natural selection. While research indicates 
that an understanding of within-species variation is an important transitional 
concept paving the way to a deeper understanding of natural selection (Emmons 
and Kelemen; E. Evans et al., “Conceptual”), a focus on morphologically diverse 
species highlights a deeper problem. Students who might grasp the concept of 
within-species variation and, indeed, of natural selection, still essentialize kinds, 
failing to understand that all living kinds are related, with one individual dif-
fering to a greater or lesser degree from another in terms of molecular structure 
(Olson). Nowhere is this disconnect clearer than among creationists who, while 
believing that God placed each living kind on earth separately, may accept the 
concept of natural selection providing it is used to explain variation within a 
kind, such as dogs or fruit flies (E. Evans, “Conceptual Change”; E. Evans et al., 
“Conceptual”).
Even members of the population who accept the idea of evolution agree that 
the more taxonomically diverse the species, the less likely they are to share an 
ancestor (Phillips et al.; Poling and Evans). In a study of undergraduates, some 
of whom strongly endorsed creationism and others of whom accepted evolution, 
all were more likely to agree that the more similar the species (e.g., rats, mice) 
the more likely it was they had an ancestor in common. The judgment for dis-
similar species (e.g., sunflowers, bears) was that they were very unlikely to share 
an ancestor. Overall, though, the creationist and more evolutionist students did 
diverge, with the latter endorsing common ancestry at a significantly higher 
level (Poling and Evans). However, if they had embraced the logic of their belief 
systems, creationist students would have rejected any idea of common ancestry, 
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while evolutionist students would have endorsed it strongly, regardless of the 
dissimilarity of the species depicted. These findings suggest that at an intuitive 
level, the idea that taxonomically diverse species are essentially different from 
one another is so ingrained in everyday reasoning that it can only be overcome at 
a reflective level. This psychological essentialism (Gelman and Rhodes) contrasts 
with philosophical or Platonic essentialism in that it is thought to be primar-
ily an intuitive bias rather than one derived from cultural input. However, such 
essentialist biases are often reinforced by cultural input, not only as seen in cre-
ationist beliefs, which are reinforced by biblical texts, but also, paradoxically, by 
museums of natural history. Many if not most museum exhibits of prehistoric 
life display single iconic exemplars to represent a species or taxon, reinforcing 
typological reasoning (E. Evans et al., “Conceptual”)
Modern cladistics may also reinforce these intuitions. As described by sev-
eral researchers (e.g., Catley et al.; Shtulman, this volume), students and museum 
visitors alike are very likely to misinterpret biologists’ trees of life, which display 
the evolutionary relationships of diverse species based on molecular or fossil evi-
dence (or both). Static diagrams are necessarily limited in the number of taxa 
they can portray in a single graphic and they cannot convey the dynamic qual-
ity of the relationships. Moreover, visual groupings of limited numbers of taxa 
linked by a common ancestor reinforce the idea that taxonomically similar spe-
cies share a common essence, which differs markedly from that of taxonomically 
dissimilar species. Even more egregiously, often there is a single image of an indi-
vidual of the represented species, which again reinforces typological essentialist 
concepts. Overall, this line of research indicates that psychological essentialism 
is not only almost impossible to eliminate, but can also be inadvertently rein-
forced. If that is the case, perhaps a more radical approach is needed: embrace 
essentialism but expand it to include all living things. Recently, an interdisci-
plinary team of researchers have succeeded in doing just that, with a large digital 
touch table exhibiting a dynamic interactive tree of life (Block et al.)
One particular focus of this exhibit was the concept of relatedness, from 
the familiar notion of family relationships to the less familiar idea of evolution-
ary relationships. The dynamic visualization of 70,000 species in the interactive 
tree of life exhibit portrayed the idea that all living things on earth are related 
(Block et al.). Such a visualization extended the essentialist notion that each liv-
ing kind has a unique, immutable essence by providing evidence of the common 
ancestry and shared traits of all living kinds, especially that of DNA. Visitors 
were encouraged to zoom through the entire tree of life or select images from 
a subset of 200 species representing key evolutionary groups and zoom to that 
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species’ location in the tree. For pairs of species, the visitor could also activate the 
“relate” function, to which the system responded by fl ying through the tree to the 
common ancestor of the two species. A key question was “how are humans and 
bananas related?” At the shared node, images and text could be activated, which 
depicted further information about the species, their ancestors, and their major 
shared traits, particularly that of DNA; the latter was represented throughout 
the exhibit by a glowing double helix.
In an experimental study carried out at two large museum sites, 250 8- to 
15-year-olds were randomly assigned in pairs to one of four conditions consisting 
of two diff erent versions of the tree of life interactive, a video on a similar topic, 
and a control condition, where there was no intervention; all the interventions 
were 10 minutes in length (Horn et al.). In the follow-up interviews, youth and 
their parents were asked about common ancestry, their interpretation of a tree-
of-life graphic, their understanding and acceptance of evolutionary concepts, and 
related issues. Th e intuitions of participants in the control condition in response 
to questions about common ancestry can be seen in fi gure 8.1 (Phillips et al.). All 
Figure 8.1 Common ancestry: percentage of museum visitors in each age group who agreed 
that the depicted groups of species share a common ancestor.
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participants were asked whether particular groups of species shared an ancestor 
(five-point scale: 1 = disagree, 5 = agree); included in the final group of “all living 
things” were a beetle, a human, a flower, a bear, a reptile, and a kangaroo. Adults 
were significantly more likely than the youth to agree with common ancestry, but 
they, like the youth, were significantly more likely to agree that closely related 
species such as mice and rats had an ancestor in common (indicating that the 
question wording was easily understood).
These findings are compatible with the observation that the folk biological 
concept of living kinds, in which each kind possesses a unique and unchanging 
essence (E. Evans, “Emergence”; Gelman and Rhodes; Mayr; Samarapungavan 
and Wiers), emerges early and is widely held, even by educated museum visi-
tors — the average adult in this study had a college degree. Overall, those visitors 
who agreed that diverse species, including humans, share a common ancestor 
were better informed regarding evolution in general and were more likely to feel 
that they were related to “all life on Earth” (Phillips et al.).
The key question for the study was whether the interventions themselves 
would have an effect. The answer was yes (Horn et al.). Youth who interacted 
with the touch table in either of the two interactive conditions were significantly 
more likely than their counterparts in the control or video conditions to endorse 
common ancestry, correctly interpret tree-of-life graphics, and use tree concepts 
in their responses to open-ended questions. Analyses of the dyads’ interaction 
patterns indicated that the quality of their conversations and of their physical 
interaction with the exhibit was positively related to their endorsement of com-
mon ancestry, independently of demographic variables such as the youth’s age 
and prior knowledge, parent educational level, and parent support for evolu-
tion. More specifically, youth who more often used genealogical terms in their 
conversation, such as “relate,” and who referenced a greater number of diverse 
species were more likely to endorse common ancestry and reference shared traits 
such as DNA. Additionally, the more often the dyads activated key table func-
tions, such as the relate function, the more likely they were to have these positive 
learning outcomes. Although the quality of the conversation and of the tabletop 
activations were related factors, they operated independently of each other in 
predicting the learning outcomes (Horn et al.).
In sum, an informal learning experience that encouraged pairs of youth 
to interact with a dynamic tree of life elicited genealogical concepts during the 
experience both in their conversation and in the exhibit activation, which, in 
turn, predicted a deeper understanding of Darwin’s theory of common descent. 
This strongly suggests that these repeated interactions, leading inexorably to the 
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observation that all living kinds have an ancestor in common, shifts the empha-
sis from the essence of morphologically similar species to the heretofore hidden 
essence of diverse living kinds, all life on earth — as indicated by shared DNA.
Practical Implications: Informal and Formal 
Learning Experiences in Science
Based on these two sets of findings, one on a restricted teleology and the other on 
an expanded essentialism, I argue that core intuitions can provide a series of step-
ping-stones (E. Evans, “Conceptual Change”; E. Evans et al., “Encountering”), 
which, if navigated with care, may scaffold science learning (see also Blancke, 
Tanghe, and Braeckman, this volume, for a similar argument). First, as demon-
strated in these studies, what is required is a molecular approach to these intuitive 
patterns, dissecting out the differing concepts that have been subsumed under 
the broad categories of teleology and essentialism. Then, effective measures are 
needed to assess these concepts and embed them in new learning paradigms. 
Finally, it is necessary to devise pedagogical techniques that recruit the reflective 
mind, in this case children’s emerging metacognitive skills (Wellman; Zelazo), 
to help achieve the transition from intuitive to scientific reasoning. These cogni-
tive tools could be made accessible to purveyors of learning experiences from the 
classroom teacher to exhibit developers and, indeed, we were able to utilize them 
to a limited extent in effective museum exhibits (E. Evans et al., “Spiral”; Horn 
et al.). Nonetheless, currently this approach offers only a little more than a prom-
issory note; what is needed is a deeper understanding of how these two minds, 
intuitive and reflective, can be integrated into a developmental learning program
Theoretical Implications: Dual Process Theory
“I shall argue that it is essential for the relatively neglected developmental story 
of dual processing to be worked out in any complete cognitive theory” (J. Evans, 
“Dual-Process” 87).
The clear (and obvious) predictions for the development of type 2 processing 
are supported by this research; the older the child or student, the more likely he or 
she is to use reflective learning processes and adopt scientific concepts, despite the 
impact of fairly powerful default reasoning modes provided by omnipresent cog-
nitive biases. Importantly, as is clear from the responses of adults (see figure 8.1), 
such cognitive biases do not disappear. Type 2 processing does not supplant type 
1 processing, moreover, they both coexist. In fact, there is substantive evidence to 
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suggest that the use of both reasoning modes simultaneously is a typical feature 
of human cognition (E. Evans and Lane; E. Evans et al., “Engaging”; Legare et 
al., “Coexistence”). As discussed by both Jonathan Evans (“Dual-Process”) and 
Stanovich the predictions for type 1 processing are less clear because essentially 
there is no such thing as a uniformly developing type 1 process (Stanovich et al., 
“Complexity”). Type 1 processes are manifest in a variety of forms, from early 
emerging cognitive biases, which may or may not be modular in origin (Wellman 
and Gelman), to automatized type 2 processes (Stanovich et al., “Complexity”).
The examples described in this chapter are of particular cognitive biases or 
predispositions that are thought to be impediments to the acquisition of science 
concepts. There is a strong tendency in research communities to consider them 
biases that should be suppressed in order to acquire a veridical account of the 
world (e.g., Gelman and Rhodes; Kelemen; Shtulman and Calabi). Stanovich et 
al. (“Complexity”) argue that the capacity to reason hypothetically, a reflective 
type 2 process, implies that it is not only necessary to clearly decouple the imag-
ined and the veridical worlds, but also to override or inhibit type 1 processing. 
This is undoubtedly the case for many instances of controlled processing such as 
the execution of skilled behaviors.
In contrast, however, what I am suggesting here is that the acquisition of 
complex counterintuitive scientific material involves both type 1 and type 2 pro-
cessing. The research described in this chapter indicates that with development, 
children are increasingly able to integrate the two types of reasoning processes, 
using type 2 processing to both modify intuitive biases, as in the case of teleo-
logical reasoning, and to amplify them, as in the case of essentialist reasoning. 
For this kind of learning to be effective, the reflective and intuitive systems must 
cooperate. These studies provide evidence of both top-down and bottom-up acti-
vations of implicit and explicit reasoning processes. Further, it seems obvious 
that a child or student cannot leapfrog directly from an intuition derived from 
a cognitive bias, such as anthropomorphic reasoning, to a scientifically accept-
able grasp of a particular topic. What is needed instead is a series of stepping 
stones that guide the learner from an inaccurate to a more accurate scientific 
model — a developmental trajectory (E. Evans et al., “Encountering”). For this 
to be achieved, suppression of the intuitive concept is not sufficient; in fact, it 
might be counterproductive, as intuitive predispositions could well provide the 
student with an initial entrée into difficult scientific topics. In conclusion, this 
line of research indicates that the research community should rethink the role 
of intuitions in the acquisition of science concepts. As in mathematics, they may 
well jump-start the whole process.
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Cladograms are tree-like structures devised by evolutionary biologists for 
conveying patterns of shared ancestry among biological kinds. These rep-
resentations have become highly popular in science textbooks and science 
museums, yet most non-biologists have difficulty reading them. This chap-
ter discusses how those difficulties stem from common misconceptions 
about evolution — misconceptions reinforced not only by what is included 
in cladograms but also by what is not included. Cladograms routinely omit 
information about extinction (depicting only the extant species within a tax-
onomic grouping), biodiversity (depicting only a subset of those species) and 
variation (depicting species with a single label), and these omissions, while 
irrelevant to how biologists understand cladograms, likely have cognitive con-
sequences for how non-biologists understand them. The chapter concludes 
by considering other types of diagrams — circle diagrams, spiral diagrams, 
and bush diagrams — that depict patterns of shared ancestry with different 
graphing conventions and may thus be more appropriate than cladograms 
when their intended audience is non-biologists and their intended purpose 
is education.
A fundamental principle of modern biology is that all life is interconnected. 
Every organism on the planet is related to every other organism through common 
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ancestry. This principle has implications for our understanding of all biological 
phenomena and is one that most biology educators hope to teach their students. 
Visual representations are a common means of teaching this principle, as visual 
representations can capture the depth and breadth of phylogenetic information 
more succinctly than words can. But the translation of phylogenetic informa-
tion into visual representations has its challenges (Pennisi). One could design 
representations that highlight any number of phenomena: patterns of speciation 
and extinction across time, patterns of speciation and extinction across geogra-
phy, changes in the complexity of existing lifeforms, or changes in the frequency 
of different anatomical plans. Historically, biologists have experimented with 
representations that highlight each of these phenomena (Gould, “Redrafting”), 
but one representation, in particular, has come to dominate modern biological 
science: the cladogram.
Cladograms highlight a single property of life — common ancestry — and 
they do so through a series of branching relations. Given a collection of taxa, or 
taxonomic groupings (e.g., species, genus, family, or order), the pair of taxa that 
share a common ancestor more recently than any other pair are connected with 
lines that converge at a node. This node represents their common ancestor. The 
pair is then connected to every other taxa via the same logic: taxa that share more 
recent ancestors are connected prior to those that share more distant ancestors 
until all taxa are interconnected. Each new connection yields a new node, with 
deeper nodes signifying ancestors that are more distant (time-wise) and more 
widespread (descent-wise). As an illustration, consider the cladogram displayed 
in figure 9.1, which depicts the ancestral relations among apes. This cladogram 
indicates that humans and chimpanzees share a more recent ancestor than do any 
other pair of apes. Humans and chimpanzees, in turn, share a more recent ances-
tor with gorillas than they do with orangutans, and humans, chimpanzees, and 
gorillas share a more recent ancestor with orangutans than they do with gibbons.
Within the scientific community, cladograms have become a mainstay of 
phylogenetic analysis for a number of reasons, the foremost being that technolog-
ical advances in gene sequencing have made it possible to discern shared ancestry 
at a molecular level. But one need know nothing about the genetic basis of clado-
grams to glean profound insights from them. Cladograms can greatly alter 
commonsense notions of when and how different types of lifeforms emerged. By 
appearance alone, we might assume that manatees are closely related to dolphins 
and that elephants are closely related to cows, but a cladogram that includes all 
four would tell us that manatees are actually more closely related to elephants 
and that dolphins are more closely related to cows. Likewise, we might assume 
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that two creatures with eyes are more closely related to one another than either is 
to a creature without eyes, yet a cladogram that includes both eyed and non-eyed 
creatures would tell us that eyes emerged independently across several lineages 
and that having eyes is not as reliable an indicator of shared ancestry as certain 
other traits, like having lungs or having a spine.
For their simplicity, cladograms are surprisingly powerful tools for decod-
ing the mysteries of diverse morphology, and, as such, they have spread beyond 
the scientifi c domain into the public domain, becoming a stock representation in 
science textbooks (Catley and Novick) and science museums (MacDonald and 
Wiley). Recent research, however, suggests that most non-biologists have diffi  -
culty understanding cladograms (Gregory, “Understanding Evolutionary Trees”). 
In this chapter, I argue that those diffi  culties stem from common misconceptions 
about evolution (Shtulman; Shtulman and Calabi, “Cognitive Constraints”) and 
that individuals who hold such misconceptions are not simply confused by clado-
grams but actively misinterpret them. In particular, I argue that misconceptions 
about evolution infl uence not only our understanding of the elements contained 
Figure 9.1 Cladogram (in the form of a ladder diagram) depicting the ancestral relations 
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within a cladogram — its lines, nodes, branches, and tips — but also our under-
standing of the elements missing from a cladogram. Three such elements, routinely 
omitted from cladograms, are those that pertain to extinction (cladograms typ-
ically depict only the extant species within a clade, or group of organisms united 
by a particular common ancestor), biodiversity (cladograms typically depict only 
a subset of extant species within a clade), and variation (cladograms depict spe-
cies as unitary entities and provide no representation of the variation within a 
species). Information about extinction, biodiversity, and variation is irrelevant to 
how biologists use cladograms — to depict a hypothesized sequence of speciation 
events among a predefined set of species — but omitting that information may 
paint a skewed picture of evolution for non-biologists.
In short, I argue that, when viewing cladograms, non-biologists interpret 
an absence of evidence — evidence regarding extinction, biodiversity, and varia-
tion — as evidence of absence. Further, I argue that cladograms may need to be 
replaced with other types of representations, such as circle diagrams (Novick 
and Catley), spiral diagrams (Ricou and Pollock), or bush diagrams (Gould, 
“Bushes”), when their intended audience is non-biologists and their intended 
purpose is education.
Common Misconceptions about Evolution
The eighteenth-century biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck proposed a theory of 
evolution in which organisms acquire adaptive traits throughout their lives and 
then pass those traits to their offspring. Students in today’s biology classrooms 
are easily dissuaded of the idea that acquired traits are inherited (Springer and 
Keil); amputees do not, after all, give birth to limbless babies. But they are less 
easily dissuaded of the broader idea, implicit in Lamarck’s theory, that individ-
uals evolve rather than populations. In other words, non-biologists tend to view 
evolution as the uniform transformation of all individuals within a species rather 
than the selective survival and reproduction of just a few.
At least two factors are responsible for this misconception. One factor is 
our tendency to essentialize species or assume that species possess an underlying 
nature (or “essence”), which determines their outwardly observable appearance 
and behavior (Gelman; Medin and Atran; Solomon and Zaitchik). This bias 
serves us well when reasoning about the development of individual organisms, 
but serves us poorly when reasoning about the evolution of entire species, because 
it causes us to undervalue the variation within a species. And without variation, 
there can be no selection. Another factor is our tendency to perceive nature as 
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a caring and benevolent place — a peaceable kingdom rather than a Malthusian 
struggle (Ozkan et al.; Zimmerman and Cuddington). We underestimate the 
extent to which organisms compete for resources, especially within the same 
species. Consequently, we fail to appreciate the transformative power of selec-
tion, that is, the transformative power of dying without leaving any offspring. 
We gravitate instead towards the more optimistic belief that organisms will 
somehow acquire the traits they need to acquire in order to survive, with selec-
tion playing no role in this process (for a review, see Gregory, “Understanding 
Natural Selection”). These misconceptions are highly coherent (Shtulman and 
Calabi, “Cognitive Constraints”) and highly robust (Shtulman and Calabi, 
“Tuition vs. Intuition”). In fact, they resemble theories of evolution proposed 
prior to Darwin in the history of science (Shtulman).
Misconceptions about the mechanisms of evolution give rise to misconcep-
tions about the outcomes of evolution, that is, misconceptions about the origin of 
new species (speciation) and the demise of old species (extinction). With respect 
to speciation, those who hold an essentialist view of evolution have difficulty 
conceiving of speciation as the splitting of one population into two, because 
all members of the original population are assumed to be united by a common 
and enduring essence. Consequently, they prefer to view speciation as the holis-
tic metamorphosis of one population into another. This preference for linear 
evolution (“anagensis”) over branching evolution (“cladogenesis”) leads to the 
misconception that morphologically similar species are related through direct 
descent rather than common descent — for example, that chimpanzees are the 
ancestors of humans rather than their cousins (Catley et al.). Furthermore, most 
non-biologists deny that morphologically dissimilar species, like salamanders 
and sparrows or bees and brontosauruses, are related at all (Poling and Evans, 
“Religious Belief ”; Shtulman).
With respect to extinction, the belief that organisms acquire the traits they 
need to acquire gives rise to the misconception that extinction is rare, occur-
ring at the hands of catastrophic disasters, like earthquakes or floods, but not at 
the hands of more mundane forces, like predation or disease. Extinction, from a 
selection-based view of evolution, is just selection writ large, but it cannot be such 
from an essentialist view because essentialist views make no room for selection. 
Whatever process is responsible for adapting a species to its environment should 
also ensure that the species will not go extinct. Consequently, those who hold 
essentialist views of evolution greatly underestimate the frequency of extinction 
over time (Shtulman) and the ubiquity of extinction across species (Poling and 
Evans, “Are Dinosaurs the Rule”).
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Common Misinterpretations of Cladograms
The fact that most non-biologists hold deep-seated misconceptions about spe-
ciation and extinction does not bode well for their interpretation of cladograms, 
which depict patterns of speciation and extinction across clades. Indeed, several 
studies have found that non-biologists have difficulty reading cladograms (Catley 
et al.; Gregory, “Understanding Evolutionary Trees”; Halverson et al.; Novick et 
al., “Linear Versus Branching”; Phillips et al.; Shtulman and Checa) and con-
structing cladograms (Meir et al.; Novick and Catley; Novick et al., “Characters 
are Key”). These difficulties cluster into two general categories.
First, most non-biologists misinterpret the ordering of the taxa along the tips 
of the cladogram, reading information into the ordering that is not supported by 
the cladogram’s branching relations. The ordering of taxa in a cladogram is, to 
a large extent, arbitrary. While taxa that share a most recent common ancestor 
must be adjacent (e.g., chimpanzees and humans in figure 9.1), their ordering rel-
ative to one another can be changed (e.g., chimpanzees can appear either to the 
left of humans or to their right), as can the ordering of entire clades (e.g., gorillas 
can appear either to the left of the human/chimpanzee clade or to its right). Any 
two clades can be rotated around the node that connects them, resulting in 2n 
possible orders for every node in the graph. The five species depicted in figure 
9.1, for example, could be presented in 16 (or 24) possible orders, including the 
following three:
Gibbons, (Orangutans, ((Chimpanzees, Humans), Gorillas))
Gibbons, (((Humans, Chimpanzees), Gorillas), Orangutans)
(((Chimpanzees, Humans), Gorillas), Orangutans), Gibbons
These rotations are possible because a branch between two taxa indicates 
only that those taxa share a more immediate ancestor with each other than they 
do with any other taxa, in the same way that two siblings share a more immediate 
ancestor with each other than they do with any of their cousins. Nevertheless, 
most non-biologists assume that taxa on the left are more ancient or more prim-
itive than those on the right — or, in a vertically arrayed cladogram, that taxa at 
the bottom are more ancient or more primitive than those at the top. A corollary 
of this assumption is that the further apart two taxa appear along a cladogram’s 
tips, the more distantly they are related. Figure 9.1, for instance, would be com-
monly misinterpreted as indicating that gibbons are the most ancient/primitive 
of the five taxa and that gibbons are more closely related to orangutans than they 
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are to humans. In reality, this cladogram indicates that gibbons have evolved 
independently from other apes for as long as other apes have evolved inde-
pendently from gibbons, and gibbons are no more closely related to orangutans 
than they are to humans.
Second, most non-biologists misinterpret the linear elements of a cladogram, 
assuming that the length of the line connecting a taxon to its nearest node con-
veys information about that taxon’s evolutionary history when, in fact, it does 
not. The lengths of a cladogram’s lines are essentially arbitrary, as are their ori-
entation and their curvature. Moreover, the number of nodes contained on any 
given line provides no information about how closely the taxon at its tip is related 
to any other taxon. Gibbons and humans, for instance, are as closely related to 
one another as gibbons and gorillas despite the fact that, in figure 9.1, there are 
four nodes on the path from gibbons to humans but only three on the path from 
gibbons to gorillas. The number of nodes is merely a byproduct of the number 
of taxa included in the cladogram. Drop chimpanzees from the cladogram and 
the number of nodes between gibbons and humans drops from four to three. 
Nevertheless, most non-biologists read meaning into how long a line is (the lon-
ger the line, the older the taxon) and how many nodes appear on its surface (the 
more nodes, the more distantly the taxon is related to other taxa in the clade). 
These misinterpretations are not unreasonable; how long a line is and how many 
nodes appear on its surface bear meaningful information in other types of dia-
grams (e.g., road maps, line graphs, flow charts, blueprints).
Further complicating matters, many depictions of shared ancestry designed 
for public consumption include scientifically questionable elements. Cladograms, 
by definition, are a representation of cladogenesis, or branching evolution, yet 
most cladograms in textbooks and science museums include representations 
of anagenesis, or linear evolution as well (Catley and Novick; MacDonald and 
Wiley; MacFadden et al.). That is, the nodes in these diagrams are labeled with 
extinct species, implying that those species gave rise to the extant species along 
the diagrams’ tips. Empirically, such representations are suspect because biologists 
cannot ascertain whether an extinct species is the ancestor of an extant species or 
its cousin, and the latter inference is several times more likely (given the ubiquity 
of extinction). Other problematic features common to cladograms in science text-
books and science museums include varying the thickness of its branches without 
explanation, varying the endpoints of its branches without explanation, segregat-
ing “higher” taxa from “lower” taxa, and placing humans on the top-most branch 
of a vertically arrayed cladogram or the right-most branch of a horizontally arrayed 
cladogram (Catley and Novick; MacDonald and Wiley; Torrens and Barahona).
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Potential Misinterpretation of Information 
Missing from Cladograms
To summarize thus far, most non-biologists hold essentialist views of evolu-
tion that make branching speciation a conceptual quandary, so they ignore the 
branching relations in a cladogram and attend primarily to its non-informative 
elements: the ordering of its tips, the lengths of its lines, and the frequency of its 
nodes. Ignoring the branching relations in a cladogram is highly problematic, but 
it is not the only problem that may arise from an essentialist view. Cladograms 
omit several types of information that, from a biologist’s point of view, are innoc-
uous forms of simplification but, from a non-biologist’s point of view, may be 
seen as veridical representations of evolutionary change. Below I discuss three 
such omissions, noting how those omissions may reify and reinforce the essen-
tialist misconceptions reviewed above.
The Omission of Extinction
Cladograms have come to dominate the biological sciences mainly because 
they can be constructed using highly objective information: similarities in 
genetic structure (Pennisi). It is possible to build cladograms from morpholog-
ical information, but such information is less reliable, as it is rarely clear from 
visual inspection alone whether a trait observed in two taxa was inherited from 
a common ancestor (a homologous trait) or was derived separately in response to 
similar selection pressures on organisms whose common ancestor did not possess 
that trait (an analogous trait). This situation poses problems for including extinct 
taxa in modern cladograms because our knowledge of extinct taxa is primarily 
morphological in nature; fossils contain no living tissue for genetic analysis. As 
a result, when extinct taxa are included in textbook diagrams or museum dia-
grams, they tend to be placed in the branches of the diagram rather than at its 
tips (Catley and Novick; MacFadden et al.). Among genuinely cladistic repre-
sentations of shared ancestry in textbooks and museums, extinct taxa are rare 
(MacDonald and Wiley).
This absence of extinct taxa potentially reinforces the misconception, noted 
above, that extinction is uncommon and that extinction affects only certain 
types of species (Jarnefelt, this volume; Poling and Evans, “Are Dinosaurs the 
Rule”; Shtulman). The reality is that over 99.9% of the species that once existed 
are now extinct (Mayr), and cladograms, by representing the 0.1% of species 
that happen to have survived to the present (and a small subset of the 0.1% at 
that), present a skewed picture of the outcome of evolutionary change. Perhaps 
more problematic, the blind and messy process of mutation-plus-selection is 
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represented as a series of straight and orderly lines. The historical record is wiped 
clean of all false starts and blind paths, leaving only the “successful” lineages still 
present today. While cladograms are certainly an improvement over anagenetic 
representations of evolutionary change, they still vastly underrepresent the fre-
quency of cladogenesis in that every instance of cladogenesis represented in the 
tree was likely accompanied by dozens of instances not represented.
This speculation — that non-biologists are unclear on how extinction is (and 
is not) represented in cladograms — is supported by a study of how visitors to 
the Los Angeles Natural History Museum interpret one of the museum’s clado-
grams (Shtulman and Checa). Participants completed a series activities using a 
cladogram that depicted all 19 orders of mammals. In one activity, participants 
decided whether an extinct, pig-like creature — an “entelodont” — could be placed 
within the cladogram and, if so, where. Virtually all participants (96%) agreed 
that the entelodont could be placed within the cladogram, but only a minority 
(39%) discerned that it should be located on a branch within the ungulate clade. 
Most participants thought the entelodont should be located either at the bottom 
of the cladogram, near its root (45%), or on a separate branch altogether (12%). 
Thus, the modal response was to treat the entelodont either as an ancestor to all 
mammals or as an isolated lineage related to no mammals.
The Omission of Biodiversity
Just as extinct taxa tend to be omitted from cladograms, so are many extant 
species within the depicted clades. Such omissions date back to one of the very 
first depictions of the interconnectedness of life: Ernst Haeckel’s (1866) “tree 
of life,” covering everything from insects to mammals. While Haeckel devoted 
an entire layer of branches to the four thousand species of mammals — conspic-
uously depicted at the top of the tree, with humans in the center — he devoted 
only a single branch to the million species of insects (Gould, “Redrafting the 
Tree of Life”). Another example of the omission of extant species can be seen 
in figure 9.1. Only one tip in this cladogram represents a unitary species: the tip 
labeled “humans.” The tips labeled “orangutans,” “gorillas,” and “chimpanzees” 
represent two species each — Bornean and Sumatran orangutans, eastern and 
western gorillas, common and pygmy chimpanzees — and the tip labeled “gib-
bons” represents 15 different species. These examples, among others (see Gould, 
“Redrafting the Tree of Life”), suggest that the less salient a taxon is in our folk 
biology, the fewer tips we devote to that taxon in our cladograms.
Obviously, not all species can be represented in a single cladogram; a clado-
gram containing 3000 species, designed by David Hillis and his colleagues at 
the University of Texas at Austin, is legible only when enlarged to a size of 1.5 
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meters or more (Pennisi), and 3000 species is less than 0.1% of the total number 
of known species. But all species within a clade can be represented if the clade 
chosen for depiction is sufficiently small. For instance, figure 9.1 could be rede-
signed such that gibbons are dropped from the cladogram and the remaining 
clades could be expanded to include all known species. Doing so would not only 
highlight the diversity among the great apes but would also lessen the impression 
that those species are ordered from least complex to most complex, as is implied 
by the current ordering.
An additional problem created by compressing a diverse clade into a single 
tip is that the particular species chosen to label the clade, as a whole, likely influ-
ences our interpretation of its relation to other clades in the diagram. Consider, 
for instance, the fact that the genus Pan is almost always represented by Pan 
troglodytes, the common chimpanzee, rather than Pan paniscus, the pygmy 
chimpanzee or “bonobo.” These two species, while roughly similar in mor-
phology, differ widely in behavior. Whereas common chimpanzees are hostile, 
patriarchal, and meat eating, pygmy chimpanzees are docile, matriarchal, and 
vegetarian. We humans are as closely related to pygmy chimpanzees as we are to 
common chimpanzees, yet our relation to common chimpanzees undoubtedly 
looms larger in our minds given how frequently that relation is depicted in pri-
mate cladograms.
There is no research, to my knowledge, supporting the speculation that 
the type of biodiversity represented in a cladogram influences how we inter-
pret that cladogram. There is, however, ample research demonstrating that 
non-biologists underestimate biodiversity in general. For instance, US under-
graduates conceptualize trees and fish as basic-level categories — categories that 
are optimally cohesive in terms of the number of features shared by all category 
members — even though, from a biological point of view, “tree” and “fish” should 
function as superordinate categories given the great diversity of organisms they 
cover (Rosch et al.). Likewise, in a survey of US undergraduates’ tree knowledge, 
over 90% reported familiarity with Cedar, Hickory, Maple, and Spruce trees, 
but fewer than half reported any familiarity with Alder, Buckeye, Hawthorn, or 
Sweetgum trees, even though many had encountered those trees daily on their 
campus (Coley et al.). And use of tree terms, flower terms, bird terms, and fish 
terms in English-language documents has dropped precipitously from the nine-
teenth century to the twentieth, concurrent with a precipitous increase in artifact 
terms (Wolff et al.). These data suggest that we systematically underestimate the 
biodiversity around us and are therefore unlikely to infer the biodiversity missing 
from a cladogram.
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The Omission of Variation
As noted above, non-biologists tend to view variation between species as perva-
sive and adaptive but variation within species as minimal and nonadaptive — a 
byproduct of essentialism. Such notions influence a variety of cognitive processes, 
including memory (Legare et al.), categorization (Nettle), induction (Shtulman 
and Schulz), and explanation (Opfer et al.). Cladograms do not help dissuade 
these notions. If anything, they reinforce them by representing diverse pop-
ulations with a single image or a single label. The only variation depicted in a 
cladogram is variation across species, which, depending on the species chosen for 
inclusion, can be quite dramatic.
Admittedly, the unit of analysis in a cladogram is some form of higher-order 
taxon (e.g., species, genus, family, order) and any attempt to depict variation 
within a population would detract from the information cladograms are designed 
to display (i.e., the ancestral relations among those populations). Nevertheless, 
the omissions described above — omission of extinct taxa and omission of several 
extant taxa within the same clade — likely exacerbate essentialist interpretations 
of biological kinds in that taxa are regularly isolated from the continuum of vari-
ation from which they came.
Figure 9.1, for instance, portrays only five taxa when, in reality, those taxa 
cover 22 different species. Humans’ place among the apes would appear much 
less distinct if all 22 species were explicitly represented (and if the branches of 
the cladogram were rotated so that humans appeared somewhere in the middle 
of that continuum). Humans’ place among the apes would also appear less dis-
tinct if extinct apes were intermixed with the extant ones. Indeed, cladograms 
depicting humans among a sea of extinct hominids, like the cladogram on dis-
play in the Hall of Human Origins at the American Museum of Natural History 
(Novick et al., “Depicting the Tree of Life”), likely engender less essentialist views 
of humankind than those that depict humans among organisms with minimal 
resemblance to humans (e.g., fish, turtles, birds, flowers), though future research 
is needed to verify this speculation.
Alternative Representations
The only cladogram we have considered thus far is figure 9.1, which is a partic-
ular type of cladogram: a ladder diagram. Cladograms can also be constructed 
as “trees,” as shown in figure 9.2 (Catley and Novick). The omissions described 
above are not fatal flaws of tree diagrams or ladder diagrams. Both could be rede-
signed to include the omitted information. Still, tree and ladder diagrams may 
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not be the best representation of information about extinction or biodiversity. 
Other types of representations may be better suited for those purposes. Tree 
and ladder diagrams may play an essential role in modern biology (Novick and 
Catley), but their value as a scientific tool does not justify their use in the public 
domain. It is an empirical question which representations of phylogenetic infor-
mation are best suited for conveying that information to a lay audience.
Below, I outline three hypotheses relevant to this question: (1) circle dia-
grams are better suited than tree or ladder diagrams for conveying information 
about common ancestry but are not well suited for conveying information about 
extinction or biodiversity; (2) spiral diagrams are better suited than tree or ladder 
diagrams for conveying information about biodiversity but are not well suited for 
conveying information about common ancestry or extinction; and (3) bush dia-
grams are better suited than tree or ladder diagrams for conveying information 
about extinction but are not well suited for conveying information about com-
mon ancestry or biodiversity. The first of these hypotheses has been (partially) 
tested and supported, but the remaining two have not. All three, however, are 
motivated by what we currently know about how people understand evolution 
Figure 9.2 Tree diagram depicting the ancestral relations among six 
hypothetical taxa, adapted from Gregory, “Understanding Evolu-
tionary Trees.”
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and how people read cladograms, outlined above. And they are proposed in 
the spirit of what other authors in this volume have argued: that intuition can 
facilitate scientific reasoning, rather than obstruct it, if the right intuitions are 
accessed and accessed in the right ways (Blancke, Tanghe, and Braeckman, this 
volume; Evans, this volume).
Circle Diagrams
In an analysis of the visual representations contained in 31 biology textbooks, 
Catley and Novick, in “Seeing the Wood,” found that cladograms are most typ-
ically portrayed as ladders (figure 9.1). The second most common format is that 
of a tree (figure 9.2). Trees and ladders are informationally equivalent, differing 
only in whether the lines connecting taxa meet at an angle or at a rectilinear 
juncture, but trees are easier to read because the clades are more visually distinct, 
which makes the nested relations among those clades easier to discern (Novick 
and Catley). A third type of diagram — the circle diagram, depicted in figure 
9.3 — makes the nested relations among clades even more salient. A circle dia-
gram differs from a tree or ladder diagram in that shared ancestry is conveyed 
with concentric circles rather than nested branches. It is essentially a bird’s eye 
view of a tree or ladder diagram — in this case, a bird’s eye view of figure 9.2 — in 
that the branches of such diagrams are collapsed to a single dimension. Doing so 
is conceptually ideal given that the vertical dimension of a tree or ladder diagram 
conveys no intrinsic meaning. Moreover, circles are a more natural representa-
tion of groups than are branches, as all members of the group can be encapsulated 
in one spatially continuous figure.
Figure 9.3 Circle diagram of the same taxa displayed in figure 9.2.
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Novick and Catley explicitly compared the affordances of ladder, tree, and 
circle diagrams by asking two groups of college undergraduates — psychology 
majors and biology majors — to translate the phylogenetic information pre-
sented in one format (e.g., a tree diagram) into another (e.g., a ladder diagram) 
(“Understanding Phylogenies”). They found that participants were most accurate 
at translating phylogenetic information from circle diagrams. In fact, presenting 
phylogenetic information in a circle diagram nullified the effect of participants’ 
background knowledge, with psychology majors performing nearly as accurately 
as biology majors (85% accuracy vs. 95% accuracy, respectively). Presenting the 
information in a tree or ladder diagram, on the other hand, decreased accuracy 
relative to the circle-diagram condition, by 15–50% for biology majors and by 
50–75% for psychology majors. Circle diagrams allowed participants to glean 
information about common ancestry that was otherwise opaque in the form of 
trees or ladders.
That said, it’s not clear that circle diagrams are an ideal format for present-
ing information about extinction or biodiversity for the simple reason that they 
do not expand well. With each new clade comes a new circle, and each circle 
must surround, or be surrounded by, other circles. The net effect can be an over-
whelming number of boundaries. These boundaries direct attention effectively 
when few in number but may attract attention, as focal objects themselves, when 
more numerous. To represent the predominance of extinct taxa or the diversity 
of extant taxa within a clade, an alternate format is probably desirable.
Spiral Diagrams
Figure 9.4 depicts the same information as depicted by figure 9.2 (and figure 
9.3) but in a qualitatively different format: a spiral. Spiral diagrams are most 
frequently used to illustrate the interconnectedness of all life on earth, from bac-
teria to fungi to animals to plants (Ricou and Pollock), but they could just as 
easily be used to represent a more select group of taxa, like the primates depicted 
in figure 9.1.
Spiral diagrams may be an ideal format for depicting the ancestral relations 
among a single family or order for several reasons. First, spiral diagrams are more 
efficient in their allocation of tips to branches. More species can be packed into a 
spiral diagram than into a similarly sized tree or ladder diagram because the tips 
are arrayed in a circle, thereby making use of both horizontal and vertical dimen-
sions of the space. Second, spiral diagrams lack the directionality or polarity 
inherent in tree and ladder diagrams. There is no top-most branch or right-most 
branch that might be construed as the “pinnacle” taxon (as many non-biologists 
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are prone to construe humans; see Guillo, this volume). Th ird, spiral diagrams 
convey an intrinsic sense of proportionality by virtue of their pie-like structure. 
Th e proportion of space occupied by one clade (e.g., the great apes) relative to 
another clade (e.g., the lesser apes) is more apparent in a spiral diagram than in a 
tree or ladder diagram and might thus convey a more veridical representation of 
diversity within and across clades.
Th e main drawback to using a spiral diagram is that precise information 
about common ancestry is diffi  cult to discern from a spiral diagram, particu-
larly for spirals that contain hundreds — or thousands — of species (Novick et 
al., “Depicting the Tree of Life”). Spiral diagrams are also ill-suited for depict-
ing extinct taxa for the same reasons that tree and ladder diagrams are: all taxa 
are displayed along a single line (or curve, in this case), and it is thus diffi  cult 
to diff erentiate extinct taxa from extant taxa unless they are denoted with dif-






Figure 9.4 Spiral diagram of the same taxa displayed in fi gure 9.2, 
adapted from Gregory, “Understanding Evolutionary Trees.”
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of the tips in a tree diagram to indicate which taxa are extant and which are 
extinct, this strategy would be difficult to implement in a spiral diagram without 
breaking the continuity of the spiral. Spiral diagrams may thus be best suited for 
representing information about the density of taxonomically similar lifeforms or 
the interconnectedness of different types of life.
Bush Diagrams
None of the diagrams reviewed thus far are ideal for representing extinct taxa 
because they feature all taxa along a single line (or curve) with no inherent mark-
ers for distinguishing extant taxa from extinct taxa. One way to circumvent this 
problem, in a tree diagram or ladder diagram, would be to place extinct taxa 
within its branches rather than at its tips, but doing so would render the diagram 
non-cladistic and potentially misleading, as noted above. An alternative solution 
would be to relax the constraint that all branches need to terminate along a single 
line or the constraint that all branches need to be oriented in the same direction 
(Gould, “Bushes”). The result is a bush diagram of the kind displayed in figure 
9.5. Figure 9.5 conveys the same information as that conveyed by figures 9.2, 9.3, 
and 9.4, but in a less orderly manner, consistent with the less-than-orderly nature 
of evolutionary change itself. Indeed, what is most salient in a bush diagram is 
not the ordering of the taxa but the branches connecting taxa to nodes. Its nodes 
take visual precedence over its tips. And in such a diagram, there is no expecta-
tion that the tips represent only extant taxa because the tips are not arrayed along 
a line implicitly interpreted as “present day.”
The bush diagram in figure 9.5 was co-opted from one the most iconic 
sketches of evolutionary change drawn by Darwin in 1837. This sketch, appear-
ing in his Notebook B, was annotated with the conjecture, “to have many species 
in same genus . . . requires extinction.” Darwin underlined “requires” to empha-
size the necessity of extinction to speciation. He recognized that species do 
not just metamorphosize from lesser-adapted forms to better-adapted forms. 
They fractionate, splitting into a diversity of forms, and that diversity is then 
selectively winnowed. Every modern species represents a small fraction of the 
innumerable lifeforms that once existed — lifeforms whose fate was extinction 
rather than propagation.
Thus, the purpose of Darwin’s best-known visual representation of evolution-
ary change was to make salient the relation between extant species and extinct 
species. Darwin’s diagram is well suited for this purpose because the “stubbiness” 
of its terminal branches is consistent with the brevity of the lineages they repre-
sent. Indeed, those branches need not be labeled, though they certainly could be 
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in cases where biologists know a fair amount about the extinct taxa of interest 
(e.g., extinct horses or extinct hominids). Of course, a diagram that emphasizes 
nodes over tips is not an ideal diagram for reading the relations among tips (i.e., 
for reading information about common ancestry), nor is it ideal for representing 
the biodiversity among extant taxa insofar that the stubbiness of its tips estab-
lishes the expectation that those lineages have been pruned from the tree.
Conclusion
Misconceptions about evolution can lead people to misinterpret cladograms. To 
date, much research has been done on misinterpretations of a cladogram’s core 
elements — its lines, tips, nodes, and branches — but little research has been done 
on misinterpretations of the elements missing from a cladogram. Here, I have 
argued that omission of extinct taxa from cladograms reifi es the common mis-







Figure 9.5 Bush diagram of the same taxa displayed in fi gure 9.2, adapted from 
Darwin, Notebook B.
166 Part 2 • Chapter 9
omission of within-clade biodiversity reifies the common misconception that 
extant species are largely unrelated to one another, and omission of variation 
(in general) reifies the common misconception that between-group variation is 
more common than within-group variation, but these hypotheses need empirical 
verification. I have also argued that circle diagrams, spiral diagrams, and bush 
diagrams do a better job of representing common ancestry, biodiversity, and 
extinction, respectively, than do ladder diagrams and tree diagrams, but these 
hypotheses need verification as well.
Regardless of whether the specific claims sketched above will survive empir-
ical scrutiny, the more general claim that no one graph fits all instructional 
purposes has been born out in decades of research on graph comprehension and 
graph construction (for a review, see Anderson et al.). Different graphing con-
ventions have proven effective for representing different types of information, 
and this conclusion will likely hold for evolutionary diagrams as well. Thus, 
graphic designers charged with illustrating phylogenetic information in science 
textbooks or science museums may need to reconsider whether a tree diagram 
or a ladder diagram is the best diagram for the job. While these diagrams are 
powerful tools in the hands of biologists, they may be downright misleading 
to non-biologists. Circle diagrams, spiral diagrams, and bush diagrams, on the 
other hand, may have the necessary affordances to block the misconceptions rei-
fied by traditional representations of phylogenetic information.
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Representations of the Origin of Species in Secular 
(France) and Religious (Morocco) Contexts
Dominique Guillo
Abstract
Many studies in the social sciences regard the rejection of evolution, creation-
ism, and religious faith as closely related attitudes. The purpose of this chapter 
is to show that this explanatory schema is wrong and that representations of 
living species do not necessarily obey a binary logic based on the opposition 
between faith and reason, or religion and science. This chapter looks at and 
compares attitudes to evolution in two different countries, France, which is a 
laic country, and Morocco, where Islam is a state religion. In France, people 
claim to strongly adhere to “evolution” and reject “creationism.” However, 
the representations of nature they associate with the word “evolution” come 
actually very close to that of Intelligent Design, the belief that the natural 
world displays clear signs of intelligent interventions. In Morocco, adherence 
to creationism seems motivated largely by rational as well as religious argu-
ments. Most importantly, however, this inquiry underlines a major feature 
of these beliefs: they are often inherently blurred, because many individuals 
feel indifferent vis-à-vis the topic — the origin of species. Therefore, represen-
tations of living species are not universally and necessarily considered to be 
sacred, even though in many circumstances this is undoubtedly the case.
The reception of Darwinism is commonly analyzed within a framework that 
uses — or is similar to — the Weberian thesis of secularization through the 
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advancement of science. According to this thesis, Darwinism has contributed 
to the “disenchantment of the world” by extending modern rationalism to the 
biological field. In doing so, the theory met with resistance from various reli-
gious movements. In the same breath it spread to nonbelievers — or less fervent 
believers — a conception of nature that was rid of creationist elements (I use the 
term “Darwinism” to designate all the propositions that are widely accepted in 
evolutionary biology; see Mayr).
The secularization thesis underlies much of current research on this topic 
in philosophy, cognitive sciences, and social sciences. These studies often rely on 
or develop the hypothesis that creationist representations of the origin of species 
are based on fallacious reasoning inspired by cognitive schemata that are deemed 
to be typical of faith (see, e.g., Dennett; Dawkins, The God; Coyne; Coleman). 
Conversely, adherence to a Darwinian representation of living species is consid-
ered to be the result of logically correct reasoning, supported with facts and free 
of references to occult entities, divine or metaphysical.
This general thesis predicts that the more religious people are, the more 
likely they will hold creationist views regarding the origin of species, oppose sci-
ence and evolution, and, finally, reject the genealogical link between human and 
ape. Conversely, the less religious people are, the more likely they will develop 
scientifically sound, evolutionary representations of living species, will rely upon 
facts, science, and reason to support their beliefs about the origin of species, and 
reject creationism.
However, researchers who draw such a conclusion focus more often on actors 
actively involved in public debates concerning creationism: religious leaders, sci-
entists, teachers, or biology students. The objective of this article is to show that 
a very different picture emerges when one studies the beliefs of ordinary actors 
less directly involved in these debates. I chose to compare two very different 
countries: France, a secular country in which creationism is almost totally absent 
from the public sphere; and Morocco, a country where religion plays a central 
role — Islam is the state religion.
I aim to demonstrate the following points. First, in order to understand the 
basis of creationism, it is imperative to distinguish between the content of the 
representation of the origin of species that individuals have, on the one hand, 
and their attitudes towards evolution, on the other. In my field studies, I observed 
that individuals who claim to accept evolution hold representations of the ori-
gin of species that, unknowingly, are not scientifically accurate, but that are, in 
fact, quite similar to creationist beliefs. Second, in Morocco, the majority of the 
participants did not straightforwardly reject evolution. Moreover, the arguments 
Representations of the Origin of Species in Secular and Religious Contexts 173
that people invoked against evolution were both rational — or, at least, perceived 
by the participants as such — and religious. Third, many individuals show a lack 
of interest in the issue of the origin of species, exhibiting a form of indifference 
that results in intrinsically blurred or vague beliefs. Finally, people do not always 
consider the origin of humans to be deeply sacred. For these reasons, beliefs about 
origins of species do not follow a simple and binary logic based on the opposi-
tion between faith and reason or religion and science, as the secularization thesis 
implies. In sum, the aim of this research is to bring about new insights concern-
ing the actual cognitive basis of creationism, complementary to some avenues 
explored in this area of research (for example, in discussions about “cognition 
in context” proposed in Evans, “Cognitive,” and her chapter in this volume; in 
Geraedts, “Reinventing”; and more broadly in Rosengren et al., Evolution).
France: A Non-Darwinian “Evolutionism”
In order to shed light on this logic, I first investigated people’s attitudes towards, 
and understanding of, evolution in France (Guillo, Darwin). Here, I present one 
of the surveys on which I based my comparison with Morocco. I used a question-
naire on genealogical relationships between living species. On the first page of 
the questionnaire, I arranged six images in random order. These images represent 
“a chimpanzee,” “a human,” “an amoeba,” “an oak,” “a lizard,” and “a whale.” 
I wrote the name of each species in a caption under each photo. On the sec-
ond page, I posed the following question: “Trace the genealogical tree that in 
your opinion connects these individuals to each other” (on how people inter-
pret biological genealogical trees, see also the remarks and observations made by 
Shtulman, this volume; and more broadly on the effects of the use of such peda-
gogic tools, see also Blancke, Tanghe, and Braeckman, this volume).
With the experiment I investigated popular conceptions of the origin of 
species and measured to which degree these conceptions align with the scien-
tific concepts in modern evolutionary biology. More specifically, I investigated 
whether or not the diagrams drawn by the students showed signs of the five sche-
mata that characterize creationist beliefs about the origin of species (Mayr):
1. fixism, that is, the absence of genealogical connections between individuals 
of different species;
2. the Great Chain of Being, or Ladder of Nature, crowned by humans, 
that is, a linear and anthropocentric representation of the connections 
between species;
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3. no role for chance;
4. an essentialist conception of species;
5. teleological thinking, a necessary consequence of each of the four previ-
ous schemata.
These five patterns lead to beliefs in extraworldly or supernatural enti-
ties — whether in the form of a personified god, metaphysical entities, or an 
abstract underlying order — that intervene in the formation of species. The 120 
third-year students of a French scientific high school who participated in the 
study had been taught evolutionary theory in biology class, with an emphasis 
on how the theory breaks away from the five creationist schemata. This mate-
rial was rehearsed two months before the experiment, in an Introduction to 
Social Sciences course. As we will see, in this sample, the results were highly 
convergent.
A Transformism Marked by the Anthropocentric 
Great Chain of Being
The first important result was that no student proposed a fixist representation of 
living species, not even partly: no species had been left unconnected to the others 
(table 10.1). The representation of the connection between species that emerges 
from these diagrams is unanimously transformist. But does the complete absence 
of the fixist schema in a sample of students from a country where secularism plays 
a central role validate the secularization thesis? Fixism, however, is only one of 
the possible components of creationist representations of living beings. In fact, 
all other creationist schemata are present in these diagrams.
First, there is the anthropocentric Great Chain of Being. Its most visible 
manifestations are, on the one hand, the linearization of diagrams — beings are 
connected in pairs by direct lines rather than branches or chevrons (or, in other 
words, a “V”) representing a “common ancestor” — and, on the other hand, the 
crowning of these diagrams by humans (figure 10.1). 
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Figure 10.1 A Great Chain of Being crowned by humans.
These schemata are also present, despite appearances, in nonlinear, arbo-
rescent diagrams, similar to those in figure 10.2. Strictly speaking, the diagram 
in figure 10.2 is not inconsistent with a Darwinian interpretation. It draws a 
tree with branches that represent “common ancestors.” Yet the Great Chain of 
Being profoundly regulates this diagram. Species’ names are arranged along a 
line that clearly reproduces a scale following an anthropocentric and hierarchic 
criterion, which refers to their propinquity to the human being: at one end, oak 
and amoeba; at the other, human being, and just before her or him, chimpanzee. 
Note that it is quite possible to draw a tree without the human or the amoeba at 
one end, as is the case in the diagram (figure 10.3) proposed by another student.
Therefore, in diagrams such as figure 10.2, the reference to a common ances-
tor is interpreted from a scalar and anthropocentric perspective on living beings: 
the tree hides a ladder. Only in four diagrams does the schema of an anthropo-
centric Great Chain of Being play no organizing role (table 10.2). In sum, the 
overwhelming majority of participants’ diagrams are organized according both 
a transformist and an anthropocentric schema (table 10.2). The conception of 
the transformation of species — of evolution — that emerges here is thus built 
from the idea of a linear temporal progression necessarily oriented toward the 
appearance of humans. A form of teleology, or progress, is clearly readable in this 
conception of life. It therefore leaves no room for chance.
Figure 10.3 A tree without anthropocentric Great Chain of Being.
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Such representations of evolution are widespread in the French public 
sphere — in newspapers, popular scientific journals, educational textbooks, or 
documentary films (Guillo, Darwin). There are almost no public expressions of 
creationism. “Evolution” is frequently presented as a linear and ascending process 
of gradual complexification of species, which begins in the ocean depths with 
simple and crudely organized beings, evolving slowly through the ages to finally 
become human — the species with the most sophisticated mental faculties. 
This representation is perfectly summarized by the widespread formula: “man 
descended from apes.”
In other words, the students I interviewed generally claimed to adhere to 
what science says and to “the idea of evolution.” However, their adherence con-
ceals a misunderstanding. Certainly, the representation they associate with the 
word “evolution” is transformist. As such, it breaks with the fixist beliefs typical 
of creationism. Nonetheless, their understanding of evolution remains strongly 
marked by teleology, anthropocentrism, essentialism (see Guillo, Darwin), and 
hostility to chance. This is definitely not a Darwinian representation of evolution 
(see Mayr, What Evolution; Dawkins, The Ancestor’s).
An Evolutionism That Resembles Some Forms of Creationism
These results lead to two remarks. First, the strong teleological, essentialist, and 
anthropocentric undertones of students’ representations of evolution explain 
why people can accept evolution and, at the same time, adhere to religion. We 
observed this close association between evolution and religion in a survey on read-
ers’ letters about evolution sent to a French popular science magazine — Sciences 
& vie (Sciences and Life) (Guillo, Darwin). In the eyes of many of the readers, 
evolution, as they understand it, requires a form of religious explanation, at least 
a reference to metaphysical entities or extraworldly forces. Within a teleologi-
cal, essentialist, and anthropocentric framework, it is necessary to explain the 
direction evolution seems to take and the orderly progression it displays. Such 
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statements demonstrate that, psychologically, there is no necessary link between 
adherence to religion, on the one hand, and rejection of the idea of evolution, 
rejection of science, or an explicit endorsement of creationism, on the other.
Second, students’ representations of evolution are not in line with modern 
evolutionary biology, although students themselves think they are. In fact, in 
many ways, their ideas about evolution come very close to explicitly creationist 
representations, in particular to intelligent design, which accepts the transformist 
schema. The students claim to accept evolutionary theory, state they are “anticre-
ationists” and consider their beliefs to be far more scientific than “creationists.” 
However, within the fierce debates surrounding evolution, people who perceive 
each other as opponents often have very similar representations of living beings.
Of course, there is a very important difference between these two groups of 
people: the participants in this survey refer to evolutionary biology and, more 
broadly, to the scientific method. They tend to claim that the facts must decide 
on matters of natural phenomena. Conversely, militant creationists believe that 
religion and the authorities that represent it should have the last word. These 
are two radically different positions on truth, the type of arguments that estab-
lish it, and the authority of science in society. In other words, the real difference 
between the pro-evolutionary students and creationists lies much more in an 
ontological and epistemological register — how to establish the truth–and a 
social register — the status of scientific institutions in society — rather than in 
their representations of living beings, that is to say, in a cognitive or positive regis-
ter. Therefore, on this point, these data lead to conclusions similar to those drawn 
in research showing that believers and nonbelievers very often mobilize the same 
fundamental “automatic intuitions” about the origin of species (see, in particular, 
Järnefelt in this volume, who shows that one can find even among nonreligious 
individuals an understanding of the origin of nature “as purposefully created by 
some being”). For this reason, creationism, the reception of evolution, and the 
creation-evolution debates cannot be solely explained by the opposition between 
two representations of living beings, one built on faith and religion, the other on 
reason and science. At least in this case, the secularization thesis is inadequate.
Blurred Representations and Lack of 
Interest in Matters of Evolution
After the questionnaire was completed I interviewed some of the students. It 
appeared that they do not have an extremely precise and definite opinion about 
the origin of species. It simply does not seem to be a matter of great interest to 
them (Guillo, Darwin). This applies to nonbiologists in general. I asked school 
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teachers a question similar to the ones commonly used in surveys on the reception 
and the misunderstanding of evolutionary theory. In these studies, the researcher 
rearranges the answers of the participants in a particular order so that they are 
supposed to reflect his or her beliefs about evolution (see, for example, Bishop and 
Anderson, “Student”). In the experiment I conducted, I recorded the dialogues 
between the experimenter and the interviewee, to capture the modalities of expres-
sion, the properties, and the strength of the participants’ conviction. The problem 
I posed was about the evolution of the giraffe’s neck. E designates the experimenter 
and JD are fictitious initials for the interviewee (the dialogue is here translated 
from French: for a detailed presentation of this experiment, see Guillo, Darwin).
E: How would you explain to a child the steps of the evolution that led 
to the formation of the current giraffe’s long neck, knowing that their 
ancestors had short necks?
JD: I write that?
E: No, no, you just explain.
JD: I just speak . . .
E: Yes, yes, you speak.
JD: So they had short necks . . .
E: The ancestor of the giraffe, it has a very short neck, so how did the first 
giraffe with a long neck appear?
JD: Well it’s in relation to food, because they had to . . . [silence].
E: Yes. [laughing]. I do not know, me, don’t look at me this way, I don’t have 
the slightest idea . . .
JD: I’ve gotta talk to someone.
E: Yes, yes, go on.
JD: And why did they have to . . . It means that there was nothing left to eat 
on the ground or um . . .
E: Yeah.
JD: Why was there nothing left to eat on the ground? Well there’s been cli-
mate changes that made it impossible to find something to eat on the 
ground . . . but at the same time it means that there was a drought, so 
normally there should be no more trees . . . So why . . . To have access to 
food that was not eaten by other animals? I do not know, I don’t have 
the answer.
E: Okay. Then a change in environment, well, in vegetation . . .
JD: Adaptation to the fact that . . . Thanks to their long neck they have access 
to branches to which other animals that use to eat plants do not neces-
sarily have access.
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E: Okay, and how did that happen? How there were the first long-necked 
giraffes among short-necked giraffes? How did that happen?
JD: Well it is an evolution . . . you know . . . genetic, you know, progressive.
E: Okay.
JD: Natural, which involves an adaptation, you know. They had no choice, 
in fact, either . . . Well there was a time . . . To thrive and survive, this 
species has had to adapt, and it succeeded in adapting, you know.
E: Okay.
JD: So with a long neck, well, that was doing better for feeding you know.
E: OK. All right?
JD: Yes.
It might be tempting to consider that JD entertains in his or her answers 
a teleological — here a “lamarckian” — schema: “well that was doing better for 
feeding.” These are the conclusions drawn by a lot of research on this issue (see 
for example Bishop and Anderson, “Student”). However, such an interpretation 
of the data underestimates the long distance between, on the one hand, words 
or sentences with finalist accents — such as those pronounced by JD — and, on 
the other hand, finalist beliefs about living beings in the strong sense, that is to 
say some kind of theory — here teleological or Lamarckian (on this point, see 
insightful observations and remarks in Geraedts and Boersma, “Reinventing”). 
Indeed, if one focuses on the elements of the dialogue that reflect the individual’s 
relation to the belief attributed to him or her, it appears that the few words he 
or she utters — “it’s an evolution,” “which involves an adaptation” — seem to the 
interviewee very quickly a sufficient explanation, that answers the question with 
a satisfactory degree of precision. These concepts, however, have only a vague 
meaning in the mind of the interviewee. They do not seem to refer to a range of 
questions that she or he uses to explore in depth, about which he or she uses to 
have an opinion or specific beliefs. Certainly, cognitive content outcrops here. 
Nevertheless, it would be a long stretch to translate these vague expressions 
into logically ordered propositions with a specific and precise content, that is 
to say, into a theoretical discursive system. More broadly, in many interviews I 
conducted, people often displayed feelings, postures, and attitudes such as dis-
comfort, laughs, and confessions of ignorance — “I don’t know” — or referred 
to scientific authorities for an answer. These words and postures express a low 
intensity commitment and a form of distance and indifference towards the ori-
gin of species.
It should be emphasized that these words and postures need to be taken into 
account in the description that the researcher gives of such beliefs. They should 
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lead her or him to characterize these beliefs as intrinsically blurred in part. This 
property — or variable — is rarely mentioned. In particular, in cognitive research 
on representations about the origin of species, the responses of the individuals 
interviewed are very often transcribed into propositions considered as having 
a precise semantic content. This semantic content is generally described as dif-
ferent from the one that the same proposition has in biology (for example, the 
proposition “living beings are genealogically interconnected”). It is also generally 
considered to be false or to lead to false conclusions (for example, the proposi-
tion: “the natural phenomena have been all ‘purposefully created by some being’ ” 
[Järnefelt, this volume]). Nevertheless, in these studies, the propositions are very 
often treated as semantically precise. If they are not, they cannot be regarded 
as strongly jump-starting participants’ biological reasoning. However, the inter-
views I conducted show that this hypothesis needs to be nuanced: clearly, in the 
minds of some people, the semantic content of the cognitive elements that form 
the “intuitions” about the origins of species is inherently vague and the public 
expression of these “intuitions,” as their ontogeny, are context-dependent in large 
part. Certainly, they are not entirely context dependent: but, for a lot of people, 
these intuitions are partly fuzzy. This fuzziness plays a key role in the relationship 
between scientific discourse, religious faith, and ordinary representations of nat-
ural beings, as I try to show in the third part.
Morocco: What Kind of Creationism?
I followed up on these investigations in France with a study in Morocco. The goal 
was to make a comparison between two very different contexts. Indeed, religion 
plays a central role in Morocco: Islam is the state religion. The Koran contains 
passages that explicitly mention the divine creation of humans. Therefore, this 
context is very relevant and promising for testing the impact of a strong public 
presence of religion on common representations of the origin of species.
To compare with the French case, I posed the question about the geneal-
ogy of living beings to 97 first- and second-year political science students at a 
Moroccan University. I chose political science students, not science students, as I 
did for the French case. My hypothesis was that people’s representations on this 
subject are not exactly those that could be expected given the respective traits of 
the public sphere in these countries — secular, in France, religious, in Morocco. 
Therefore, it seemed to me that my demonstration would have more force if I suc-
ceeded in showing, on the one hand, in France, that even among students who 
have received a solid scientific background, the representations are quite far from 
what science actually says, and that, on the other hand, in Morocco, even among 
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students who have not studied science, the representations are both less hostile to 
evolution and less directly determined by faith that we might think.
The students mostly belonged to higher social classes. The vast majority of 
them had not studied the question of the origin of species during their schooling. 
Most of those who had studied in French schools located in Morocco — a minority 
in my sample — were in literary studies. The others — a large majority — had stud-
ied in Moroccan education system schools. The Moroccan school programs do 
not cover the question of the origin of species, even in scientific curricula, which 
are yet very rich and varied on other subjects such as genetics. In fact, biology text-
books mention neither evolutionary theory nor creationism. At the same time, 
religious authorities actively promote creationism in the public sphere.
Changes to the Experimental Protocol in This Context
I adapted the questionnaire to the specificities of the Moroccan context. First, I 
had it translated into Moroccan Arabic. Second, as I assumed that there would 
be many more creationist representations than in France, I chose to offer three 
possible answers, in order to better analyze the content of students’ beliefs. These 
three answers were:
1. “there is no genealogical link between these beings”
2. “there are genealogical links between some of these beings”
3. “there are genealogical links between all these beings”
For responses 2 and 3, I asked students to draw a genealogical tree. The aim of 
the distinction between responses 2 and 3 was to enable individuals to establish 
some connections and to exclude some others. With this distinction, I wanted 
to find out whether the reluctance vis-à-vis the idea of evolution is rooted in the 
sacred status given by religion to humans, as the secularization thesis predicts. If 
this hypothesis was correct, we should observe that people are more reluctant to 
establish a link between the human and the ape than any other link. Moreover, 
we should observe that the closer living beings are to humans, the more reluctant 
people are to establish genealogical links between them.
As in France, the questionnaire was anonymous. It was distributed to 
students after an examination. This way I avoided face-to-face interviews — a sit-
uation that tends to cause considerable bias when discussing the origin of species 
in religious contexts. It also prevented students from communicating with one 
another before, after, or while they responded to the questionnaire.
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The results are different from those that I collected from the French stu-
dents. However, they have something very important in common. Again, they 
show how simplistic and dubious the secularization thesis is, by attesting that the 
rejection of evolution is not simply the product of cognitive biases in reasoning 
caused by a blind faith in religion.
Integral Fixism Is a Minority Position
The first important result is that integral fixism — that is to say, the hypothesis 
of a total absence of genealogical links between living beings (response 1) — is not 
a majority viewpoint. It is chosen by 36.1% of students surveyed, against 29.9% 
for partial transformism — response 2 — and 18.6% for integral transform-
ism — response 3 — giving a total of 48.5% for the two variants of transformism. In 
sum, fixist creationism is present in this population of students from higher social 
classes, but it is far from unanimous (table 10.3). Note also that the vast major-
ity of students who refused to establish any genealogical connection — response 
1 — did not make any explicit remark concerning her or his commitment to faith, 
although I had provided some space on the answer sheet for any comment they 
wanted to make. Only three students mentioned God or religion.
A Transformism That Resembles That of French Students
Detailed analysis of the diagrams proposed by students who chose a transform-
ist response — partial (response 2) or integral (response 3) — provides additional 
information and teaches us valuable lessons. First, many diagrams leave out some 
living beings — response 2 — without links, sometimes even without mentioning 
them, like the following (figure 10.4). More generally, none of these diagrams 
can be regarded as strictly compatible with the theory of evolution (such dia-
grams, however, were also very rare among French students). Certainly, some 
diagrams have a tree structure and one of them even refers to “common ancestors” 
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(figure 10.5). However, most of the collected diagrams are composed of lines con-
necting directly beings in pairs, and more rarely by branches that may represent 
a common ancestor. The human species is located each time at a particular place, 
obviously eminent, either at one end of the diagram or apart.
In total, these diagrams (figures 10.4 and 10.5) are obviously underpinned 
by the same schemata as in the “evolutionary” representation of nature observed 
in France: a transformism based on the anthropocentric ladder of nature, which 
implies a form of teleology and a denial of the role of random chance.
The Major Role of a Positive or Rational Criterion: 
Differences in Appearance between Living Beings
A probably even more important fact emerges from the transformist diagrams. 
This is related to the hypothesis I wanted to test by distinguishing responses 2 
and 3. These diagrams suggest that the reluctance to establish a genealogical link 
between living beings is not always — or not only — rooted in the demands of 
faith, in opposition to reason. As noted above, if faith was the only principle 
guiding the choice whether or not to connect each being to another, the link 
between human and ape should be the least represented in the diagrams col-
lected, being the most potentially sacrilegious. However, we observed precisely 
the opposite. The human/ape link is by far the one that was preferred by students 
who traced genealogical diagrams: 68.1% of these students — 33% of all stu-
dents surveyed — established a link between these two living beings. Far behind 
come human/bacterium and oak/bacterium links, established by 51.1% of these 




Figure 10.4 A diagram linking only three beings. Written in Moroccan Arabic.
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Moreover, the living being that participants connected most to another 
species — whatever the latter — is the human being. It is associated with another 
species in 89.4% of diagrams, that is to say, 43.3% of total responses. Then comes 
the ape — 80.9% of diagrams (39.2% of total) — and then the bacterium — 78.8% 
(38.2%). The most neglected being was the oak: 46.9% (22.7%) (table 10.5). 
These data show that students who do not subscribe to an integral fixism pref-
erentially establish a link with the human species. Even more significantly, the 
students seem much less reluctant to draw a genealogical connection between 
a human and an ape than any other conceivable link (table 10.4) — fifteen links 
between two beings are possible here. Therefore, their position on transformism 
and fixism does not seem to be motivated only by faith, because if that were the 
case, we should see the strongest reluctance to establish genealogical connections 
when humans are involved.
Such data invite us to make a different assumption. They suggest that some 
kind of positive, or rational, at large (Boudon, The Art), criterion or argument, 
and not only emotional — sustained by faith — plays a key role in the forma-
tion of beliefs about transformism and fixism. This criterion is the perceived 
degree of similarity between living beings, except in the bacterium case, however, 
a very special one (on this case, see Guillo, “Le Créationnisme”). Hence, it seems 
that people refuse to admit the existence of genealogical connections, that is to 
say, refuse transformism, because, as they understand it, it forces them to endorse 
assumptions that they think are empirically very doubtful — for example, that 







innovation that marks the difference
common ancestor
Table 10.4 Number of direct links 





% of the 
total of 
responses
Human/Ape 32 68.1 33
Human/Bacterium 24 51.1 24.7
Oak/Bacterium 24 51.1 24.7
Lizard/Bacterium 23 48.9 22.7
Whale/Bacterium 22 46.8 21.7
Ape/Bacterium 21 44.7 14.4
Whale/Lizard 14 29.8 11.3
Ape/Oak 11 23.4 10.3
Lizard/Oak 10 21.3 9.3
Ape/Whale 9 19.1 8.2
Human/Oak 8 17 6.2
Human/Lizard 6 12.8 6.2
Ape/Lizard 6 12.8 6.2
Whale/Oak 6 12.8 6.2
Human/Whale 4 8.6 4.1
Table 10.5 Number of links established 





% of the 
total of 
responses
Human 42 89.4 43.3
Ape 38 80.9 39.2
Bacterium 37 78.8 38.2
Lizard 29 61.8 29.9
Whale 27 57.5 27.9
Oak 22 46.9 22.7
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a tree, or a lizard, could have given birth through its successive descendants to 
completely different beings such as a whale or a human.
This hypothesis could explain why a majority draws a connection between 
humans and apes: the two individuals that were in the photos I used looked the 
most similar. It also accounts for the setting aside of the tree, insofar as the tree 
looks very different, apparently, from all other living beings proposed in the 
questionnaire. Symptomatically, one of the students wrote (in French): “there is 
no connection or similarity between these living beings.”
In general, it is possible that the transformist thesis, as these students under-
stand it, namely, that “this living being A descended in direct line from this living 
being B,” offends their reason as well as — and perhaps, for some students, more 
than — their religious faith. In the minds of the students, there does not seem 
to be a tension between religion, on one side, and what the facts and common 
sense suggest, on the other. In sum, the secularization thesis needs to be seri-
ously nuanced again (for nuanced conclusions about the reception of evolution 
in Muslim contexts, see also Koning, “Anti-Evolutionism”).
A Hypothesis Confirmed by Interviews 
Concerning the Questionnaire
To strengthen these assumptions, I conducted interviews about the question-
naire with some of the students, but also with people from very different social 
classes (this survey is currently being pursued systematically and on a larger 
scale). More widely, the goal was to identify more precisely how the question was 
interpreted by interviewees and so to better grasp the meaning of their answers. 
Three key lessons emerge from these interview series. They confirm the assump-
tions made above.
First, for most of the interviewees, differences in appearance between living 
beings are key in doubting the existence of genealogical links between them. This 
remains true even when the interviewer suggests that one must imagine a very 
long time and a huge number of generations between living creatures.
Second, people in Morocco do not always understand the question in exactly 
the same way as in France. The different words that could be used to suggest to 
the interviewee that the question was about the family tree drawn by biological 
kinship, and only that, were spontaneously invested with meanings that were 
somewhat floating and different. These meanings very often included implic-
itly, and sometimes quite explicitly, nonbiological ties, like filiation between 
adoptive parents and adopted children, for example. Of course — and this point 
188 Part 2 • Chapter 10
needs to be strongly emphasized — people understand the idea of a purely bio-
logical conception of genealogy, including the groups it builds and the nature 
of the relationships it draws between individuals. However, unlike a biologist, 
they do not use this definition or categorization of kinship very often in their 
daily life. Therefore, one should be extremely careful about the conclusions that 
can be drawn from such questionnaires when they are not accompanied with 
in-depth interviews or ethnographies. Indeed, the meaning given to the ques-
tion by individuals — and therefore the meaning of the answer they give — may 
both differ from the one that the researcher had in mind when she developed 
her experiment. In such a case, the answers may differ from one another — and 
even be literally conflicting — not because individuals have contradictory beliefs, 
but simply because they do not answer exactly the same question. Therefore, one 
must avoid drawing hasty conclusions from such answers, as some surveys do, 
using directly those data to decide whether people in a cultural area or a social 
group “believe in evolution” or “are creationist” (see for example Gallup polls, as 
in Newport, “In U.S.”)
Third, in my sample of students in Morocco, the rejection of evolution 
does not seem to be part of a rejection of science in general. Religion and sci-
ence are rarely presented as institutions or beliefs in tension, unlike what can be 
observed, for example, in the discourses of some neo-evangelical activists in the 
US. Conversely, people very often reject evolution in the name of science — as 
they perceive it — as well as religion.
Finally and more importantly, as in France, the question of the origin of 
species does not always seem to have a strong sacred dimension. Furthermore, evo-
lution does not always seem to be very strongly sacrilegious (at least so far, because 
the situation can change). This is what we observe in the interviews with the stu-
dents discussed above as well as in the ones I am currently conducting with people 
from other social classes in Morocco. In these interviews, many people speak about 
God’s creation of living beings. They also mention that they know that Westerners 
think that “man descended from apes.” Interviewing them about evolution some-
times generates some emotional reaction, a will to express a conviction. But these 
reactions are, so far, often very slight, compared to the ones generated by issues 
directly related to morals or religious matters. Above all, frequently, interviewees 
do not show a keen interest in these issues, which are devoid of direct practical 
moral implications. It is not uncommon for individuals to show a low level of com-
mitment, except when they express an intense and militant faith, combined with 
a discourse against the West. Therefore, here again, the secularization thesis seems 
to be fragile. The same applies to a famous hypothesis by Sigmund Freud: here, 
evolution does not always seem to inflict a great “narcissistic wound” on believers.
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Cognitive Indifference and Blurred 
Representations of Living Beings
The indifference that people sometimes display concerning the object and the 
accuracy of their own beliefs is often overlooked by social and cognitive scientists 
in their investigations on the relationship between ordinary knowledge, science, 
and religion. However, this fact is extremely important in understanding the 
logic behind these beliefs. What really distinguishes between the representa-
tion of the origin of species of an evolutionary biologist, on the one hand, and 
that of a nonexpert in biology, believer, or nonbeliever — at least when she or 
he is not a creationist activist or an amateur, passionate about science — on the 
other hand, is actually not their respective contents. It is first and foremost their 
degree of detail, their degree of accuracy, and the strength of the commitment 
that accompanies them. The representations of the biologist are very precise and 
detailed, the other two — those of the believer and the nonbeliever — often much 
more blurred.
This is the reason why in many cases there can be no real contradiction 
between the beliefs of scientists and lay people — even in cases where people per-
ceive their respective beliefs as mutually contradictory. Scientists’ beliefs, on the 
one hand, and laymen’s beliefs, on the other, cannot really be considered as con-
tradictory, not because their contents would be incommensurable, but simply 
because they differ too much in degree of precision to allow for a comparison; 
scientific beliefs are usually developed with care and with a strong commitment 
by a specialist who devotes all her or his time studying living beings. In contrast, 
laymen’s beliefs are often marked by a form of partial indifference, by which the 
justification is delegated to authorities regarded as competent. As a result, these 
beliefs are left epistemologically fallow. To put it in another way, a fuzzy rep-
resentation does not oppose a precise representation, whatever their respective 
contents. For the same reason, in many cases, there can be no real match between 
the scientific discourse on evolution, on the one hand, and representations shared 
by nonspecialists who adhere to evolution and the science, on the other.
Both social sciences and cognitive sciences should take this fact very seri-
ously. In research on representations, beliefs, or knowledge, hesitation, the 
discomfort or indifference expressed by interviewees is almost always consid-
ered a methodological obstacle to be overcome in order to reach the content 
of individuals’ real “belief ” or “representation.” The task of the researcher then 
becomes to track down some latent knowledge, representation, schema, cogni-
tive biases, automatic intuitions, folk biology, or underlying modules specialized 
in the treatment of a type of information — in this case, information about the 
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classification and origin of species (Medin and Atran, Folkbiology). One might 
wonder what the researcher is doing by following too far this approach. How far 
should he or she go? Is there not a risk to collect partly an artifact, in ordering too 
strongly interviewees to provide justifications and explanations about questions 
that they may never have asked? Finally, should we not see these hesitations, signs 
of discomfort, and disinterest as cognitive and anthropological data first, rather 
than methodological obstacles?
The fuzziness of people’s beliefs could be more deeply taken into account 
in the social and cognitive studies that look into laypeople’s representations of 
and attitudes towards scientific concepts and theories. Certainly, some studies 
acknowledge it by using the term “intuition” rather than “theory” to qualify 
these representations or by emphasizing the context-dependent aspects of their 
public expression. However, its importance is still often underestimated, which 
has consequences. It leads to partly overestimate the weight of independent 
cognitive factors — as “biases” or “automatic intuitions” — that impede peo-
ple’s understanding of evolutionary theory. Actually, some people have in mind 
less precise private mental representations than the experimenter suggests they 
have, when the latter treats the sentences they utter in experimental situations 
as propositions with precise content. In sum, on these issues, rather than hav-
ing erroneous theories — or even sometimes “intuitions” — some people do not 
have well-articulated beliefs. Of course, this is not true for most activist believers, 
starting with those who have targeted evolution among Christian and Muslim 
movements (see, for example, Yahya, Atlas). Here the opposition is frontal, lively, 
more based on arguments — even though, of course, these arguments are false 
and based on mistakes and fallacies. Such individuals show a strong commit-
ment. Such activism has, undoubtedly, a political and media impact, especially 
on beliefs of nonspecialists in biology. However, I would like to emphasize that 
one should not conclude from the existence of such movements that the theme 
of the origin species contains in substance a necessary matter of conflict, at least 
psychologically. This issue is not always conceived as highly sacred, including by 
believers — and even then, in some cases, only a little. Therefore, contrary to what 
a superficial interpretation of the often heated debates in the US suggest, evo-
lution becomes controversial only in specific historical circumstances, in which 
religious groups are able to give the issue a highly sacred meaning, with major 
moral and political implications.
The reception of evolution obeys an infinitely more complex logic than 
assumed in the secularization thesis. There exists neither a necessary conflict nor 
an ineluctable convergence between ordinary believers and nonbelievers on the 
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issue of the origin of humans and species. Instead, a complex interplay emerges 
between people’s actual representations of living beings, the mutual perception 
and labeling of one another’s representations, and the historical context in which 
beliefs unfold and spread. This interplay opens a space for beliefs and interactions 
that are marked by a large uncertainty. Considering all these factors together is 
crucial to ensure an effective dissemination of evolutionary theory, especially in 
education.
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Naturalized epistemology takes insights from the cognitive sciences to develop 
a broad understanding of how people generate and sustain scientific knowledge, 
which is a classical philosophical theme. The starting point is that humans are 
limited biological beings that rely on all sorts of help to arrive at a scientific 
understanding of the world. This help includes conceptual, observational, and 
reasoning tools, but also dependence upon other people’s expertise and criti-
cisms by peers. As such, science proceeds through the interaction of numerous 
human minds, with their specific abilities and limitations, with one another 
and their environment. An epidemiological approach provides us with the 
theoretical framework to identify and map the cognitive and environmental 
factors that affect the forms and distribution of scientific concepts, in science, 
science education, and the public understanding of science. Such an approach, 
which integrates historical, sociological, rhetorical, cognitive, and philosophical 
approaches to science, does not infringe upon but provides us with a rich natu-







This chapter critically analyzes evolutionary epistemology as a theoretical 
framework for the study of science as a historical and cultural phenomenon. 
As spelled out by Campbell in the 1970s, evolutionary epistemology has an 
ambitious goal: it aims at understanding the complex relations between bio-
logical evolution, especially the biological evolution of human cognition, and 
the cultural evolution of scientific knowledge. It eventually aims at forming 
an integrated causal theory of the evolution of science, starting with the evo-
lution of human cognition. In this chapter, the author considers Campbell’s 
project and specifies why it is still today a worthwhile project for explain-
ing the evolution of science as a specific case of cultural evolution. But he 
also criticizes Campbell’s evolutionary epistemology for assuming that blind 
variation and selective retention are the processes through which science 
evolves. This assumption, the author argues, is at odds with much of what 
we know about scientific cognition and the history of science. He advocates 
(1) dropping the methodological constraint of looking for processes of blind 
variation and selective retention at the expense of other constructive processes 
and mechanisms of knowledge production; but (2) retaining the integrative 
point of evolutionary epistemology, which implies taking seriously the results 
of evolutionary psychology; and (3) retaining the populational framework 
for explaining the history of science, which means questioning why some 
scientific beliefs and practices eventually spread and stabilize in a scientific 
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community. We end up with an updated research program for evolutionary 
epistemology, which faces new challenges.
Campbell on the Evolution of Scientific Knowledge
Campbell introduces evolutionary epistemology as a research program in 
descriptive epistemology “that would be at a minimum an epistemology tak-
ing cognizance of and compatible with man’s status as a product of biological 
and social evolution” (“Evolutionary” 413). Evolutionary epistemology aims at 
providing a causal history of scientific knowledge that not only accounts for 
the human history of science making, but also includes accounts of the cogni-
tive processes at the basis of this history, and of the evolutionary history of the 
cognitive abilities implementing these processes. Evolutionary epistemology is 
therefore an integrated research, which spans biology, evolutionary psychology, 
cognitive psychology, sociology, and history. For instance, Campbell, following 
Konrad Lorenz, advocates the understanding of Kant’s categories of perception 
and thought as evolutionary products (“Evolutionary”). Thus, Campbell applies 
evolutionary biology to human cognition, elaborating thoughts much akin to 
contemporary evolutionary psychology.
Another point that Campbell makes, which was developed by David Hull 
and which I criticize in this chapter, is that science evolves by means of blind 
variation and selective retention. According to Campbell, blind variation and 
selective retention together make the single principle at work at the levels of 
natural history, thought processes, and science history. It is the principle that 
is generalized from Darwin’s theory of natural history and applied to science 
studies. It is meant to account for scientists’ creative thinking and the cultural 
evolution of science. Concerning the history of science, Campbell fully takes on 
Popper’s account of the “logic of scientific discovery” and its principle of “con-
jecture and refutation.” Concerning creative thought, Campbell develops his 
own argument, which puts at the center stage of creative thought the “eureka” 
phenomenon (“Blind Variation”). For Campbell, blind selection and selective 
retention are necessary processes of evolution: evolution implies the generation 
of genuinely new items, which means that the generative process cannot be 
biased by the value of the items (in terms of fitness); the generative process does 
not embed knowledge of the value of the new items. As analytical truths about 
evolution, or as abstract principles that can always describe, at some level, the 
processes of evolution, there is nothing to say against blind variation and selec-
tive retention. Yet, I argue that when one attempts to explain the detailed causal 
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processes through which cultural evolution takes place, then, blind variation and 
selective retention are insufficient analytical tools.
Thus, one can distinguish several projects under the label of evolutionary 
epistemology. The most radical project is the application of the Darwinian 
selectionist model in order to account for the evolution of knowledge. I argue 
that this project, although inspiring, can unduly limit research about the pro-
cesses — cognitive and social — at work in the production of scientific beliefs and 
practices. But a more modest understanding of evolutionary epistemology would 
advocate the two following more fundamental projects:
1. The naturalization of epistemology as passing through population think-
ing: population thinking for the history of science consists in analyzing 
scientific theories and practices as populations of thoughts and ideas 
that are realized in mental states of actual scientists, of behaviors that 
are repeated (think of, say, running a specific statistical test), of scientific 
tools that make the environment of scientists. Populations are sets of actual 
items that grow, shrink, or are maintained in time. Populations of mental 
states, behavior, and artifacts are the actual realization of macro-social 
phenomena. For instance, the success of a scientific theory is the fact that 
the population of mental states and behaviors associated with the theory 
is not shrinking with time. The naturalism involved here is concerned 
with ontology: one must attempt to explain what macro-social entities 
refer to in terms of natural, or material, entities only. Population thinking 
requires specifying which natural entities constitute cultural phenomena, 
and the processes through which these entities are distributed in human 
communities and their habitat.
2. The naturalization of epistemology as a theory of knowledge production 
that is, as Campbell puts it, “taking cognizance of and compatible with 
man’s status as a product of biological and social evolution.” In effect, this 
means that evolutionary epistemology is an interdisciplinary project that 
studies (1) biological evolution, as the cause of the existence and nature of 
the human cognitive apparatus; (2) cognitive psychology, as the description 
of the processes through which mental representations are constructed by 
the evolved human cognitive apparatus; and (3) history, as the description 
of the particular chains of social events that eventually constitute scientific 
evolution. This project is naturalistic because it aims at showing the con-
nections between natural sciences, such as biology, and the social sciences, 
such as the history of science. There are layers of processes constructing 
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elements for the next layer of processes: biological evolution constructs 
biological cognitive apparatuses that construct, when interacting with the 
environment, representations, which are elements out of which scientific 
knowledge is made.
While Campbell based his integrated model of scientific development 
on the single principle of blind variation and selective retention, which would 
account for natural history, the dynamic of thought, and the history of science, I 
argue that different processes are at work at each level and that Darwinian selec-
tionist theory (i.e., evolution occurs via blind variation and selective retention) 
does not necessarily apply to scientific cognition and to the history of science. 
Integration does require showing how biological, cognitive, and historical expla-
nations match and combine into a single more exhaustive account, but there is 
no need to assume that the explanatory principles that account, respectively, for 
natural history, cognition, and social history are the very same. More precisely, 
I point out that current theories in sociology and cognitive psychology describe 
mechanisms for the production of knowledge that differ from blind variation 
and selective retention. The conclusion is that the Darwinist selectionist model 
of evolution applies to the evolution of epistemic mechanisms (EEM) of the 
structure of the brain, but do not extend to an evolutionary epistemology of the-
ory (EET) (typology introduced by Bradie [“Assessing”]). I argue that there are 
two problems with an EET that assumes blind variation and selective retention 
of scientific ideas and practices: the first is blind variation, and the second is selec-
tive retention.
Blind variation does not describe properly the generation of new scien-
tific ideas and practices, because the processes of discovery might not differ so 
radically from the processes that enable the spread of the idea. In other words, 
discovering and learning a scientific concept, a theory, or a practice rely on partly 
identical cognitive mechanisms. This is in stark contrast with biological evolu-
tion, where genetic variation occurs at molecular levels following principles that 
have nothing to do with the principles of selection, which occur at the level of 
the reproductive success of the organisms having traits whose development was 
favored by the genetic variant. Rather than blind variation, the cognitive processes 
of discovering and learning are grounded in (a) the evolved cognitive abilities and 
principles that characterize the human mind, (b) previously acquired knowledge 
and skills, and (c) the constructed social environment.
Selective retention does not describe properly the spread of new scientific 
ideas and practices because these are constantly changing, being interpreted and 
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reinterpreted by different scientists in different context. The question is therefore 
why, in spite of these changes, the ideas remain strikingly similar, at least for a 
given time and within a given community. There are diverse social and cognitive 
mechanisms that determine how types of representations stabilize in the scien-
tific community. Expressing an idea, interpreting it, applying the idea to new 
contexts or problems, learning a practice, and so on: these are complex processes 
that are not processes of replication. First, it is rarely the intention of the scien-
tists to faithfully replicate and, second, there are many cognitive mechanisms 
involved, whose function is not replication. These mechanisms inevitably induce 
variations that, sometimes, converge towards the same type.
In brief, the processes that lead to biological, cognitive, and cultural constructs 
are not necessarily of the same kind. Biological stages are indeed characterized by 
blind variation and selective retention, but cognitive stages are achieved through 
the functioning of evolved capacities of perception, understanding and learning. 
Finally, cultural stages involve, of course, social interactions allowing mental and 
public representations to stabilize within the population of scientists, through 
processes such as education, feedback loops, and so on. There is a wealth of 
social and cognitive processes out of which scientific knowledge is constructed 
and spread. In the spirit of evolutionary epistemology, one goal is to integrate 
the results from evolutionary psychology, the psychology of science (including 
psychology on creativity), and the sociology of science. But this integration can-
not but be hindered by further attempts to impose the Darwinian selectionist 
model on all processes, at all levels, of knowledge making. In the next sections, 
I consider the limits of blind variation for explaining scientific creativity. I then 
specify some of the research questions and challenges that integrating evolution-
ary psychology to the study of scientific creativity raises. Second, I consider the 
limits of selective retention for explaining the spread and success of scientific 
ideas and practices. I then specify some of the challenges that evolutionary epis-
temology faces.
Blind Variation Does Not Accurately Describe 
the Processes of Scientific Creativity
Blind variation and selective retention require a decoupling of variation and 
selection. But are psychological processes of scientific belief formation based on 
blind hypothesis formation? An important motive for including blind variation 
in scientific cognition comes from Popper’s arguments against inductivism: it is 
never sufficient to gather data for creating knowledge; scientists have to develop 
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new hypotheses for accounting for the data. Induction does not solve the prob-
lem of scientific creativity, “trial and error” does.
Kronfeldner develops a careful analysis of how blind variation is under-
stood when describing scientific hypothesis formation (“Darwinian”). It is not, 
she warns us, to be understood as completely random variation, since hypothesis 
formation is strongly constrained by human cognitive capacities, sociohistorical 
context, and the state of knowledge. It remains that creative hypothesis for-
mation is blind, meaning that the occurrence of new ideas is not influenced by 
factors that determine the selection of these new ideas. More precisely, it is blind 
in the sense that generative processes are not attached to any justification of the 
hypothesis. The idea behind this “blind as unjustified” account of hypothesis 
generation is in line with Popper’s criticism of induction. A scientific hypothesis 
is justified (corroborated would be a better term here) when it has passed many 
attempts to falsify it. The thesis thus specified says little, as Maria Kronfeldner 
remarks, of the cognitive processes of discovery and hypothesis formation. So 
we remain with blind variation being a random production of ideas, but within 
a subdomain of possibilities constrained by psychological and contextual facts. 
However, Campbell brings another interesting specification of cognitive pro-
cesses: a satisfying halting procedure. As he himself notes, blind search implies 
an enormous number of possible thought trials to be searched before one can 
select a solution. The tremendous number of nonproductive thought trials that 
blind variation and selective retention necessarily produce make the cognitive 
system unfit for survival, where decisions need to be taken quickly (e.g., when 
facing a predator) and where energy resource is rare and scarcely allocated (“Blind 
Variation”).
Campbell’s solution to the above problem is to postulate the existence of a 
simple stopping rule for the search: being selected when answering some criteria. 
Campbell is aware of the problem of informational explosion that blind search 
can create (he refers to Newell et al.); he acknowledges the credibility of the heu-
ristic approach. He consequently allows its system to incorporate “shortcuts” to 
full blind variation and selective retention processes, thus making a nested hierar-
chy of selective retention processes (“Evolutionary”). Domain-specific heuristics, 
innate knowledge, or Kantian categories are such shortcuts because they allow 
compiling the solution without blind search or through limiting the blind search 
to a restricted domain. It thus turns out that even if one follows Campbell’s ideas 
on human cognition, explaining the generation of ideas still requires specifying 
human-specific cognition, while the explanatory role of blind variation is small. 
Campbell nonetheless quickly points out that (1) such human cognitive abilities 
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are themselves produced through blind variation and selective retention; and (2) 
“such shortcut processes contain in their own operation a blind-variation-and-se-
lective-retention process.” Within the perspective of evolutionary psychology, 
the first point is granted, at least to the extent that the cognitive processes result 
from evolved cognitive abilities.
However, acquired skills and knowledge should also be taken into account 
for understanding generative processes. This might not be a minor point, since 
learning itself is probably not a blind variation and selective retention process. 
The second point, that the evolved cognitive mechanisms themselves implement 
blind variation and selective retention, is even more problematic: it is an empirical 
claim about human cognition that has received little support from contemporary 
cognitive psychology. The set of possible constraints that affect both creation and 
reception goes well beyond “pre-adaptations” or “developmental constraints,” 
which Stein and Lipton show to bias both biological and scientific evolution 
(“Where Guesses”).
The variations that make up new knowledge are guided by both ideas acquired 
from the cultural background and evolved mental mechanisms. This is granted by 
Campbell. What make these variations not blind is that these same processes are 
involved in modulating the success of these generated ideas. This is because the 
ideas that can be easily learned and that are built upon existing cognitive resources 
are more likely to be successful than ideas that have no such grounds. The recep-
tion of a new scientific idea depends on the understanding of the communicated 
idea. But this understanding is itself a creative process whose success is rendered 
possible because the audience has similar cognitive abilities and shares the same 
background knowledge as the one expressing new ideas. Finally, the background 
knowledge involved in the generation of ideas also contributes to their relevance to 
the community having the background knowledge. For instance, the relevance of 
calculus — and its cultural success — is increased by its applications to mechanics. 
But Newton invented calculus exactly for solving problems in mechanics. These 
aspect of science making constitute a strong connection between generations by 
individual scientists and selection by the scientific community. There is therefore 
a coupling between variation and success such that blind variation cannot be said 
to properly characterize scientific creativity and the success of scientific ideas and 
practices. At a minimum, the Darwinist framework seems, at this point, to hin-
der rather than foster research, as it unwarrantedly denies connections between 
creative processes and factors of reception.
Campbell is misled by the examples he takes as paradigmatic thought pro-
cesses because he heavily relies on scientists’ intellectual discoveries and their 
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phenomenological accounts, such as the Eureka phenomenon and Poincare’s 
essay on mathematical creativity. But according to Campbell’s own emphasis on 
the cognitive apparatus as an evolved organ, scientific inventions can hardly be 
taken as paradigmatic of cognition in general: the cognitive apparatus evolved 
to cope with day-to-day needs and dangers. Rather than scientists’ discoveries, it 
is the ability to solve problems present in the environment that determined the 
selection of the genetic basis of human psychology that is best likely to charac-
terize the function of evolved cognitive abilities. The human brain, in particular, 
evolved when the human species was hunting and gathering, and our cognitive 
apparatus is therefore designed for coping with the tasks of the hunter-gatherer 
as performed in the manner of our ancestors. Science, on the other hand, is a very 
recent cultural achievement; science making cannot be a biological function of 
the human brain. The challenge for the evolutionary epistemologist is then to 
explain how scientific cognition is done with the means of a brain that evolved 
for hunting and gathering. Taking evolutionary psychology seriously requires 
that the theories of cognition — including scientific cognition — be compatible 
with some evolutionary history of the biological function of cognitive processes. 
Thinking of human evolved cognition, evolutionary psychologists such as Gerd 
Gigerenzer et al. have emphasized fastness and frugality, which provide obvi-
ous advantages in the face of natural selection (Simple Heuristics). Others have 
emphasized the domain specificity of cognitive processes, leading to the thesis 
that the mind is massively modular (Barkow et al.). In comparison, it is implau-
sible that blind variation and selective retention evolved as domain-cognitive 
processes, on top of which “shortcuts,” such as heuristics, would further evolve. 
Evolutionary psychology recenters the investigation of cognition on real-world 
tasks rather than on abstract problem solving (such as scientific theorization) 
because it requires assessing the adaptive behavior enabled by cognitive processes.1
Challenge Ahead: From Evolved to Scientific Cognition
From Ecological to Scientific Rationality
The assertion that the biological functions of cognitive processes are designed 
(through evolution) for coping with the environment (so as to ensure survival 
and reproduction) leads to the investigation of “ecological rationality” as a prop-
erty of cognitive processes (Gigerenzer et al.).
Evolutionary epistemology, by its very definition, must be compatible with 
the above principles of evolutionary psychology. How can we pass from eco-
logical rationality to scientific rationality? The latter is oriented towards the 
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discovery of truth, while the former is oriented towards gains in fitness.2 I suggest 
that key factors that lead from ecological rationality to scientific rationality are 
communication and the social aspects of knowledge making. The fact that com-
munication and social interaction constitute essential parts of scientific practice 
is nearly a truism. Communicating new ideas and convincing peers of their truth 
are core activities of scientists. Scientists also constantly assess the truth or plau-
sibility of what other scientists communicate.
The importance of communication in the social evolution of science is 
actually much present in Popper’s epistemology. Commenting on Campbell’s 
evolutionary epistemology, Popper emits a criticism, which he claims to be 
related to the difference between man and animal, and especially between 
human rationality or human science and animal knowledge (“Replies”). Popper 
stresses the argumentative practice that is at the heart of science and that makes 
criticism possible. In doing so, Popper points out that science is a social practice 
that involves people communicating and judging each others’ communications. 
It is this fact that put the problem of truth and scientific rationality back into 
scientific cognition.
With regard to truth, Popper says: “I think that the first storyteller may have 
been the man who contributed to the rise of the idea of factual truth and falsity, 
and that out of this the ideal of truth developed; as did the argumentative use of 
language.” The ideal of truth and the practice of argumentation therefore stem 
from social interactions; they are constitutive of scientific cognition because 
science is a social activity, with argumentation at its core (Mercier and Heintz, 
“The Place” and “Scientists”). On this basis, new constraints on scientific cogni-
tion arise: scientific cognition must conform to the rules of scientific rationality, 
which is made of historically developed normative ideas about truth-preserving 
cognitive processes. Through this complex path, going through social interac-
tion, scientific cognition becomes rational in the normative sense, rather than 
ecologically rational. In Campbell’s evolutionary accounts of the history of sci-
ence, both individual cognition and social processes are given due roles, but not 
so as to account for the evolution of the factors of success of scientific ideas: the 
evolution of normative ideas about what it takes to be scientifically justified. The 
factors of selection of scientific ideas are immutable.
Campbell faces a dilemma. He can adopt the views of evolutionary psy-
chology and assume that human cognition in general, and scientific cognition 
in particular, is ecologically rational. He then misses essential features of scien-
tific cognition, which aims at truth and objectivity. Alternatively, he can adopt 
a scientific-centered view of human cognition. He then abandons the vow to be 
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compatible with theories of man as the product of biological evolution. Putting 
communication, social interaction, and their cognitive bases at the center stage 
of the evolution of science should help solve the dilemma.
Scientific Creative Thinking from Massively Modular Minds
Another difficulty with relating evolved and scientific cognition comes from 
the apparent flexibility and creativity of scientific thinking. Evolved cognition, 
by contrast, seems not to allow for such features in human cognition: evolved 
cognition is constituted by a set of cognitive mechanisms that have evolved to 
deal with specific adaptive problems — modules. As evolutionary psychologists 
have hypothesized, the mind is massively modular. Fodor has argued that central 
cognition, in particular the processes issuing in belief formation, are not mod-
ular (The Mind and The Modularity). Fodor’s arguments in The Modularity of 
Thought appeal to scientific cognition as the archetypical cognitive performance, 
which shows that belief formation relies on cognitive processes that can draw on 
any information held in the mind. Scientists, or so it seems to Fodor, have unre-
stricted access to their stored information, which could not be so if the human 
mind were massively modular. In spite of the difficulties it comes with, as those 
forcefully pointed out by Fodor, the massive modularity hypothesis remains the 
standard account of human evolved cognition among evolutionary psycholo-
gists. So the challenge is to show how a massive modular mind can be flexible 
enough to produce new scientific ideas.
Cognitive flexibility is defined as the ability to adapt cognitive processing 
strategies to face new and unexpected conditions in the environment. It involves 
learning how to deal with new types of problems by implementing new computa-
tions. These learning abilities and exploratory strategies seem not to be attainable 
with massively modular minds — which are composed of task-specific cognitive 
devices. The massive modularity hypothesis also imposes important constraints 
on the architecture of the mind and on the consequent flow of information: an 
input is processed by the modules to which it meets the input conditions, which 
produces an output acting as an input for further modules, depending on the 
architecture of the mind, until the processing comes to a halt. The communi-
cation between modules is relatively limited, and strongly constrained by the 
cognitive architecture.
How can we account, with this hypothesis, for the known flexibility, diver-
sity, malleability, and creativity of human behavior? How can we account for 
the human ability to integrate information from different domains? It is a 
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challenge that proponents of the massive modularity hypothesis have taken seri-
ously. Sperber argues that flexibility and context sensitivity are attained, at the 
psychological level, because most modules are learning modules (“In Defense” 
and “Modularity”). Learning can happen not only through the enrichment of 
modules’ databases but also through the fixation of parameters determining the 
domains of modules.
Development, according to Sperber, also includes learning that is reflected in 
modular architecture: learning modules produce dedicated modular subsystems 
for acquired capabilities. Last, in order to account for context sensitivity, Sperber 
argues that modules do not process inputs in a mandatory way (“Modularity”). 
One of Fodor’s characteristics of modules is that once an input meets the input 
conditions of a module, the module is automatically triggered and runs its full 
course. Sperber argues on the contrary that a module is activated not just in view 
of its input condition, but also in view of the relevance of the input, that is, its 
expected cognitive effect (such as acquisition of new and useful information) and 
effort for processing it. Nested modularity, enrichment, maturation of cognitive 
abilities, development of new modules through learning, maximization of cog-
nitive efficiency are features of the modular mind that provide much flexibility. 
How do they support scientific cognition?
Carruthers argues for a “moderately massive modularity” where the lan-
guage module is given a special role serving as the medium of intermodular 
integration and conscious thinking (“Moderately”). Without denying the role 
of the above principles of flexibility, context sensitivity, and integration, I would 
like to emphasize the role of metarepresentations in generating new integrated 
knowledge, and sustaining conceptual change in science. The flexibility of the 
human mind, indeed, is paradigmatically exemplified with conceptual change 
in science, where some previously held beliefs are abandoned and replaced by 
new beliefs incommensurable with them. In particular, conceptual changes 
in science have rendered some of the content of science at odds with intuitive 
beliefs. How can we have come to think, and be now so convinced, that the 
earth is moving around the sun while the contrary belief naturally imposes 
itself upon us? While knowledge enrichment can be thought of as the addi-
tion of new data to previously existing databases, conceptual change and the 
abandonment of previously believed theories requires, on the part of scientists, 
a new attitude towards the stimuli of the newly theorized domain. What are the 
cognitive processes accounting for these new attitudes? The existence of concep-
tual change raises two questions for cognitive psychologists. First, what are the 
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cognitive processes that make conceptual change possible? Much work has been 
done in cognitive studies of science on this topic. Most notably, Nersessian has 
analyzed the role of physical analogy, the construction of thought experiments, 
and limiting case analyses (“In the Theoretician”). Carey has also pointed out 
the role of mappings across cognitive domains for the creation of new domains 
(e.g., Carey, Conceptual; Carey and Spelke, “Domain-Specific”). There is gen-
eral agreement that conceptual change involves metarepresentational abilities. 
Scientific cognition heavily relies on the ability to metarepresent our own repre-
sentations, and thus to think reflectively. Metarepresentational ability allows for 
the processing, using, and producing of representations of representations. One 
or more cognitive modules may implement the ability. Some metarepresenta-
tional modules, indeed, have an already studied evolutionary history and satisfy 
the requirements of evolutionary plausibility. Presumably, metarepresentational 
abilities appear with the ability to represent the representations that others may 
hold — their mental state. This ability, called Theory Of Mind (TOM), is adap-
tive by allowing Machiavellian intelligence, the ability to manipulate others’ 
behavior, and is certainly at the basis of human social life, including linguistic 
communication.
The relevant consequence of metarepresentational ability (or abilities) is that 
the cognitive output of modules can be rethought. In particular, metarepresen-
tational abilities enable making epistemic evaluation of the output of modules. 
For instance, I perceive that the sun is traveling around the earth, but I know that 
this perception is misguiding. When a perceptive representation gets embedded 
within a framework theory, the perceptive representation is metarepresented as 
a manifestation or consequence of some state of the matter or of some laws of 
nature. Scientific practice, says Nancy Nersessian, “often involves extensive meta-
cognitive reflections of scientists as they have evaluated, refined and extended 
representational, reasoning and communicative practices” (“The Cognitive” 
135). Deana Kuhn has also pointed out the metacognitive skills at work in sci-
entific thinking. These include not only metastrategic competence, but also the 
ability “to reflect on one’s own theories as objects of cognition to an extent suffi-
cient to recognize they could be wrong” (275). Metarepresentational abilities are 
thus central to scientific thinking. Most interestingly for our present purpose, 
they also bridge the gap between lower cognitive abilities processing the input 
from our sense organs, hardwired heuristics and naïve theories, and the abstract 
and consciously controlled thinking practices of science.3 I therefore suggest that 
scientific thinking is well characterized as a systematic exploitation of human 
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cognitive abilities by exploiting, via metarepresentations, existing heuristics and 
intuitions.
Spranzi’s case study is an example of such reasoning, where an analogy is 
drawn between two distinct phenomena: Galileo interprets the black marks on 
the moon as similar to the shadows thrown by mountains on the earth (“Galilei”). 
Now, Spranzi argues, the analogy did not pop up out of the blue — which would 
have exemplified a mysterious “Fodorian” (isotropic) cognitive event. She shows, 
on the contrary, that it was rendered possible through a historical process of 
bootstrapping. In other words, the cultural context made some ideas and repre-
sentations available to Galileo, making the analogy possible. We therefore have a 
case where the determination of scientific thinking is shown to be historical and 
social as well as cognitive.
Cognition does not only take place in a cultural environment: more rad-
ically, aspects of the environment itself implement or contribute to cognitive 
processing. For instance, Galileo perceived shadows on the moon by means of 
his telescope. As another instance, most scientists now perform their statistical 
analysis with specialized software or programming languages. Here is, therefore, 
another source of flexibility: scientific cognition is implemented in systems in 
which cognition is distributed to tools and specialists. These “distributed cog-
nitive systems” quickly change; they have the plasticity out of which flexibility 
arises. In particular, new technologies are exploited, new experts are given new 
roles in the production of knowledge, and the architecture of the systems changes 
as a function of the available resources and goals. (For instance, contemporary 
large experiments in atomic physics require numerous researchers dealing with 
very specific tasks, while traditional theoretical debates require few researchers 
having similar expertise). This suggests that distributed cognitive systems evolve 
so as to respond to contextual factors such as changing means and needs. Flexible 
cognition is thus also achieved through the flexibility of institutions of scientific 
production and their associated systems of distributed cognition.
Conclusion on Evolutionary Epistemology and Scientific Innovation
An important gap in science studies is the study of the role of our primary intu-
itions in scientific knowledge (Heintz, “Scaffolding”). Social studies accord little 
importance to these cognitive events that are intuitions, while cognitive stud-
ies are much more focused on higher reasoning practices (induction, abduction, 
analogical reasoning, thought experiment, etc.). The continuity thesis, which 
asserts that scientific cognition is of the same nature as lay cognition, has raised 
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important debates that could bear on the distinction and relation between reflex-
ive and intuitive thinking, between metarepresented knowledge and the direct 
output of non-metarepresentational modules (see Sperber, “Intuitive,” for the 
distinction between intuitive and reflective beliefs). In other words, Campbell 
set a research program that has not really been implemented. One possible reason 
was that Campbell himself skipped through it and appealed to blind variation 
instead, which we criticized as either being an implausible description of scien-
tific cognition or a black box standing for the complex psychology of scientific 
innovation.
Selective Retention Does Not Adequately Describe 
Why Some Ideas and Practices Spread
According to the traditional view of evolutionary epistemology, blind varia-
tion that generates new ideas occurs within scientists’ minds, while selective 
retention is mostly a social process involving scientists checking the work of 
others and choosing the best of it. Selective retention involves a process of 
selection that well describes the fact that not all of scientists’ ideas gain the 
status of scientific knowledge and get distributed in the scientific community. 
But selective retention involves also a process of retention, and Darwinian 
selectionist theory holds that it is done through replication. In biology, it is 
DNA sequences that are replicated; in science, the replication is of beliefs, 
ideas, and practices. The replication happens by means of social interaction, 
mainly communication.
David Hull, whose work can be understood as a refinement and updating of 
evolutionary epistemology (Science as a Process and Science and Selection), speci-
fies what replicators are in the evolution of science:
the replicators in science are elements of the substantive content of sci-
ence — beliefs about the goals of science, the proper ways to go about realizing 
these goals, problems and their possible solutions, modes of representation, 
accumulated data reports, and so on . . . These are the entities that get passed 
on in replication sequences in science. Included among the chief vehicles of 
transmission in conceptual replication are books, journals, computers, and 
of course human brains. As in biological evolution, each replication counts 
as a generation with respect to selection . . . Conceptual replicators interact 
with that portion of the natural world to which they ostensibly refer . . . only 
indirectly by means of scientists. (Science and Selection 116)
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Conceptual replication is a matter of information being transmitted largely 
intact from physical vehicle to physical vehicle. The problem is that replication at 
the conceptual level does not properly describe the mechanisms through which 
representations are distributed and stabilized within a community. An appeal to 
replication is a way to black box the mechanisms of transmission. As the notion 
of blind variation, it prevents from developing studies that investigate actual cog-
nitive processes and their evolved basis.
In order to make this point, I only briefly review the arguments put for-
ward by Sperber and colleagues against selectionist models of cultural evolution 
(Heintz and Claidière; Sperber, Explaining Culture; Sperber and Claidière). The 
bulk of the argument is that representations do not in general replicate in the 
process of transmission, but rather they transform as a result of a constructive 
cognitive process.
In place of replication and selection, Sperber appeals to the role of several 
factors stabilizing the distributions of representations. Among those factors, 
importantly, lies the rich and universal human cognitive endowment. For 
instance, a natural language is known and distributed within a population 
not only because children learn to speak on the basis of what they hear, but 
also because they have an unlearned ability to learn languages. As Sperber and 
Cladière put it: “cultural propagation . . . is achieved through many different 
and independent mechanisms, none of which is central and none of which is 
a robust replication mechanism” (20). In particular, imitation is not the main 
mechanism of transmission, but only if “the notion is stretched to cover a wide 
variety of quite different processes” (20). Thus, the observed macrostability, as 
manifested by “relatively stable representations, practices and artifacts distrib-
uted across generations throughout a social group,” (21) does not warrant the 
existence of mental processes insuring the microheritability of cultural items.
For instance, one can hear a version of the little red riding hood tale, where, 
say, it is not specified that the wolf is greedy and cunning. Yet, this aspect can 
easily be inferred from the behavior of the wolf. This inference is a constructive 
process that draws upon a disposition to ascribe intentions and psychological 
traits to agents. This inference will in turn influence how the tale will be told, 
again, on the basis of an understanding of what cunning and greedy people do. 
More generally, the utterances heard during the telling of a tale are interpreted. 
This is a constructive process that might rely on cognitive capacities shared by 
a community and that are psychological factors of attraction: they favor some 
interpretations more than others. The same holds for the transmission of math-
ematical proofs, and scientific theories and their empirical basis. For instance, 
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many steps are being skipped in a written or uttered proof. Mathematicians in the 
audience just reconstruct these steps, sometimes automatically, and at other times 
after some effort. Background knowledge is key: no mental representation of the 
proof of Gödel’s first incompleteness will be constructed if it is told to someone 
with no mathematical literacy. The proof of Gödel’s first incompleteness theo-
rem is not merely replicated. If it was so, its versions would quickly drift towards 
non sense. The proof is understood, which means that background knowledge 
and diverse cognitive processes are put to work for interpreting some written or 
oral version of the proof. This trivial observation demonstrate that transmission 
of scientific ideas and practices is not resulting from some domain general mech-
anism of replication, it is resulting from complex processes of understanding 
and communicating. Thus, “the microprocesses of cultural propagation are in 
good part constructive rather than preservative” (22). Consequently, Darwinian 
models of cultural evolution are unsatisfactory because “cultural contents are not 
replicated by one set of inheritance mechanisms and selected by another, disjoint 
set of environmental factors” (22).
Opening the black box that “retention” is around the multiple processes of 
cultural transmission, one sees that transformation is pervasive and faithful rep-
lication is a rare limiting case of zero transformation. Theories in psychology and 
sociology about memory, imitation, and communication show that high-fidel-
ity reproduction is the exception rather than the rule. The consequence is that 
concepts or ideas are not replicated well enough to undergo effective selection: 
the rate of change is such that selection cannot be consequential on evolution. 
How, then, can ideas and practices, including scientific ones, form cultural 
phenomena?
The causes of preservation and propagation often lay in the fact that con-
structive biases are shared in a population. I mentioned the universal human 
cognitive endowment, such as the ability to communicate, but, importantly, 
similar aspects in individuals’ histories also cause shared constructive biases, 
such as the knowledge and practice of a scientific paradigm, which provides 
an interpretative framework for processing new input. In spite of the fact that 
transmitted representations are different from one another, the representa-
tions do not drift away through added transformations to strongly dissimilar 
representations. The constructed representations tend to gather around some 
“attractors.” For instance, the mental representations of a proof do not resemble 
in any straightforward way to the public representations, yet they resemble each 
other’s in relevant ways: they cluster around a perfect understanding of the proof. 
They will give rise to public versions of the proof which, again thanks to shared 
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constructive mechanisms (including communicative skills), will tend to cluster 
around understandable versions of the proof.
The Darwinian selectionist model for thinking about the evolution of sci-
ence is certainly a source of inspiration and discovery. Hull, for instance, draws 
on the model for explaining social processes of competition and collaboration 
in the sciences (Science and Selection). In the same way as inclusive fitness in 
biological evolution accounts for kinship altruism, in the sciences, scientists pro-
mote both their own work and the work of those who use their work. The works 
of scientists thus have “conceptual inclusive fitness.” However, the Darwinian 
selectionist model makes erroneous assumptions about scientific cognition. 
Assuming that one single mechanism enables the faithful transmission of scien-
tific ideas hinders rather than fosters the cognitive and social investigation of the 
processes of cultural evolution.
The criticism against selective retention as a process of scientific develop-
ment can be summed up with the following points:
1. As opposed to biological evolution, there is no mechanism of replication 
that would insure the faithful copying of ideas and practices. Cultural 
transmission is realized by diverse processes that are implemented in 
evolved psychological mechanism, but also by learned skills, artifacts, and 
institutions.
2. The mechanisms of cultural transmission are not especially preservative 
processes. Processes of transmission involve transformations, and preser-
vation is only a limiting case of no transformation.
3. The consequence of the above lack of faithful transmission is such that 
there is not enough retention for selection to operate on stable populations 
of cultural items.
4. Ideas and practices are maintained and spread not through faithful repli-
cation, but through attraction: transmission induces some transformation, 
but these transformations are systematically biased towards an “attractor.” 
Cultural phenomena are made of clusters of resembling tokens rather than 
identical tokens.
5. The above points, made by cultural attraction theorists for understand-
ing the evolution of culture in general, apply to the cultural phenomena 
that constitute the history of science and technology. The transmissions 
of scientific ideas and practices are complex processes relying on multi-
ple mechanisms whose function is not replication. Transmission events 
need not be faithful and preservative. If and when they are, this needs to 
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be explained rather than granted. The success of an idea or a practice can be 
explained by attraction rather than just retention.
Challenge Ahead: The Stabilization of 
Scientific Beliefs and Practices
Science as Cumulated Culture
How can we obtain the stabilization of some specific ideas and practices in spite 
of the fact that cultural transmission is not sufficiently faithful? The hypothe-
sis put forward by cultural attraction theory (also called cultural epidemiology; 
Heintz, “Cultural Attraction Theory”; Sperber, Explaining) is that some forms 
or types of ideas and practices are more likely to be produced than others. The 
cause of stabilization thus does not rely on the viability of transmission processes, 
but on the constructive processes that, in spite of small variations in input, are 
likely to produce outputs that resemble one another.
How can cultural attraction theory be used for explaining the stabiliza-
tion of scientific beliefs and practices? It has been put to work for explaining 
the spread of intuitive and minimally counterintuitive beliefs: pseudoscientific 
beliefs (Blancke et al.; Miton et al.) and religious beliefs (Boyer), for instance. 
Practices of painters (Morin) have also been analyzed with cultural attrac-
tion theory.
 Yet, while this type of account acknowledges the role of evolved cognitive 
capacities in shaping cultural phenomena, it does not seem to provide a proper 
framework for understanding the cumulated culture that characterizes science 
and technology. Explaining scientific beliefs and practices seems to raise another 
type of challenge because it seems so disconnected from our naive or intuitive 
beliefs. Some of our scientific beliefs are even downright counterintuitive (e.g., 
Darwinian evolution; see Atran; Gervais). Science results from a cumulative 
process that seems to make evolved intuitions irrelevant to understanding the 
history of its content. Doesn’t scientific cognition stand on reason rather than 
evolved intuitions? The question about how to go from ecological rationality to 
scientific rationality arises here again, which is not surprising, since the processes 
of variation and retention are not essentially distinct. However, what is of spe-
cial interest for this subsection is how acquired knowledge and cognitive skills 
become constructive mechanisms at work in the transmission of complex scien-
tific ideas and practices.
More precisely, the cumulated aspect of cultural evolution can be grasped by 
considering the following:
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• The input of psychological mechanisms is, most of the time, itself a socially 
constructed input. Currently, many of the things we perceive and that 
affect cognition have been anteriorly processed by humans: these include 
linguistic productions, of course, and human artifacts. Even when scien-
tists study basic natural phenomena, such as the behavior of atoms, the 
input they use for theorizing about them involve many cultural artifacts: 
it is, for instance, a data chart produced by a computer after some highly 
controlled experiment happened. This is vividly illustrated by the activity 
of scientists at the CERN, who study fundamental natural phenomena 
but in a highly constructed social and material environment.
• Psychological constructive mechanisms are themselves the result of 
cultural processes. Both genetic endowment and individual history 
determine an individual’s psychology. While evolutionary epistemology 
prompts us to pay special attention to evolved cognitive mechanisms, this 
cannot be sufficient for understanding how highly enculturated individ-
uals think — including scientists, who benefited from a long and complex 
education, most of the time by way of educational institutions (and, rarely, 
through the sole access to scientific writings).
These are simple and, I would say, noncontroversial observations. Yet, they point 
to the relevance of a multiplicity of processes, and it is a challenge to integrate 
them in a single evolutionary account. Constructive processes at work in the 
transmission of scientific ideas involve “cognitive artifacts” and “learned skills” 
as well as evolved intuitions.
There is a fuzzy and changing set of common beliefs that regulate scien-
tific practices. These beliefs have been sometimes characterized as epistemic 
claims about the value of empirical investigation, the use of mathematics, the 
avoidance of ad hominem arguments, and other values coming from the scien-
tific revolution (Shapin). These shared beliefs contribute to generating types of 
behaviors because they are “scientific,” and these behaviors stabilize in the sci-
entific community for the same reason — being considered as scientific by the 
scientific community. Fuzzy subsets of common beliefs can be found at the more 
local levels of disciplines and research fields. The sets will include implicit and 
explicit beliefs, know-how and know-that, beliefs about the reliability of some 
instruments, beliefs about nature, and beliefs about methods of investigation. 
The role of education cannot be overemphasized in science: it includes mem-
orization, but also drills of scientific practices. It importantly contributes to 
building shared cognitive capacities among scientific communities. These shared 
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capacities will be involved in the construction of mental representations and 
public productions.
Scaffolded Attraction in the Making of Science
The important consequence of the above observations for cultural attraction the-
ory is that factors of attraction, while they do influence cultural evolution, can 
themselves be contingent on historical and cultural phenomena. For instance, 
scientific education includes a specification of the problems worth solving and 
the kinds of tools that might be useful for the task: such specifications are factors 
of attraction because they determine what will interest scientists and how they 
will dedicate their efforts. But these factors of attraction are not evolved; they are 
themselves the product of history. Education and, more generally, enculturation 
will partially determine what attraction there will be. Likewise, the material 
environment — what kind of facilities there are, the social environment — and 
who talks with whom will also partially determine the content and form of 
cultural attractors. Enculturation and the cultural environment (material or 
social) constitute scaffolds for cultural attractors.4 There is cognitive attraction 
caused by evolved cognition, but also scaffolded attraction caused by learned 
skills, knowledge, habits, and the historically built environment. The more spe-
cific challenge for evolutionary epistemology is to specify the scaffolds that are 
important factors of attraction in science. The cumulative aspect of science is 
partially expressed by the fact that there is scaffolded attraction. For instance, 
the success of calculus in the eighteenth century is due to the fact that it helped 
solving already well-known and well-specified problems: for instance, calculat-
ing an area under a curve was a well-known problem well-specified in Cartesian 
geometry, and calculating the speed and acceleration were problems whose 
importance derived from Galileo’s work. In that sense, preliminary geometric 
and mechanistic knowledge specified ways of using calculus. The preliminary 
knowledge did therefore more than just enable the discovery of calculus: it is not 
just Newton who had to climb on the shoulders of giants, but his readers too. 
And it did more than just make calculus useful (increasing its cultural fitness, 
in Darwinian selectionist theorization): it acted as a factor of attraction towards 
some mathematical practices.
There are, among the ideas shared by the scientific community, normative 
ideas that regulate how other ideas should be produced. For instance, in many 
research fields, standard thought is that only experiments that show a statis-
tical significance (a low p-value) are worth being published.5 These normative 
ideas do play a role in scientific practices. In our example, experiments will be 
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designed so that a significant difference between experimental conditions might 
be revealed. They also play a role in the success of ideas or representations. In our 
example, only papers showing a p-value lower than .05 will be published in pres-
tigious journals. An important argument made by sociologists of science (e.g., 
Barnes et al.) is that all scientific ideas and practices have such a normative aspect 
because science is essentially a social product that involves social interactions and 
coordination. For instance, a scientific term includes a normative component 
about how it should be used: the kind of inferences it warrants, how it relates to 
other scientific or nonscientific terms, and its reference. There is therefore a social 
regulation of the use of scientific terms that will impact the interpretation and 
production of these terms. Such norms are also scaffolds that strongly regulate 
the production of representations.
The constructed material environment can also act as scaffolded attraction. 
The role of material tokens in science making is apparent with writing, which has 
been the main means for sharing beliefs and thus establishing common grounds. 
The pervasive reference to written artifacts obviously constrains scientific think-
ing: written artifacts provide to scientists a shared corpus of data, of theoretical 
and methodological texts. Materials in science also include cognitive tools, such 
as the telescope or, more recently, data-crunching computers. And they include 
material models of natural phenomena; for instance, the physical models of 
molecular structures are a research tool that has influenced the thoughts and 
productions of chemists (Charbonneau). The general aspect of such models is 
that once their cognitive role is being specified, they fully participate in the pro-
duction of knowledge. Again, we have shared elements that participate in the 
production of mental representations and public productions. These shared ele-
ments increase the probability that some cultural items rather than others will be 
produced. They act as scaffolding factors of attraction. Another way to put it is 
that the cognitive constructive processes that will act as factors of attraction not 
only are in the heads of scientists but are systems that include scientists and their 
cognitive tools. The work on distributed cognitive systems in science (Giere and 
Moffatt; Nersessian et al.) is relevant to understanding the factors of attraction 
in the history of science.
Conclusion on Evolutionary Epistemology 
and Cultural Attraction Theory
The selectionist evolutionary model does appear to provide solutions to the 
challenge of explaining cumulated culture. Cultural items are usually faithfully 
copied, but sometimes, one of the relatively rare mutations turns out to be more 
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successful than other variants. The success of a variant is mainly (but not only) 
determined by its ability to confront the world whose selection pressures occur 
in the form of experimental tests. As ideas confront the world through new 
experiments, some are refuted and selected out and others survive. As appealing 
as it is, this picture is a simplification that historians of science are not willing to 
use for describing scientific developments. It prevents from discovering the true 
underlying processes that spread ideas and practices in a community.
Rather than appealing to selective retention, I think the best way to pursue 
the program of evolutionary epistemology is to use cultural attraction theory. 
This move enables relaxing the assumption that selection is the only factor 
accounting for the stabilization of some ideas and practices. It also advocates 
peering into the constructive processes that will act as factors of attraction, 
which make some ideas more stable than others in spite of important changes 
occurring in the chains of transmission.
The main advantage of relaxing the assumption of Darwinian selection is 
that it reopens evolutionary epistemology to all the work that has been done by 
sociologists, historians, and cognitive scientists of science. I have alluded to the 
Khunian notion of paradigm and its development when talking of the fuzzy set 
of ideas and practices that are shared by the research community, I have pointed 
to the work of sociologists on the conventions and social norms that are perva-
sive in science making, and I have made reference to the work on distributed 
cognition as an important addition for describing the cognitive constructive 
mechanisms of scientific production. Cultural attraction theory does not pro-
vide an alternative explanation to the constructive processes of science making. 
It only provides a framework for connecting the evolutionary aspect of science, as 
a cultural domain, to the social and cognitive events described in science studies.
In the end, it might turn out that science is the most selectionist of the evolv-
ing cultural domains. But this should be explained, not just assumed. Selection 
might be due to specific institutions: the educational system, the systematic 
reliance on writing, the relative perennity of material arrangements — these all 
make reproduction more faithful. There are also institutions that implement the 
selection of ideas: in particular, the system of scientific publication and the argu-
mentative practices that encourage systematic skepticism.
What of evolved cognitive capacities? While their role has been pointed out 
above, they have disappeared in the current section. In fact, my bet is that when 
describing the scaffolded factors of attraction, one will eventually see that they 
are grounded in evolved cognitive capacities. For instance, teaching institu-
tions will be more successful in their teaching if they rely on existing learning 
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capacities. More radically, I have argued elsewhere that the interpretation of even 
complex mathematical notions is geared by evolved cognitive capacities (Heintz, 
“Scaffolding”).6
Conclusion
Campbell’s ambition to find a unique principle accounting for biological evo-
lution, cognition, and scientific evolution provides an oversimplified picture of 
cognition and culture. The naturalization of science studies passes first through 
an integration of cognitive and social studies of science. Imposing the Darwinist 
selectionist model on the evolution of science leads to bypassing too much of the 
results in cognitive psychology and the sociology of science.
The sociology and history of science of these last decades have pointed out 
the social processes at work in scientific knowledge production. These include the 
institutional constitution of science, the coercive strength of scientific traditions 
(including the norms of rationality), the self-referring aspects of scientific beliefs, 
the goal orientation of research, the role of trust in science, novice-expert interac-
tions and how scientific practices are taught and learned, the reliance on external 
values and beliefs, and negotiations during scientific controversies. The abstract 
and methodological Popperian picture of conjecture and refutation is given more 
sociological reality, which implicates a complexification that can no longer be 
grasped with blind variation and selective retention. Blind variation and selective 
retention seem, at this stage of sociological and psychological knowledge, unable 
to account for the factors determining the success of scientific practices, includ-
ing scientific judgments; the forms of justifications, rebuttal, and assent; types of 
scientific communication; and the causes of creative thinking.
Still, evolutionary epistemology is a worthwhile project for two reasons. 
First, it stands on a naturalistic ontology; there are beliefs and behavior. Some 
beliefs stabilize in the scientific community and others do not; some behav-
iors become common practices and others do not. This ontology comes with a 
research program: specifying what more holistic notions, such as “paradigm,” 
really mean and, more generally, analyzing cultural phenomena in terms of the 
spread of ideas and practices in a community. Second, evolutionary epistemol-
ogy requires understanding scientific knowledge production as the activity of 
evolved organisms — the scientists. Evolutionary psychology is thus made rele-
vant to understanding the history of science. This, again, comes with a research 
program, which consists of specifying the role of evolved capacities in scientific 
practices and thinking.
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These two related research programs have known few developments as 
such, but contemporary work in the history and sociology of science and 
work on scientific cognition are already contributions to these research pro-
grams. Evolutionary epistemology as I advocate it is thus not much more than 
a comprehensive framework that emphasizes the relevance of interdisciplinary 
investigations — psychology, sociology, and the history of science — and enables 
spelling out the contribution of one to the other. Evolutionary epistemology 
in the restrictive sense, as envisaged by Campbell and pursued by Hull, by 
contrast, relies on the assumption that culture evolves and knowledge is pro-
duced by means of blind variation and selective retention. I have argued that 
this assumption is not well grounded and furthermore prevents investigating 
the constructive processes through which culture and knowledge are produced 
and spread. I therefore advocate doing evolutionary epistemology, but only in 
the nonrestricted sense of the term. In the place of blind variation and selective 
retention, I have argued that cultural attraction is what enables the stabilization 
of cultural items. To understand cultural attraction, one needs to discover the 
constructive processes that generate new ideas and their interpretations by the 
scientific community.
Notes
1. To be fair, Simonton’s account of creativity is compatible with Campbell’s idea of 
cognition as blind variation and selective retention (“Creativity”). Simonton states 
that hypothesis formation is based on a subconscious random generation of ideas: 
only selected ideas come to consciousness, but a massive number of unconscious 
random ideas have been previously generated. However, such a process has low adap-
tive value because it requires computing a massive number of ideas. In addition to 
its low adaptiveness (the generation of a massive number of random ideas seems too 
costly for being selected by natural evolution), there is little empirical evidence in 
favor of a hidden, unconscious, chaotic generation of ideas (Sternberg).
2. For a radical analysis of the difference between truth-preserving cognitive mecha-
nisms and fitness enhancing ones, see Stich, The Fragmentation.
3. Gorman, “Heuristics,” illustrates this point with Kepler’s mental model of the solar 
system and the application of heuristics as designed and implemented in the discov-
ery program, BACON 1, of Herbert Simon and his colleagues. Kepler’s particular 
problem representation, he explains, was necessary for the heuristics to apply and 
be useful.
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4. I take the term “scaffolding” in cultural evolution from Wimsatt and Griesemer, 
“Entrenchment” and “Reproducing,” and their analysis of cumulative cultural 
evolution.
5. The dominant role of the p-value is currently being challenged, with Bayesian data 
analysis as a competitor statistical method (Gelman et al.).
6. The case study (Heintz, Cognition) consisted of showing that the interpretation of 
the notion of infinitesimal was influenced by our object-tracking systems, which 
Susan Carey has shown to be involved in learning natural numbers (“Precis”; Carey 
and Spelke, “Science”).
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Chapter 12
Intuitions in Science Education and the 
Public Understanding of Science
Stefaan Blancke, Koen B. Tanghe, and Johan Braeckman
Abstract
Although science builds on ordinary, intuitive reasoning, its results can be 
highly counterintuitive. This tension between the intuitive, cognitive basis 
of science and its counterintuitive results offers both opportunities and 
challenges for those who are involved with taking science to the public, in 
particular science educators, communicators, and popularizers. On the one 
hand, they need to engage with people’s intuitive understanding by resorting 
to appealing metaphors, imagery, or narratives as tools to facilitate the under-
standing and acceptance of scientific concepts. Because of their intuitive 
appeal, these representations can become popular, bringing scientific con-
cepts to large parts of the public. On the other hand, however, these tools can 
also be highly misleading, creating or sustaining unscientific representations 
that, because of their intuitively appealing nature, are more likely to become 
popular within the culture at large than the underlying scientific concepts the 
educator or communicator is trying to convey. Furthermore, as science educa-
tors, communicators and popularizers do not have minds that differ markedly 
from any ordinary human mind, they themselves are not entirely immune to 
the powerful seduction of intuitively appealing representations, thus enforc-
ing their misleading effect. As such, science educators, communicators, and 
popularizers should be careful about the educational, communicational, 
and rhetorical strategies and tools they employ. Some can become highly 
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successful, but this might come at the expense of their own understanding of 
science and, especially, that of their audience and of society at large.
Scientific Thinking as Scaffolded Cognition
Traditionally, the philosophy of science looked at science in the abstract. 
Philosophers assumed that they could get at the nature of science by treating it 
as a collection of symbols that stood in a special formal relationship to both one 
another and the facts of the world. The task of the philosopher was to apply the 
tools of logic to lay bare these relations. The assumption was that science or 
the scientific method produced a special and solid type of knowledge, one that 
was rooted in deduction and pure induction, characterized by rational ways of 
reasoning and, above all, blessed by steady if largely piecemeal progress. However, 
this research program failed, and for good reason. Philosophers generally found 
that there yawns a wide gap between their models of rationality and progress 
and the actual process of science, whereas sociologists and historians brought 
to light several irrational or not so rational factors and forces in concrete cases 
or episodes of scientific change. Karl Popper in a way still tried to salvage the 
traditional, rational model of scientific progress by invoking an idealized, dialec-
tical process of conjecture (of scientific hypotheses and theories) and refutation 
(or falsification) (Haack, Defending Science; Kitcher, The Advancement). It was 
Thomas Kuhn who showed that such ideal views on science in no way reflect 
actual scientific practice (The Structure). Science, as perceived and portrayed by 
Kuhn, is not about following the logical norms of induction and deduction, but 
about what real scientists do while trying to solve problems or puzzles under the 
guidance of a so-called paradigm or disciplinary matrix. One important aspect or 
dimension of this scientific praxis is that scientists do not work in isolation, but 
within social groups that can be described as cultures of science: the social nature 
of the scientific endeavor can hardly be underestimated (Goldman, Knowledge; 
Boudry and Pigliucci, this volume).
Several strands can be discerned in the post-Kuhnian philosophy of science. 
One approach focuses on its sociological aspects, and assumes that, given the 
failure of the traditional view, objective knowledge about the world is simply 
impossible. Hence, science cannot be considered a quest for objective truth, but 
is nothing more than sociological interactions based on power relations. Such 
ideas led to the development of relativism, postmodernism, and the science wars. 
The other approach, naturalism, accepts the idea of science in the flesh without, 
however, resorting to, or harboring, relativist ideas about that all too human 
endeavor. Instead, philosophers in the natural tradition assume, inspired by 
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modern evolutionary theory, that scientific reasoning can and should be regarded 
as an activity of evolved, biological information-processing organs — human 
brains — that shape and constrain the ways scientists can obtain scientific knowl-
edge about the world (Haack, Defending Science). As Phillip Kitcher writes:
Science is not done by logically omniscient lone knowers but by biological 
systems with certain kinds of capacities and limitations. At the most fine-
grained level, scientific change involves modifications of the cognitive states 
of limited biological systems. What are the characteristics of these systems? 
What kinds of cognitive states can they be in? What are their limitations? 
What types of transitions among their states are possible? What types are 
debarred? What kinds of goals and interests do these systems have? (Kitcher, 
The Advancement 59)
An important feature of this naturalistic approach is that scientific cogni-
tion is considered not to be fundamentally different from ordinary cognition. As 
Susan Haack puts it: “Scientific inquiry is continuous with everyday empirical 
inquiry — only more so” (Defending Science 94). This “continuity hypothesis” has 
paved the way for applying the methods of the cognitive sciences to the study of 
science itself, the results of which feed back into the research on human cogni-
tion (Nersessian, Creating). It also entails that philosophers of science need to be 
informed about the results of the cognitive sciences.
One of the main findings in cognitive science is that, in contrast to personal 
experience, human thinking is not limited to the mental processes over which 
we have voluntary control. Theoretical considerations within the field of arti-
ficial intelligence research, the cognitive sciences, evolutionary psychology, and 
a plethora of empirical studies have demonstrated that our thinking depends 
on domain-specific mechanisms that work largely under the radar of conscious 
awareness (Barrett, The Shape of Thought; Pinker, How the Mind Works; Tooby 
and Cosmides, “The Biological Foundations”). These evolved mental mechanisms 
provide quick and adequate solutions and responses to particular challenges, 
resulting in intuitive beliefs (Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow). Luckily, we 
also have metarepresentational capacities that enable us to evaluate these intui-
tive beliefs (Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow). Our intuitions do, in the form 
of systematic constraints, patterns, preferences, and biases, exert great influence 
on the resulting beliefs about beliefs or “reflective beliefs” (Mercier and Sperber, 
“Intuitive”). Nevertheless, in the course of our evolution and history, we have 
succeeded in overcoming the limitations of that intuitive reasoning and thus 
developed increasingly complex ways of living and thinking.
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It is tempting to associate science exclusively with our reflective capabilities. 
Indeed, that is precisely the approach of the classic or standard pre-Kuhnian 
model. Certainly, scientists have to think hard and carefully about formulating 
their research hypotheses, setting up their experiments, making their analyses, 
and drawing their conclusions. They have to be aware of the distorting influence 
of perceptual, cognitive, and other biases. However, intuitive cognition plays an 
important part in science as well: not merely in the sense that our intuitions lead 
to hard-to-overcome biases, but also, and more importantly, that they enable 
us to reason scientifically at all. Indeed, recent cognitive approaches to science 
have discussed the roles of both types of cognition, the interaction between 
them, and their respective contribution to scientific thinking (Atran, Cognitive 
Foundations; Blancke et al., “From Ends to Causes”; Carruthers et al., The 
Cognitive Basis; Evans, this volume; Mercier and Heintz, “Scientists”; Mercier 
and Heintz, “The Place”; Nersessian, Creating; Thagard, The Cognitive Science).
This, however, confronts us with a paradox: if science indeed is based on, or 
inspired by, a natural way of knowing, how then, can it generate highly counter-
intuitive results, that is, ideas and concepts that do not come naturally to mind? 
The solution lies in what is known as mental scaffolding (Heintz, “Scaffolding”). 
Scientists have managed to supersede the constraints they too have been 
endowed with by evolution. Mathematics, logic, and statistics discipline their 
reasoning and increasingly sophisticated artifacts render their experiments and 
observations more precise and support their cognitive processes; scientists rely on 
colleagues to check whether their ideas and results really match reality or express 
bias; analogies, models, and thought experiments enable them to explore unchar-
tered domains on the basis of familiar, intuitive inferences and natural capacities. 
As such, human cognition has become extended, distributed, and social; in short, 
scaffolded (Sterelny, “Minds”).
The Influence of Intuitions on Scientific Thinking
Intuitions as Biases
Because we are here primarily interested in intuitions, let us zoom in on them 
and elucidate their role in scientific thinking. Broadly, one can identify two types 
of influence. First, as intuitions entail naive assumptions about how the world 
functions, they often produce systematic distortions of, and even resistance to, 
scientific concepts and theories. Examples in the history of science abound. 
When in July 1837, Darwin scrabbled his first sketch of common descent in one 
of his notebooks, the image he produced looked like a piece of a coral reef. More 
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than forty years later, however, Ernst Haeckel, German’s foremost Darwinian in 
the nineteenth century, depicted evolution as a tree that ends with the emergence 
of man. He had transformed a widely diverging process without any specific 
direction into a purposeful progression. Such teleological representations of evo-
lution are still popular today; think, for instance, of the chimp-like creature that 
gradually changes into a modern human. However, in contrast with Darwin’s 
earliest drawing, these conceptions are not scientifically accurate, but rather 
reflect a strong tendency to ascribe a finalistic (and anthropocentric) purpose to 
natural events. This universal inclination, aptly coined “promiscuous teleology” 
by psychologist Deborah Kelemen, exerts, from a very young age, a strong influ-
ence on our thinking about the natural world (Kelemen, “Function”). When 
five-year-olds are asked why rocks are pointy, they prefer the answer that explains 
this property in terms of purposes rather than the answer that refers to natural 
causes. They believe that rocks are pointy “so that animals wouldn’t sit on them” 
(Kelemen, “Why are Rocks”). With years of education, we learn to override the 
nefarious impact of our teleological reasoning — although we should imme-
diately point out that this kind of thinking is not necessarily wrong: artifacts 
and, according to some philosophers, adaptations are perfectly explainable in 
terms of the function they serve (Ruse, Darwin; Kampourakis, Understanding). 
However, this does not completely immunize us against the siren song of teleo-
logical reasoning. Under speeded conditions, not only educated adults, but even 
professional scientists show a preference for teleological over causal-mechanis-
tic explanations (Kelemen and Rosset, “The Human Function”; Kelemen et al., 
“Professional”). It is therefore unsurprising that scientists such as Haeckel also 
succumb to the allure of purposeful reasoning.
Haeckel’s tree is but one example of the many misconceptions and represen-
tations of the evolution of life that emerged after the publication of Darwin’s On 
the Origin. Historian Peter Bowler has documented how Darwin succeeded in 
making the idea of evolution acceptable in the scientific world, but failed to con-
vince the majority of his colleagues of the mechanism of natural selection (The 
Eclipse). This period in the history of science is known as the eclipse of Darwinism. 
Scientists resorted to representations of evolution that somehow opened up space 
for the idea of purpose and even agency. In other words, they created, and argued 
for, types of evolution, such as orthogenesis and neo-Lamarckism, that aligned 
more closely with an intuitive understanding of the world. Perhaps the clearest 
example of a more intuitive representation of evolution is theistic evolutionism, 
which assumed that God guided and even actively intervened in evolution. One 
way, for instance, proposed by Asa Gray, Darwin’s friend and leading Darwinian 
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in the United States, was that God procured the right mutations so that organ-
isms could adapt to their environment. This theory is highly intuitive for the 
same reason that religious beliefs are intuitive. It taps into our folk psychology. 
The mental capacity (“theory of mind”) by which we spontaneously interpret 
other people’s behavior in terms of mental states such as intentions, wishes, fears, 
emotions, and so on, evolved as an adaptation that facilitated living in ever big-
ger and more complex and tight-knit social groups. However, we also apply this 
kind of reasoning to purely natural things, processes, and phenomena or even to 
cultural artifacts. We kick the flat tire of our car because it ruins our plans for a 
trip to the countryside and curse our computer when it breaks down the moment 
we are about to finish our paper. Of course, we know that cars and computers 
do not have minds, but it is remarkable how readily we treat them as intentional 
beings. We also ascribe mental states to the biological world or describe and 
interpret it in terms of intentions and goals. Creation stories across the world 
imagine the origin of the world and life on it as the result of an intentional act 
by some powerful agent. Even in more secular surroundings, the intuitive idea 
that nature is designed for a purpose does not all of a sudden disappear from 
our thought processes (Evans, “Emergence”). Instead, it re-emerges as the idea of 
Mother Nature or (the strong version) of the Gaia theory, the belief that natural 
processes are intentionally designed to produce only good results (Järnefelt et al., 
“The Divided Mind”; Järnefelt, this volume).
Darwin himself contributed to the misunderstanding of his theory through 
his choice of metaphor. To explain the evolutionary process he had discovered, he 
relied upon an analogy with artificial selection. Just as breeders picked from the 
variation at hand in each generation the traits they were looking for, the environ-
ment “selects” those traits that add to the fitness of organisms. Hence, Darwin 
spoke of natural selection. However, by using the term “selection,” he not only 
created an analogy, but also a metaphor that transferred the inferences that come 
with intentional thinking — that is, our folk psychology — onto people’s think-
ing about evolution. As a result, people came to think of natural selection, not 
as purely natural, but as an agential process in which nature chooses the most 
suitable individuals or species and thus creates the diversity and complexity of 
nature. In fact, Darwin himself used the metaphor in exactly such a way when, 
for instance, he wrote:
It may be said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinising, through-
out the world, every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, 
preserving and adding up all that is good; silently and insensibly working, 
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whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of each 
organic being in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life. (On 
the Origin 82)
The codiscoverer of the theory of evolution by natural selection, Alfred 
Russel Wallace, complained to Darwin that by employing such language he had 
misguided his audience. Darwin, however, was confident that, with time, people 
would understand his theory correctly. Given what we know today about peo-
ple’s predisposition to reason in intentional terms about natural events, it seems 
that Wallace had a point. By using an intentional metaphor to explain a natu-
ral process, Darwin triggered and strengthened rather than overcame people’s 
intuitive thinking about nature (see Blancke et al., “From Ends to Causes,” for a 
similar analysis of cladograms; Shtulman, this volume).
From an educational and communicational point of view, the metaphor is 
not always successful. It can realize the very goal it was intended to avoid, namely, 
that people think about the natural process of evolution in intentional terms. 
Nonetheless, from a cognitive perspective, it is understandable why Darwin chose 
this particular metaphor. Darwin’s cognitive makeup was not basically different 
from anyone else’s in that he shared the same predispositions as his contempo-
raries and these had been entrenched by the cultural environment he grew up in. 
Indeed, before Darwin left on his five-year voyage with the Beagle (1831–1836), 
he was a creationist. A series of observations and theoretical insights during his 
journey planted seeds of doubt about the traditional, theistic account of the ori-
gin of species that later developed into the mechanistic Darwinian theory of 
evolution. But in order to arrive at his radically new and counterintuitive way 
of thinking about nature, Darwin too had to override his intuitive inclinations. 
The analogy with artificial selection, with its intentional overtones, may have 
served to accomplish this difficult task, as it allowed him to reason about the 
terrain he was exploring in familiar terms, as if natural selection was an agent. 
In a way, he used a novel but still intuitive way of thinking (selection) to override 
another intuitive but traditional (creationist) way of thinking about nature.
Intuitions as Scaffolds
This story of natural selection brings us straight to the second role of intuitions 
in scientific thinking. Not only do they entail biases that hinder scientists in 
their quest for a better understanding of the world, they also function as scaf-
folds to attain such an understanding. Just as we depend on artifacts, rules of 
logic, and conspecifics to transcend our intuitive grasp of the world, we rely 
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on our intuitions as building blocks to develop scientific knowledge (Heintz, 
“Scaffolding”). This is possible because intuitions not only process the type of 
information they evolved to process, but also any relevant piece of informa-
tion that meets their input conditions. For instance, we have a face recognition 
system that responds to the presence of actual faces, but also to any cue in the 
environment that sufficiently resembles a face, from a realistic portrait or a pho-
tograph to a smiley (Sperber, Explaining; on the implications for the cultural 
evolution of portrait paintings, see Morin, “How Portraits”). Similarly, intuitive 
ways of thinking that generate our naive understanding of the world can be put 
to work on tasks they were not evolved to solve. The key thus lies in creating and 
providing the right cognitive environment so that our intuitions do not merely 
produce naive theories about the world, but scientific ones as well (for an account 
of the psychological faculties required for the transgression of our intuitive views, 
see Vlerick, “How Can Human Beings”).
Such a perspective has considerable implications for our understanding of 
the development of science. The history of science shows that the scientific process 
does not merely constitute a simple and incremental accumulation of knowl-
edge, but is characterized by deep conceptual changes (Vosniadou, International 
Handbook). The Darwinian revolution, for instance, was not simply an addition 
to the then extant knowledge about nature, but brought an entirely new way of 
looking at nature. Einstein’s relativity theory and quantum mechanics depart 
sharply from Newtonian physics, which, in turn, contradicted even more intui-
tive Aristotelian physics. Such drastic changes in our understanding of the world 
could be easily interpreted in terms of replacing intuitive, but misleading, with 
counterintuitive, but more accurate beliefs, the latter being the result of reflective 
thinking. In this view, intuitions are overruled and replaced by a different type 
of reasoning. However, if intuitions remain at play even in scientific thinking, 
conceptual change is not a matter of replacing one way of thinking with another 
one, but of altering the ways in which intuitions function. Scientific thinking is 
not about fighting the impact of our intuitive reasoning, but about putting it to 
good use. We already mentioned, for instance, that teleological thinking is not 
bad per se. It helps us to think correctly about artifacts (that are definitely made 
for a purpose) and adaptations (that have been shaped by evolution to perform a 
particular purpose). However, it goes awry if we apply the same way of thinking 
to whole organisms (lions are to live in a zoo) and natural objects and events 
(rain falls to water plants). It also misleads us if we think that the function of 
an adaptation suffices to explain its existence: for instance, eyes have not come 
into existence with the purpose of giving us sight as natural theologians argued. 
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Instead, natural selection favored those mutations, which happened to enable 
our ancestors to make sense of light information, which gave them a bonus in 
terms of fitness. Teleological reasoning does not need to be eradicated from our 
thought processes (which would be impossible in the first place); it only has to be 
canalized and sanitized so that it enables us to attain a scientific understanding 
of the world (see Evans, this volume, for a similar argument and demonstration).
Another example of a hard-wired intuition that needs to be recruited 
properly is psychological essentialism. This is the spontaneous assumption that 
organisms contain an invisible and immutable core (“essence”) that determines 
their identity, development, and behavior. As such, it poses serious obstacles to 
a scientific understanding of the biological world. Essentialist reasoning, for 
example, hampers a proper understanding and acceptance of evolutionary the-
ory at several levels. For starters, it leads one to assume sharp boundaries between 
species and to disregard the individual variety that natural selection necessarily 
works on (Gelman and Rhodes, “Two-Thousand Years”). Even when students 
accept the concept of evolution, they tend to represent it in terms of changes 
of the species essence, rather than as the gradual rearrangement of properties 
within a particular population by natural selection (Shtulman and Schulz, “The 
Relation”). It also affects our understanding of genetics, as it makes us conceive 
of an organism’s DNA as its essence. This becomes clear, for instance, in the con-
text of the opposition to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In one survey, 
when asked whether a tomato of which the genome was edited with fish DNA 
would taste like fish, not even half of the respondents gave the correct, negative 
answer. Moreover, people particularly oppose the practice when biotechnolo-
gists cross so-called species boundaries. They think it more problematic that an 
apple’s genome would be engineered with DNA from a fish than from another 
race of apples (Blancke et al., “Fatal Attraction”). However, despite the fact that 
essentialism constitutes an enormous impediment to the understanding and 
acceptance of scientific theories and important technological innovations, it is 
not completely off the mark either. As in the case of teleological thinking, essen-
tialism does capture several real properties of the biological world: organisms 
can indeed be categorized into different species. In fact, the idea that informa-
tion of one typical member of a species can be extended to all members of that 
species forms the basis of biological studies (Shtulman and Calabi, “Cognitive 
Constraints”). And DNA does play a determinative part in the identity, devel-
opment, and behavior of an organism. It is only when essentialism supports the 
belief in the fixity of species, in sudden mutations of species (to another “essence”), 
or the idea that a single piece of DNA contains the essence of an organism, that 
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this intuitive way of thinking about nature distracts us. Again, whether or not 
essentialism has a negative impact depends on how the intuition is canalized (see 
also Evans, this volume).
One way to canalize intuitions in the right direction is the (correct) use of 
analogy. Analogies map the inferential structure of a familiar source domain 
unto an unfamiliar target domain, which makes it possible to fruitfully explore 
the unknown territory or to convey new insights with relative ease. Think of 
Darwin’s selection analogy, which allowed him to understand and convey how 
nature generates adaptive biological structures and, eventually, new species. In 
this example, the immediate source domain is of course a cultural practice, but 
intuitions too can function as a source. In fact, intuitions can be considered to 
be inference machines that quickly and automatically provide us with enormous 
amounts of information without us having to store and consciously retrieve that 
information. Take essentialism, for instance. If one happens upon a woodpecker 
during a hike, it suffices to categorize the bird as such and immediately we know 
that it breathes, that it reproduces through hard-shelled eggs, that it flies and has 
a habit of banging its beak against trees in order to obtain its daily dose of small 
insects hiding in the bark. We do not have to observe these features, nor are we 
consciously aware of them. Essentialism makes it possible to generate a plethora 
of inferences simply on the basis of category membership. These inferences are 
there for the taking and available when we need them. Similarly, our intuitive 
psychology functions as an inference system. A 1944 classic video by Fritz Heider 
and Marianne Simmel features three geometric objects, two triangles and a cir-
cle, moving across the screen. Our understanding of objects is usually guided by 
our intuitive physics, which includes the expectation that objects do not move 
unless a force (by another object or an agent) is exerted unto it. The simple fact 
that these objects move by themselves triggers our intuitive psychology, which 
immediately starts to make inferences about what these objects are up to. As a 
result, the mind makes up a story that runs more or less as follows: two lovers, 
one of the triangles and the circle, are being bullied by the other triangle. In the 
end, the two lovers leave and the bully in anger rips the place apart (a rectangle 
suggesting the presence of a room). It is remarkable how little information, how 
little input we need to conjure up such a scenario. We do not see the love of the 
two objects or the anger of the bully, nor can they tell us how they feel. We sim-
ply infer their emotional states from the objects moving in particular ways. And 
we are able to do so because our intuitions provide us with a rich understand-
ing of how people behave under particular circumstances. Again, the example of 
natural selection demonstrates how these inference systems can be recruited in 
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scientific thinking. By coining the term “natural selection,” Darwin could not 
only rely on the inferences that became available through the analogy with artifi-
cial selection. It is also an intentional term that elicits intuitive inferences about 
agents that Darwin could employ to reason about natural selection.
Analogies are of course not the only means to scaffold cognition and to 
put intuitions to work in scientific reasoning. In fact, scientific reasoning only 
becomes possible through the availability of a cognitive environment that 
includes both ecological and psychological scaffolds that lift up our intuitions 
and cognitive abilities. Professional scientists are trained to acquire a specific ter-
minology, use and manipulate particular objects, and conduct a series of practices 
that are typical of their field. They have learned to memorize relevant facts about 
the subject they are studying, think differently about certain entities (e.g., species 
as a population of slightly varying individuals instead of an essence) and they 
keep their knowledge up-to-date by consulting the relevant literature. Moreover, 
they rely on colleagues whom they expect to have gone through a somewhat sim-
ilar training and who will be interested in more or less the same issues and share 
the same epistemic background. These practices and social relations are embed-
ded within institutional arrangements (procedures, peer-reviewed journals, 
organizations). The resulting shared cognitive environment prevents scientists 
from holding naive assumptions about the world and helps them to produce and 
maintain highly counterintuitive scientific concepts and theories. Without this 
environment, science would simply not be possible.
Educating and Communicating Science
Imagine what would happen if you introduced scientific concepts in an envi-
ronment that is different from the one shared in scientific communities, an 
environment that lacks the scaffolds that enable scientists to push the barriers 
of our knowledge. What would happen to these concepts? In fact, this is not 
difficult to imagine at all, because it happens all the time. Through science edu-
cation, communication, and popularization, scientific concepts are transmitted 
from the environment in which they have been developed, maintained, and 
become ingrained in brains that lack the necessary background and motivation 
to process them properly. What happens all too often is that these brains then 
transform these concepts into types that are easier to work with, in other words, 
into intuitively more appealing types. As a result, people misrepresent scientific 
information in systematic ways, leading to detectable patterns. For instance, sur-
veys show that students do not distort basic concepts of evolutionary theory in 
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any odd way, but hold misconceptions that betray essentialist, teleological, and 
intentional biases. Another example is that people typically expect a ball that 
leaves a curved tube to continue moving in a curve, instead of proceeding in a 
straight line as predicted by modern physics (McCloskey et al., “Curvilinear 
Motion”). And so on. In a cognitive environment without sufficient support, our 
intuitions easily play up as biases again.
The fact that scientific concepts require proper scaffolding and the right 
environment to flourish poses formidable challenges to science educators and 
communicators who transmit and explain these concepts under less suitable 
conditions. It does not suffice to simply communicate scientific ideas, because 
students and lay people will not understand them and quickly transform them 
into more palatable, but scientifically inaccurate versions. Thus, educators 
need to develop and employ practices and tools that enable people to appre-
hend the science correctly. One approach is to partly reconstruct some of the 
scientists’ environment in the classroom. For instance, teachers can challenge 
students to develop hypotheses, test them against the facts, and discuss their 
results with classmates. Such experiences might induce them to revise their ear-
lier, intuitive beliefs with scientific beliefs that are more capable of explaining 
what they observed. Another approach makes use of thinking aids. Analogies 
and metaphors are excellent examples of such aids, but they are not the only 
ones. Drawings and models, for instance, help us to visualize a scientific con-
cept, which in turn assists us to understand the issue at hand. Scientists use 
them to clarify their thinking — Darwin’s coral drawing in his 1837 notebook 
comes to mind — but teachers can apply them equally well in the classroom. For 
instance, Kelemen and her colleagues showed that picture storybooks can be 
used to teach the basics of natural selection to 5- to 8-year-olds (Kelemen et al., 
“Young Children”). Note how these educational solutions do not exclusively 
depend on students’ reflective reasoning. Surely, they involve some reflection, as 
learners have to make a sustained and conscious effort to overcome their intui-
tive theories and to understand and accept scientific beliefs. To a large extent, 
however, these tools also rely upon intuitions and mental capabilities shared by 
all students (e.g., testing hypotheses, visualizing objects and scenarios, finding 
reasons). As scientific thinking depends upon intuitions, it would be truly sur-
prising if science education did not.
The classroom setting is special in the sense — and to the extent — that it 
allows for the re-creation of certain aspects of scientific practices, for systematic 
and sustained ways of teaching, and for the continuous control and correction 
of misconceptions. In other words, teachers can partly reconstruct the necessary 
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cognitive environment in which scientific concepts hold sway. Nonetheless, it is 
remarkable how, even under these relatively favorable circumstances, students 
experience great difficulties coming to terms with scientific beliefs. In the case 
of the public understanding of science, science communicators do not have the 
same opportunities to manage and control how people receive and understand 
the message they want to convey. When one reaches out to a lay audience, either 
directly or via the media, it is difficult to have the public engaged in experiments 
or to systematically check and correct for misunderstandings. All one can do is 
communicate in the hope that one will instil at least a minimal public under-
standing of the scientific content. However, the odds are very much against 
communicators, as distortions may occur at several levels. Many people are 
simply not interested in scientific issues, so even if the communicated message 
reaches them, they will at most assimilate only a fragment of the information. 
In the case that people do pay attention, they might have motivations other than 
a concern for truth that constrain the way in which they perceive and interpret 
scientific information. Religious, political, and ideological beliefs can seriously 
affect people’s understanding and acceptance of scientific concepts and theories. 
Creationists will treat any confirming piece of information about evolution with 
great scepticism, argue against it, or transform it into a belief that fits within 
their religious framework. Such views are enforced by alternative sources of 
information that people consider to be authoritative but that contradict the 
science. Environmentalist groups, for instance, oppose genetic modification in 
agriculture and thereby use intuitively appealing but inaccurate representations 
of GMOs. Finally, even if people are genuinely interested in learning about sci-
entific matters, they usually do not have the time and energy to acquire a full 
understanding and also lack the right background knowledge and institutional 
support to interpret the information correctly. On other occasions, people will 
claim to accept a scientific belief without properly understanding its content 
(Guillo, this volume).
Intuitions have an effect at each of these levels. Generally, people feel no 
need to acquire a scientific understanding, as scientific matters are often too 
complex to understand and are usually redundant in people’s daily lives. They 
prefer the messages that align most closely with their intuitive understanding of 
the world and the ideas that are popular within their own cultural environment, 
giving trust to the sources that provide such information and distrusting others. 
Finally, intuitions bias people towards reconstructing highly counterintuitive sci-
entific content in the direction of more cognitively palatable notions. However, 
intuitions not only affect the transmission of scientific ideas at the receiver’s end, 
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but also at the end of the sender. In order to make scientific concepts and theories 
more salient and more understandable, science popularizers lower complexity and 
make their message more intuitively appealing. Think, for instance, of the interac-
tions between several different species within a particular environment. A scientific 
evolutionarily informed look at these ecological patters discloses a ruthless strug-
gle for survival under harsh conditions and an endless competition for resources 
between individuals, not the least within the same species. Death and spoilages 
are distressingly common, and preying and parasitism are the most common form 
of interorganismic interactions, while not uncommon instances of symbiosis or 
cooperation are merely driven, or at the very least facilitated, by genetic “interests.” 
Environmental factors such as predators, disease, and lack of food sources keep 
each species in check, thereby creating an equilibrium that gives the impression of 
a delicate balance. However, this balance can easily be disturbed. If an individual 
organism or species has the opportunity, it will exploit its environment to the full-
est and flourish to the detriment of others. Maintaining the “balance of nature” 
would be the least of its concerns. Nevertheless, documentaries tend to present the 
delicate relations between and within species in a narrative of a harmonious and 
almost romantic play, written by nature, in which each species knows and plays it 
role. Such a presentation may help to convey the correct idea that species depend 
on one another for survival (e.g., as a food source, shelter). Moreover, it may help 
to raise public concern about the annihilation of valuable ecosystems. It also, 
however, romanticizes nature and thus misinforms people about how ecosystems 
function. Romantic views tap into our essentialist, teleological, and intentional 
biases: individual organisms are regarded as representatives of their species and 
can easily be replaced. Tens and tens of individual blackbirds may die, but as long 
as one blackbird sings in the dead of night, we behold the beauty of nature. The 
delicate balance between organisms is not regarded as emerging from interactions 
between individuals but as the very goal of such interactions, either intended by 
the individuals themselves, evolution, or Mother Nature. Such views, however, fail 
to address and emphasize the important Darwinian point that ecosystems consist 
of countless individual interactions in which not the conservation of the system 
but the survival and the reproduction of organisms, or, in ultimate (genecentric) 
terms, protection and spreading of genes is at stake.
Such examples make clear that it is not just the case that people distort the 
scientific content that they receive, but that the content itself is already distorted 
before it reaches them. Egil Asprem discerns two steps in which science becomes 
transformed through popularization, driving theories towards cognitively opti-
mal forms (“How Schrödinger’s Cat”). In the first step, the theory is translated 
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into common language that consequently taps into our intuitions. Asprem dis-
cusses the example of genetic determinism (a gene for this, a gene for that) that 
thrives on our preferences for monocausal explanations. In a second step, causal 
explanations are warped in the cloak of intentionality by means of analogy, thus 
exploiting our folk psychology. As we have seen, Darwin’s use of natural selec-
tion in On the Origin of Species stands out as an example, but Asprem himself 
refers to the popular concept of the selfish gene, coined by the British biologist 
Richard Dawkins. Dawkins has always emphasized that it was just a metaphor 
to facilitate the understanding of genecentrism and should not be taken liter-
ally — although he has made this mistake himself. “Nevertheless,” as Asprem 
notes, “Dawkins opened a can of worms. The metaphor invites readers to pro-
cess the science in ways that are antithetical to its theoretical content” (“How 
Schrödinger’s Cat” 121). As Darwin had done more than hundred years before, 
Dawkins, unintentionally, confuses his audience by using intentional language 
as a communicational tool.
Conclusion
In science intuitions play a double part. As biases they tend to distract scien-
tists from finding out how the real world functions, and they have induced 
scientists to develop practices, tools, and methods to counter their influence. As 
scaffolds, intuitions play a pivotal role in the construction of counterintuitive 
ideas, and hence they are essential to the progress of science. However, this is 
only possible given the right cognitive environment in which both psychological 
and ecological factors enable the development of scientific concepts. This dou-
ble role of intuitions puts science educators and communicators in a precarious 
position. On the one hand, they need to find ways to override them if they want 
to succeed in instigating a conceptual change in their learners or members of the 
audience. On the other hand, they have to employ the very same intuitions as 
stepping-stones towards a scientific understanding. One way to walk this deli-
cate line is to translate the complexity of scientific theories into more intuitively 
appealing notions, but the examples of natural selection and the selfish gene 
clearly indicate that this strategy is risky. Another option might be to use less 
enticing machine metaphors (Tanghe, “Robots”; but see Pigliucci and Boudry, 
“Why Machine-Information”).
 So how should teachers proceed? What educational tools and strategies can 
they deploy to develop a scientific understanding of the world in their students 
or audience but avoid the pitfalls of intuitive reasoning? Limitations of space 
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prevent us from going into the practical details, but we will conclude with some 
general remarks. First, teaching science definitely requires a good understand-
ing of the human mind. Teachers and communicators should be aware that 
students or lay people do not receive scientific information like a tabula rasa’s 
inscriptions, but instead they will have intuitive expectations of how the world 
functions. These expectations, in combination with people’s acquired beliefs, 
concerns, and motivations, lead people to transform scientific information in 
ways that they find relevant. And this is certainly not always in the direction of 
accuracy. Second, knowledge about the human mind should result in the design 
and application of educational tools, methods, and strategies that are targeted at 
overcoming such systematic biases and misconceptions. Teachers and communi-
cators should not simply transmit scientific content, but think very hard about 
how they can accomplish this. Already there is plenty of literature available in 
which one can find helpful suggestions. Third, good educational tools foster a 
scientific understanding of the world by building on people’s intuitive reason-
ing. Teachers and popularizers should not be afraid of using metaphor, analogy, 
images, models, and narratives to help their learners understand scientific theo-
ries. As we have seen, these same tools help scientists to develop their theories. 
However, one should always be careful that these tools do not enforce people’s 
intuitive reasoning (see also Shtulman, this volume). And finally, ideally these 
tools and strategies take part in the development of a cognitive environment that 
raises the relevance of representing scientific beliefs correctly. This is easier said 
than done, especially in the context of the public understanding of science, but 
it is absolutely necessary if we want to live in a scientifically informed culture. 
Given the risks and dangers entailed in rampant irrational beliefs and practices, 
that goal is certainly something worth aiming for.
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Vindicating Science — By Bringing It Down
Maarten Boudry and Massimo Pigliucci
Abstract
Science, in the classical view, is the epitome of a rational endeavor, untrammeled 
by social and cultural influences. It strives to reflect the way the world really is, 
and is elevated above our petty human lives. Social explanations come into view 
only when science goes astray — when it stops being science. In recent decades, 
radical sociologists and other science bashers have tried to wrestle away science 
from the upholders of the classical view, bringing it down to the level of other 
human endeavors. Science, they maintain, is social to the bone, and what passes 
for scientific knowledge is nothing but a fabric of social constructions and power 
relations. In turn, this radicalism has fueled suspicions among science advocates 
about any naturalized conception of science: the edifice of science should be free 
from the contamination of social influences. Both parties in the dispute, as we 
argue in this chapter, buy into an intuitive view that characterizes much of our 
everyday reasoning about the causes of belief: a stark opposition between the 
rational and the social. Wherever social influences hold sway, reason takes the 
hindmost. And wherever reason reigns, no need is felt for social explanations. 
This opposition harks back to an even more basic intuition: true and justified 
beliefs don’t require a causal explanation. They are just self-evident. We grapple 
for causal explanations (social or otherwise) only when rationality fails. This 
assumption, handy though it is as a heuristic and first approximation, does not 
survive careful scrutiny, and needs to be abandoned. A rich causal account of 
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science, including the constitutive role of the social, in no way detracts from its 
epistemic credentials. Science, after all, is the concerted effort of many human 
brains. If we want a nonmiraculous explanation of science’s successes, we had 
better be able to account for them in social terms.
What is the role of the social in science? If one consults science textbooks, one 
will find that the social dimension of scientific knowledge is conspicuously 
absent. Science is supposed to reflect the way the world really is, independent 
of our petty human lives. It is, in the classical view, the epitome of a rational 
endeavor, free from social influences. Of course, science is carried out by human 
beings, but their individual backgrounds and social lives are simply taken to be 
irrelevant. Individual scientists are effaced from the fruits of their intellectual 
labors, or relegated to historical footnotes. What matters are the intellectual 
merits of a theory, not who conceived it. What matters is the evidence, not who 
gathered it. This stark contrast between the social and the rational can be found 
in philosophical accounts of science as well. Because social factors are rendered 
invisible in the end products of science, many philosophers have underestimated 
their constructive role in the acquisition of scientific knowledge.
In recent decades, sociologists and historians have tried to bring science back 
to earth, but many of them have unwittingly bought into the same simplistic 
opposition. Social influences on science have been relished by its cynical critics 
and resisted by its admirers, and for the same reason: the fear (or hope) that it 
would destroy the credentials of science. In what follows, we discuss the histor-
ical roots of this opposition, culminating in the sorry spectacle of the science 
wars. We also point to a deeper cognitive explanation for this battle over the 
social nature of science: our basic intuition that rationally justified beliefs are not 
in need of any explanation, and that only false and foolish ones are.
Explaining Rational Belief
When do we feel the need to explain why someone believes something? Not all 
beliefs held by our fellow human beings appear to produce an epistemic itch. 
People believe that dolphins are mammals, that the earth orbits the sun, and 
that World War II ended in 1945, but we rarely wonder how they arrived at 
such homely truths. Beliefs such as these are just obvious, and no sane person 
would dispute them. Not only are we not interested in how other people came 
to hold these beliefs, we are also oblivious to how we did so ourselves. Who 
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told you when the World War II ended? Where did you acquire the belief that 
dolphins are mammals, or that the earth goes around the sun? Your sources 
for these convictions, though you surely must have had them, are hard to 
track down.
Psychologists distinguish between episodic memories and semantic mem-
ories (Squire and Zola, “Episodic Memory”). Episodic memories carry a mental 
source tag, containing the time, place, and situation where we acquired them. 
Semantic memories, by contrast, are floating unanchored in our mental space: 
we can no longer retrieve the moment in our lives when we first learned that 
dolphins are mammals, although surely there must have been such a moment. 
Knowledge about biological taxonomy is not innate, and in fact, as in the case of 
dolphins, it is often surprising and counterintuitive.
There are good reasons why our brains don’t bother to keep a source tag 
for semantic memories: doing so would just clog our memory, and be a waste of 
brain resources. Take the belief that coal is black. People may have acquired this 
knowledge in any number of ways: some may have learned about soil deposits 
and compression of organic matter in elementary school, others had first-hand 
experience with the substance as a child, before learning about its origins. Still 
others may have learned about coal from the accounts of parents or friends. None 
of this is consequential for the end result: the culturally shared knowledge of a 
black, solid, combustible material called “coal.”
If we ask you what your reasons are for believing that coal is black, you would 
probably be puzzled. The first answer that comes to mind is: “Why, because it is 
black, of course!” It doesn’t matter how I came to know that. I could have learned 
it in any number of ways. Anyone in doubt about the color of coal can quickly 
retrieve the answer through any number of sources.
Because the truth of such beliefs is obvious, we rarely question how other 
people acquired them, or how they can justify them. It seems as if such beliefs 
just drop out of thin air, without much in the way of a causal history. People have 
many beliefs about the world, or so we think, simply by virtue of these beliefs 
corresponding to the way the world really is. If we are pressed to come up with a 
causal history of such beliefs, we say that people must have been exposed, one way 
or another, to the right kind of evidence or testimony. If such evidence is available 
in abundance, there is no need to worry about the details. In traditional accounts 
of knowledge, the explanation for true belief is pretty straightforward, as Paul 
Boghossian writes: “Under the appropriate circumstances, our exposure to the 
evidence alone is capable of explaining why we believe what we believe” (22).
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Explaining other Beliefs
So how do we account for other kinds of beliefs (as held by others, of course)? 
Beliefs that are false, quirky, idiosyncratic, or plainly irrational produce an epis-
temic itch. We want to explain how people end up embracing them. Confronted 
with someone who believes that coal is red, that ostriches are mammals, that 
cellphones cause cancer, or that Elvis is still alive, we grapple for explanations. 
Who told him such nonsense? Is he the victim of some sort of prank? Did he fall 
for one of those conspiracy theories circulating on the Internet? Some beliefs are 
so blatantly false that we begin to question someone’s sanity, or we assume that 
there must have been some sort of misunderstanding (Davidson).
In terms of accounting for why people believe certain things, we resort to 
special explanations only when something goes wrong. True beliefs that are part 
of common knowledge are taken at face value, but false and foolish beliefs cry out 
for an explanation. Some distorting influence is needed to explain why someone 
has arrived at a belief that no rational person would hold. This is where social and 
cultural explanations come in. We refer to someone’s upbringing or social milieu, 
his allegiances and prejudices, and we invoke concepts such as peer pressure, 
indoctrination, misinformation, or ideological posturing. We say that someone 
is being contrarian, gullible, prejudiced, or trying to save face.
Such explanations, however, are not invoked when we account for true and 
justified beliefs, especially the countless mundane beliefs that all of us share. 
Only when rationality breaks down, it seems, a space is opened up for psychoso-
cial explanations to fill. This association between the irrational (or arational) and 
the social works also in the opposite direction: if X comes up with an explanation 
of Y’s belief in terms of social factors, we assume that X is dismissing Y’s belief, 
or at least not taking it at face value. In folk psychology, rationality is the default 
of belief formation (Dennett; Bortolotti), but reasoning can be contaminated 
by social and psychosocial factors. Wherever the social holds sway, we should be 
suspicious.
This assumption that true beliefs don’t need a causal pedigree, unlike 
false ones, has even dominated much of academic psychology. For a long time 
psychologists have investigated deviations from the canons of rationality 
(Kahneman et al.), documenting all the biases and errors that human reason is 
liable to, but they have been much less interested in the cognitive mechanisms of 




In the classical view, science is (supposed to be) the epitome of reason. It is objec-
tive and impartial. It is ruthless in its indifference to what we fear or fancy. 
When it comes to the content of science, nature has the final say in the matter. 
Social, political, and ideological influences on science are anathema. If they have 
any discernible effect on science, then something must have gone wrong, and 
we are no longer talking about science. As the physicist Steven Weinberg put it: 
“Whatever cultural influences went into the discovery of Maxwell’s Equations 
and other laws of nature have been refined away, like slag from ore” (qtd. in 
Hacking 86). Indeed, the contamination by the social is one of the diagnostic 
criteria to distinguish science from pseudoscience. In many pseudoscientific 
theories, we see that ideological fashions and cultural sensibilities, rather than 
evidence, are the prime movers of theory development (Boudry and Buekens; 
Pigliucci and Boudry).
When writing science textbooks, and for many other purposes, the social 
influences on the development of scientific theories can be safely ignored, just 
like with many of our mundane beliefs about the world. Sure, there is a story to 
be told about how scientists pooled their efforts to acquire this or that piece of 
knowledge, who published it first, who convinced whom, and so on. At some 
point, so we assume, scientists must have been exposed to the relevant evidence. 
But the details of this story make no difference: an alternative history of science 
would ultimately have led to the same result. Not surprisingly, many textbooks of 
science have markedly little interest in the history of the laws and theories being 
discussed, or even in their evidential support. Scientific theories are timeless and 
universal, transcending the particular historical context in which they emerged. 
Especially in the natural sciences, students are simply taught scientific theories 
as if they descended down from some Platonic heaven. The vagaries of scientific 
history, the false starts, wrong turns, and dead ends, the protracted controversies 
between rival views, the forerunners and pioneers of scientific ideas — all of this 
is rendered invisible.
There are of course eminently good reasons for this neglect in scientific text-
books. Once a scientific theory has been firmly established, and its last reputable 
dissenters have died out or given up, the history of its eventual rise and triumph 
becomes a matter for historians and sociologists. There is no need for students 
of physics to linger over the priority dispute between Newton and Leibniz 
about the invention of calculus, or the chronological development of special and 
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general relativity, at least not when it comes to understanding these theories and 
putting them into practice.
For long, philosophers of science have also treated science in splendid iso-
lation from the social world. Philosophy of science, under the influence of 
logical positivism, and in particular Gottlob Frege’s attack on psychologism 
(Friedman), was mainly concerned with the logical structure of scientific theo-
ries, the relationship between theoretical propositions and observations, and the 
procedure or method for accumulating scientific knowledge. The philosopher 
Hans Reichenbach, one of the major proponents of logical positivism, taught us 
to strictly separate the context of discovery from the context of justification. The 
first deals with the historical conception of a scientific hypothesis, or the circum-
stances in which some observation has first been made, and is of little interest 
to philosophers trying to understand the logic of science. Brilliant ideas and 
findings may be arrived at in any number of ways, by anyone, under whatever 
circumstances. No rhyme or reason to be found there.
Philosophers of science, according to Reichenbach’s famous stricture, should 
be solely concerned with how a scientific hypothesis, once it appears on the scene, 
relates to observations, whether it is internally consistent, whether it is falsifiable, 
and so on. The latter issue, which Reichenbach called the context of justification, 
deals exclusively with the logical relation between scientific hypotheses and the 
world, and is unaffected by the context of discovery (Schickore). There is no need 
to belabor the shortcomings of this highly idealized conception of science, as 
those have been amply exposed elsewhere (Creath). Perhaps more important is 
to see that, despite the obvious problems with this exclusive focus on the logic 
of justification, there is a sensible rationale behind the distinction. The ultimate 
goal of science is indeed to cancel out any influence of the social and to retroac-
tively erase its own history: scientific theories have to stand or fall on their own 
merits, independent from their originators.
Down to Earth
In this idealized conception of science, which focuses on the successful end result 
of scientific activity, there is no place for any influence of the social, or indeed, 
for any of the actors involved in the scientific endeavor. All of that is swept 
under the carpet. But the fact that the eventual goal of science is to eliminate 
the social does not imply that social factors have no important role to play in the 
process. Science, after all, is nothing but the concerted effort of (sometimes not 
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so) humble human brains, none of which was designed to unravel the mysteries 
of the world on its own.
In the past couple of decades, science has been brought down to earth again 
by sociologists, cognitive scientists, evolutionary psychologists, and histori-
ans. Unfortunately, the opposition between the rational and the social is still 
besetting the naturalization of science. The backlash against the traditional 
conception of science, epitomized by the logical positivists and their intellectual 
heirs, has swung the pendulum in the opposite direction. Still under the spell of 
the dichotomy between rational and social (Galison), many science naturalizers 
have assumed that, as they bring science down to earth, its pretensions will start 
to unravel.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn famously argued 
that the history of science can be divided into periods of normal science, punc-
tuated by episodes of revolution. During times of normal science, all scientists 
work within a certain paradigm, sharing background knowledge, methodolo-
gies, experimental procedures, and rules of inference. Nobody questions the 
validity of the reigning paradigm. The period of normal science ends when a 
critical level of “anomalies” has accumulated, that is, empirical and conceptual 
problems that the ruling paradigm has trouble dealing with. This crisis even-
tually leads to a revolution and a paradigm shift, after which normal science 
resumes again.
In periods of normal science, uncritical acceptance of the reigning paradigm 
is ensured through social conformity and transferred from the old generation to 
the new. During the revolutionary period, in Kuhn’s picture, the social dynamics 
of science are even more important. This is because the old and the new para-
digm, according to Kuhn, are “incommensurable,” meaning that the choice of 
one paradigm over the other cannot be settled by rational means. It is akin to 
a gestalt switch, where two different conceptual frameworks offer a completely 
different perspective on a given phenomenon.
Many philosophers of science dismissed Kuhn’s notion of paradigm shifts 
and incommensurability as a form of “mob psychology.” In describing this 
gestalt switch between the old and the new, however, Kuhn opened up a space 
for social influences on science, which some sociologists have enthusiastically 
exploited and, to Kuhn’s own dismay, pushed beyond what he himself thought 
reasonable. In the end, “whether a revolution occurs or the anomalies are sim-
ply ignored,” as Golinski summarized, the approach of the radical sociologists 
“would depend on the social configuration of the community” (25). Sociologists 
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such as Harry Collins came to the rather surprising conclusion (to most scien-
tists at any rate) that “the natural world has a small or non-existent role in the 
construction of scientific knowledge” (3).
There is a continuing debate about the legacy of Kuhn’s work, and the 
correct interpretation of such ambiguous terms as “incommensurability” and 
“paradigm.” In any case, as sociologists were following up on (what they claimed 
to be) Kuhn’s lead, philosophers of science tried to reinstate the distinction 
between the rational and the social, carving out a restricted niche for social 
explanations. The proper place for the social was mainly defined in a negative 
fashion. Imre Lakatos, who was attempting to incorporate Kuhn’s insights into 
the falsificationist philosophy of his mentor Karl Popper, used the notion of 
“research program” as a unit of analysis of the history of science, a less encom-
passing concept than Kuhn’s “paradigms.” According to Lakatos, good science 
proceeds in a rational way, unless or until a scientific research program starts 
to degenerate. When science shows signs of such degeneration, we can no lon-
ger explain what happens in a purely rational fashion, and we must look for 
additional social and psychological accounts. In other words: when rationality 
breaks down, the sociologists are allowed to jump in the fray. Larry Laudan, 
another important philosopher influenced by Kuhn, explicitly defended what 
he called the “arationality assumption”: “The sociology of knowledge may step in 
to explain beliefs if and only if those beliefs cannot be explained in terms of their 
rational merits” (202).
Both the strictures of Lakatos and Laudan, as well as the sociological relativ-
ism that they were battling against (Koertge), rest on the false opposition which 
we outlined above: when it comes to understanding why people believe certain 
things, we only look for psychological and social explanations when something 
goes wrong. From a pragmatic point of view, in other words, the social becomes 
salient only when rationality fails us. The truth of the matter, however, is that all 
beliefs, the true and the false ones alike, have a causal history, involving cogni-
tive and social factors (in varying combinations). If we want to understand how 
people come to believe stuff, even simple and obvious propositions (e.g., dolphins 
are mammals) are in need of an explanation. Likewise, if we want to understand 
how scientists have been able to unearth all sorts of true beliefs about the world, 
we need to understand what kinds of people scientists are, what kind of cognitive 
strategies they bring to bear on their research questions, what the social organiza-
tion of science is, and how hypotheses are tested and evaluated within a scientific 
community (Longino, Science as Social Knowledge; The Social Dimensions of 
Scientific Knowledge).
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Opposing the Rational and the Social
The development of a cognitively and socially rich account of science has been 
delayed by the widespread misconception that such an account would compro-
mise the epistemic standing of science (Haack). Because of our habit of pitting 
social and rational explanations against each other, we assume that the intru-
sion of sociology and psychology into the citadel of science will eat away at its 
foundations. As Philip Kitcher writes: “Much thinking about the growth of sci-
ence is permeated by the thought that once scientists are shown to be motivated 
by various types of social concerns, something epistemically dreadful has been 
established” (305).
Or, as the radical sociologists would have it, something exquisite: this would 
finally bring down science as one worldview among many, with its own power 
structures, social dominance relations, and coalitions (Bloor). If we succeed 
in encroaching on the domain of science, so the sociologists seemed to think, 
surely we are debunking its epistemic pretensions. Why else were the traditional 
guardians of science trying to keep us out? Despite its lofty epistemic ambitions, 
science is shown to be nothing more than a social construction, and can be treated 
accordingly, in just the same way that sociologists treat religion and politics. At 
the heart of this opposition between the social and the rational, according to 
Mercier and Heintz, lies an individualist conception of reason, shared by both 
camps in the science wars: “On the science war front, both camps see reason 
as the ultimate place that is safe from sociological analysis. Defenders of the 
rationality of science against relativism could put rationality just there: in scien-
tists’ reasoning capacities. Protagonists on the other side of the front have seen in 
reasoning another attempt to resist naturalistic inquiries” (Mercier and Heintz 
515). Mercier and Heintz are defending a deeply social account of human reason, 
according to which its prime function, from an evolutionary point of view, is to 
argue with other people. This, not coincidentally, is also the ecological setting in 
which human reason is most successful. Mercier and Heintz’s view goes against 
the traditional concept of reason, in which others are seen as potential confound-
ers or distorters, and human reason is regarded as a cognitive faculty that works 
best in isolation, free from external influences.
This idea of the social as a contaminant of the rational, to which even social 
constructivists seem to subscribe, is more indebted to logical positivism than the 
latter would like to admit. Radical sociologists were led astray by the very same 
intuition that made the logical positivists allergic to social explanations — only 
now they were welcoming the opposite conclusion. David Hull expressed their 
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line of reasoning as follows: “Because science did not possess the ideal charac-
teristics that the ‘positivists’ insisted that it should, knowledge-claims made by 
scientists had no more warrant than those of magicians, faith healers, and poli-
ticians” (Hull xi).
It is not surprising that such iconoclasm has further entrenched the con-
viction that sociologists should get their dirty hands off the edifice of science. 
If the content of scientific theories were determined by social factors, by ideo-
logical fashions, or by the psychological quirks of scientists, how do we explain 
the impressive technological prowess of science? Science is a way of finding out 
objective truths about the universe. We don’t need sociologists to explain the 
triumph of the germ theory of disease. Microscopic organisms really make us ill, 
social constructivism be damned.
Naturalizing Science
In our view, both camps are wrong (although, arguably, the relativist sci-
ence bashers more so). The simple opposition between the rational and the 
social-psychological explanations goes against the grain of naturalism. Scientific 
knowledge does not drop out of thin air: it is embodied in real human beings. If 
our best scientific theories in some way reflect the world out there, this must have 
come about through the usual perceptual capacities and cognitive operations, 
with available technological equipment, and in a complex network of social 
interactions. How else could it have come about?
Science itself, after all, tells us that the human brain is a product of evolution 
by natural selection, and science the product of cultural evolution (Heintz, this 
volume). Humans did not evolve to unravel the structure of the cosmos. Indeed, 
evolution has equipped us with a host of biases and intuitions that served our 
ancestors well in the environment in which they had to survive and reproduce, 
but that often get in the way of our modern quest to uncover the nature of the 
universe (Blancke, Tanghe, and Braeckman, this volume). If humans succeed in 
overcoming these intuitions regardless, developing scientific theories that vio-
late their intuitive worldview at every turn, then we need some nonmiraculous, 
bottom-up, naturalistic account of this achievement. The sociologists are right 
that science is a deeply social endeavor, and that all scientific knowledge is in this 
sense “socially constructed.” No single individual marooned on a desert island, 
no matter how brilliant, would be capable of finding out any of the significant 
truths about the universe that we currently possess. Though the history of sci-
ence has known some solitary geniuses, working in relative isolation from their 
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peers, even they were still engaged in a collective enterprise, in the sense that they 
were building on the work of numerous predecessors. Isaac Newton was stand-
ing on the shoulders of giants (and it’s giants and lesser giants all the way down). 
If we want to understand anything at all about the accomplishments of science, 
we need to solicit the help of sociologists.
The realization that science is a deeply social enterprise, and that scientific 
consensus is reached through coalition forming and competition, should not 
surprise us. The question is what particular social organization is exemplified 
by science, and whether this is conducive to its epistemic aspirations. Scientists 
are human beings, warts and all. If scientists collectively succeed in finding 
out significant truths about the universe, while other endeavors have failed in 
this regard, this must have come about through the particular social dynamics 
of science.
Luckily, this research is now well underway. The discipline of social 
episte mology is investigating the particular social arrangements that are suc-
cessful in producing knowledge (Goldman). Philip Kitcher, in his seminal The 
Advancement of Science, has developed a model of the microstructure of scientific 
change, paying attention to the division of cognitive labor and the social organi-
zation of science. Ronald Giere has investigated the phenomenon of “distributed 
cognition” in science (“Scientific Cognition as Distributed Cognition”). Hugo 
Mercier and Christophe Heintz have described scientific reasoning as inherently 
social and argumentative (“Scientists’ Argumentative Reasoning”). To dissolve 
the opposition between the rational and the social, let us briefly consider some 
social influences on science, which, though initially seeming to threaten its epis-
temic ambitions, are actually enlisted in the interest of scientific progress.
Positive Roles for the Social
Many scientists believe that being objective and impartial are the cardinal virtues 
of science, and that bias and prejudice make one unsuitable for scientific work. 
Although the culture of science rightly encourages these virtues, they are by no 
means necessary for the success of science. Indeed, a certain modicum of bias in 
this or that direction may actually facilitate the progress of science.
It is not a problem that an individual scientist is biased, or emotionally 
attached to a particular hypothesis. The social organization of science makes sure 
that these biases will be balanced by others tilting in different directions. Helen 
Longino, for example, has put forth an account of the importance of epistemic 
diversity in the workings of science, arguing that (near) objectivity in scientific 
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endeavors emerges from two sources: on the one hand, science constantly con-
fronts itself with the reality of the world, as assessed by our best empirical 
methods (Science as Social Knowledge). This leaves comparatively little room for 
(reasonable) alternative views: it is a matter of fact whether light is bent by grav-
itational fields, as the general theory of relativity predicts. On the other hand, 
the more cultural, gender, and ideological diversity there is within the scientific 
community itself, the more likely it is that culture-, gender-, or ideology-specific 
biases will be corrected. A standard example of this is the reorientation of aspects 
of medical research as a result of feminist epistemological critiques: it is now 
increasingly acknowledged that, for example, we cannot conduct drug tests solely 
on a population of (mostly white, middle aged) men and simply assume that the 
results can be extrapolated to other human biological populations (Gesensway).
In general terms, a good social arrangement for finding out the truth of some 
matter is to have two or more competing groups pursue different hypotheses, try-
ing their utmost to garner evidence for their own view and to prove competitors 
wrong. As David Hull writes, with regard to the ideal of objectivity in science: 
“The objectivity that matters so much in science is not primarily a characteristic 
of individual scientists but of scientific communities. Scientists rarely refute their 
own pet hypotheses, especially after they have appeared in print, but that is all 
right. Their fellow scientists will be happy to expose these hypotheses to severe 
testing” (3–4). In other words, it is best to let a thousand flowers bloom in sci-
ence. Even if you think some hypothesis is unlikely and far-fetched, it might still 
be worthwhile for some scientist to pursue it. The reward structure of science 
ensures that even implausible hypotheses will be explored by someone: there is 
a high premium on being able to show that a certain orthodox or received view 
is wrong. The chances of succeeding are dim, but then again, the reward is huge. 
This social arrangement attenuates the risk that science, as a whole, misses out on 
an apparently unlikely alternative that might be borne out after all.
Many controversies in science can be viewed as a battle between the opposing 
biases of conservatism and rebelliousness. According to Philip Kitcher, cognitive 
variation among scientists on this dimension is conducive to progress in the long 
run (The Advancement of Science). Some scientists are mavericks, quick to chal-
lenge established views and pursue new avenues, while others are traditionalists, 
suspicious of radical ideas and inclined to defend the orthodoxy as long as possi-
ble. There is no single strategy that is always successful: the mavericks take more 
risks and will often turn out to be wrong, but may sometimes strike gold and thus 
prevent the ossification of scientific orthodoxy. Traditionalists are often right in 
sticking with the old ways, and are not the ones to waste time and effort on wild 
and improbable ideas. But sometimes they will be proven wrong too. There is no 
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single ideal way to strike a balance between caution and innovation, between 
persistence and flexibility. A social arrangement that allows for different cogni-
tive strategies to flourish, according to Kitcher, will produce better results than 
one that attempts to enforce one single “rational” policy.
A desire for fame and success is often viewed as unworthy of a real scientist. 
The goal of science is truth for its own sake. Although such base motives may 
indeed compromise one’s scientific work, if allowed to be unchecked, there is no 
convincing reason why they would stand in the way of significant discoveries. 
Even spite, jealousy, and the desire to humiliate a rival can result in excellent 
scientific work, if the competing parties know that they have to abide by certain 
rules, and will be called out whenever they violate them. In any case, a desire for 
fame and success does not compromise the collective goals of truth and objectivity. 
Institutional arrangements provide selfish motives for honesty and truthfulness 
in reporting and sharing results with others (Campbell; Goldman; Haack).
Indeed, social competition may be more effective as an incentive to do sci-
ence than the pure and noble goal of discovery, especially when it comes to the 
laborious and repetitious work that science often demands. As Susan Haack puts 
it, competition is “an aid to our limited energy and fragile intellectual integ-
rity” (108). Scooping a rival may be more thrilling than laying another brick in 
the edifice of knowledge, but that’s no problem, as both may be accomplished 
at the same time. Fraud is ruthlessly punished in the world of science, not just 
because it undermines the relationship of trust on which science is based, but 
also because it is an unfair shortcut to the success and professional achievement 
that many scientists are striving for. What goes for individual rivalry also applies 
to competition between research groups, as David Hull writes: “As unseemly as 
factionalism in science may be, it does serve a positive function. It enlists baser 
human motives for higher causes” (349).
In all these cases, social influences are not an impediment to the epistemic 
ambition of science, but rather a facilitator of scientific progress. Science harnesses 
some of the baser motives of human behavior in the service of truth, making sure 
that the interplay of scientists’ individual interests and biases mostly align with 
epistemic progress. Social constructivists are right that, in the battle between 
competing paradigms (or research programs), the social configuration of the 
research community plays an important role. This is especially true in the early 
stages of scientific research, when evidence is still ambiguous and incomplete, 
conceptual problems abound, and social factors are given free rein. Even the final 
vindication of the correct scientific theory, however, is also accomplished through 
social means: forming alliances, maintaining a good reputation, showing courage 
to challenge received views, and exercising restraint in attacking rivals.
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Charles Darwin may have been right from the start about the fact of com-
mon ancestry, but his theory would not have carried the day as swiftly as it did 
without Darwin’s indefatigable efforts to enlist allies to the cause and to engage 
and negotiate with his critics. All the parties in the dispute were trying to enlist 
nature as their ally, but Darwin of course had one big advantage: nature really 
was on his side all along. In the long run, therefore, as evidence accumulates and 
factions wax and wane, the social influences on science will be filtered out, 
and rightly so.
Conclusion
The development of a thoroughly naturalistic account of science has been delayed 
by the widespread misconception that this would compromise its epistemic 
standing. Sociological accounts of science have been met with distrust by lovers 
of science, and have been relished by its cynical critics, giving them ammunition 
to undermine science’s lofty pretensions. Beneath the surface, these apparently 
rival views are committed to the same assumption: that social intrusions into 
science would undermine its epistemic ambitions. The only difference is that one 
party welcomed this prospect, while the other loathed it.
But the assumption is false. Science is social to the bone. No single human 
brain would be capable of accomplishing any of science’s successes in isolation 
from others. Science is nothing but the concerted effort of fallible human brains 
to understand nature. As science itself tells us, those biological organs evolved 
for other activities than unraveling the structure of the cosmos. Science contains 
many safeguards against the contamination of social factors (e.g., double blind 
procedures), but in many respects, the social structure of science, along with the 
social relations between its actors, are conducive to its successes. Even the baser 
motives of the human mind — pride, jealousy, revenge — can be enlisted for the 
benefit of science.
It is true that the eventual goal of science, as a collective human endeavor, is 
to efface human actors and their social lives from view. If we ever find out that 
the theoretical content of our best scientific theories reflects the ideology of its 
originators rather that an approximate understanding of the world as it is, or if 
it carried the day for purely sociological reasons, then something would be seri-
ously wrong. That would be a reason to start all over again. Science, then, is the 
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